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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the regulation of natural monopolies.  It covers alternative definitions of 
natural monopoly, regulatory goals, alternative regulatory institutions, price regulation 
with full information, regulation with imperfect and asymmetric information, and topics 
on the measurement of the effects of price and entry regulation in practice.  The chapter 
also discusses the literature on network access and pricing to support the introduction of 
competition into previously regulated monopoly industries. 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the Handbook of Law and Economics, A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, editors. Elsevier, B.V. 
A significant amount of the material in this chapter has been drawn from my lectures on the regulation of 
natural monopolies in the graduate course that I have taught at MIT for many years.  I have had the 
privilege of teaching this course multiple times with each of my colleagues Nancy Rose, Dick Schmalensee 
and Jean Tirole.  In many cases I can no longer distinguish what came initially from their lectures and what 
came from mine.  To the extent that I have failed to give adequate credit to their contributions, I must 
apologize and thank them for what they have taught me over the years. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Textbook discussions of price and entry regulation typically are motivated by the 
asserted existence of an industry with “natural monopoly” characteristics (e.g. Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 2001, page 50). These characteristics make it economical for a single firm 
to supply services in the relevant market rather than two or more competing.  Markets 
with natural monopoly characteristics are thought to lead to a variety of economic 
performance problems: excessive prices, production inefficiencies, costly duplication of 
facilities, poor service quality, and to have potentially undesirable distributional impacts.   
 Under U.S. antitrust law the possession of monopoly power itself is not illegal. 
Accordingly, where monopoly “naturally” emerges due to the attributes of the technology 
for producing certain services, innovation or unique skills antitrust policy cannot be 
relied upon to constrain monopoly pricing.  Nor are the antitrust laws well suited to 
responding to inefficiencies resulting from entry of multiple firms in the presence of 
economies of scale and scope.  Accordingly, antitrust policy alone cannot be relied upon 
to respond to the performance problems that may emerge in markets with natural 
monopoly characteristics.  Administrative regulation of prices, entry, and other aspects of 
                                                 
1 A significant amount of the material in this chapter has been drawn from my lectures on the regulation of 
natural monopolies in the graduate course that I have taught at MIT for many years.  I have had the 
privilege of teaching this course multiple times with each of my colleagues Nancy Rose, Dick Schmalensee 
and Jean Tirole.  In many cases I can no longer distinguish what came initially from their lectures and what 
came from mine.  To the extent that I have failed to give adequate credit to their contributions, I must 
apologize and thank them for what they have taught me over the years. 
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firm behavior have instead been utilized extensively in the U.S. and other countries as 
policy instruments to deal with real or imagined natural monopoly problems.  
 American economists began analyzing natural monopolies and the economic 
performance issues that they may raise over 100 years ago (Lowry, 1973; Sharkey, 1982; 
Phillips, 1993) and refinements in the basic concepts of the attributes that lead to natural 
monopoly have continued to evolve over time (Kahn 1970; Schmalensee 1979; Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig 1982; Phillips, 1993, Laffont and Tirole 1993, 2000; Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers, 1994).   On the policy side, price and entry regulation supported by 
natural monopoly arguments began to be introduced in the U.S. in the late 19th century. 
The scope of price and entry regulation and its institutional infrastructure grew 
considerably during the first 75 years of the 20th century, covering additional industries, 
involving new and larger regulatory agencies, and expanding from the state to the federal 
levels.  However, during the 1970s both the natural monopoly rationale for and the 
consequences of price and entry regulation came under attack from academic research 
and policy makers (Winston 1993).  Since then, the scope of price and entry regulation 
has been scaled back in many regulated industries.  Some industries have been 
completely deregulated.  Other regulated industries are being restructured to promote 
competition in potentially competitive segments and new performance-based regulatory 
regulatory mechanisms are being applied to core segments of these industries that 
continue to have natural monopoly characteristics (Winston (1993); Winston and 
Peltzman (2000).  Important segments of the electric power, natural gas distribution, 
water, and telecommunications industries continue to have natural monopoly 
characteristics and continue to be subject to price and entry regulation of some form.   
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 Economic analysis of natural monopoly has focused on several questions which, 
while related, are somewhat different.  One question is a normative question:  What is the 
most efficient number of sellers (firms) to supply a particular good or service given firm 
cost characteristics and market demand characteristics?  This question leads to 
technological or cost-based definitions of natural monopoly.  A second and related 
question is a positive question:  What are the firm production or cost characteristics and 
market demand characteristics that lead some industries “naturally” to evolve to a point 
where there is a single supplier (a monopoly) or a very small number of suppliers?  This 
question leads to behavioral and market equilibrium definitions of natural monopoly 
which are in turn related to the technological attributes that characterize the cost-based 
definitions of natural monopoly.  A third question is also a normative question:  If an 
industry has “a tendency to monopoly” what are the potential economic performance 
problems that may result and how do we measure their social costs? This question leads 
to an evaluation of the losses in economic efficiency and other social costs resulting from 
an “unregulated” industry with one or a small number of sellers.  This question in turn 
leads to a fourth set of questions: When is government regulation justified in the presence 
of natural monopoly and how can it best be designed to mitigate the performance 
problems of concern?  Answering this set of questions necessarily requires both 
theoretical and empirical examinations of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
regulatory mechanisms.   Regulation is itself imperfect and can lead to costly and 
unanticipated firm responses to the incentives created by regulatory rules and procedures.  
The costs of regulation may exceed the costs of unregulated naturally monopoly or 
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significantly reduce the net social benefits of regulation.  Are imperfect unregulated 
markets better or worse than imperfectly regulated markets? 
  Finally, firms with de facto legal monopolies that are subject to price and entry 
regulation inevitably are eventually challenged by policymakers, customers or potential 
competitors to allow competing suppliers to enter one or more segments of the lines of 
business in which they have de facto legal monopolies.  Entry may be induced by 
changes in technology on the costs and demand sides are as a response to price, output 
and cost distortions created by regulation itself.  These considerations lead to a final set 
of questions.  How do changes in economic conditions or the performance of the 
institution of regulated monopoly lead to public and private interests in replacing 
regulated monopoly with competition?  How can policymakers best go about evaluating 
the desirability of introducing competition into these industries and, if competition 
appears to be desirable, fashioning transition mechanisms to allow it to evolve 
efficiently? 
Scholarly law and economics research focused on answering these positive and 
normative questions has involved extensive theoretical, empirical, and institutional 
analysis.  Progress has been made as well through complementary research in law, 
political sciences, history, organizational behavior and corporate finance.  This chapter 
adopts a similarly comprehensive perspective of the research on the natural monopoly 
problem relevant to a law and economics handbook by including theoretical, empirical, 
policy and institutional research and identifying linkages with these other disciplines.  
Indeed, research on economic regulation has flourished because of cooperative research 
efforts involving scholars in several different fields.  Nevertheless, the Chapter’s primary 
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perspective is through the lense of economic analysis and emphasizes the economic 
efficiency rationales for and economic efficiency consequences of government regulation 
of prices and entry of firms producing services with natural monopoly characteristics.  In 
addition, several industries have been subject to price and entry regulation which clearly 
do not have natural monopoly characteristics (e.g. trucking, natural gas and petroleum 
production, airlines, agricultural commodities).  These multi-firm regulated industries 
have been studied extensively and in many cases have now been deregulated (Joskow and 
Noll, 1981; Joskow and Rose (1989).  This chapter will not cover regulation of multi-firm 
industries where natural monopoly is an implausible rationale for regulation.   
 The chapter proceeds in the following way.  The first substantive section 
discusses alternative definitions of natural monopoly and the attributes of technologies 
and market behavior that are thought to lead to natural monopolies from either a 
normative or a positive (behavioral) perspective.  The section that follows it examines the 
rationales for introducing price and entry regulation in sectors that are thought to have 
natural monopoly characteristics.  This section enumerates the economic performance 
problems that may result from natural monopoly, focusing on economic efficiency 
considerations while identifying equity, distributional and political economy factors that 
have also played an important role in the evolution of regulatory policy.  This discussion 
leads to a set of normative goals that are often defined for regulators that reflect these 
performance problems.  Section IV provides a brief discussion of the historical evolution 
of and legal foundations for price and entry regulation, emphasizing developments in the 
U.S.  Section V discusses alternative institutional frameworks for regulating legal 
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monopolies, including direct legislative regulation, franchise contracts, and regulation by 
independent regulatory commissions.   
The chapter then turns to a discussion of optimal regulatory mechanisms given 
different assumptions about the information available to the regulator and the regulated 
firm and various economic and legal constraints.  Section VI discusses optimal price 
regulation of a monopoly with subadditive costs in a world where the regulator is 
perfectly informed about the regulated firm’s costs and has the same information about 
the attributes of demand faced by the regulated firm as does the firm.  This section 
includes a discussion of Ramsey pricing, two-part tariffs, more general models of non-
linear pricing, and peak load pricing.   The section that follows it begins a discussion of 
regulatory mechanisms in a world where the regulator has limited or imperfect 
information about the attributes of the regulated firm’s cost opportunities, the attributes 
of consumer demand for its services and the managerial effort exerted by its managers.  It 
discusses how traditional cost-of-service regulation evolved in an effort to reduce the 
regulator’s information disadvantage and the early analytical models that sought to 
understand the efficiency implications of cost of service or rate of return regulation.  This 
discussion sets the stage for a review of the more recent theoretical literature on incentive 
or performance based regulation where the regulator has imperfect and asymmetric 
information about firm’s cost opportunities, demand, and managerial effort attributes and 
the basic practical lessons that can be learned from it.  Section IX turns to recent 
empirical research that seeks to measure the effects of price and entry regulation of legal 
monopolies on a variety of performance indicia.  The section focuses on post-1990 
research on the effects of incentive regulation in practice.  
 7
 Individual vertical segments or lines of business of many industries that had been 
regulated as vertically integrated natural monopolies for many years have been opened up 
to competition in recent years (e.g. intercity telecommunications, electricity generation, 
natural gas production) as remaining “network infrastructure” segments remain regulated 
and provide a platform for competition in the potentially competitive segments.   The 
introduction and success of competition in one or more of these vertical segments often 
involves providing access to network facilities that continue to be controlled by the 
incumbent and subject to price regulation.   Accordingly, introducing competition in 
these segments requires regulators to define the terms and conditions of access to these 
“essential” network facilities and ensure that they are implemented.  Section X discusses 
theoretical research on competitive entry and network access pricing.   A brief set of 
conclusions completes the Chapter. 
 
II.  DEFINITIONS OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 
a. Technological definitions of natural monopoly 
I have not been able to determine definitively when the term “natural monopoly” 
was first used.  Sharkey (1982, pp. 12-20) provides an excellent overview of the 
intellectual history of economic analysis of natural monopolies and I draw on it and the 
references he sites here and elsewhere in this chapter.  He concludes (Sharkey, 1982, p. 
14) that John Stuart Mill was the first to speak of natural monopolies in 1848.  In his 
Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall (1890) discusses the role of “increasing 
returns” in fostering monopoly and oligopoly, though he appears to be skeptical that pure 
monopolies can endure for very long or profitably charge prices that are significantly 
above competitive levels without attracting competitive entry (Marshall 1890, pp. 238-
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239, 329, 380).  Richard Posner (1969, p. 548) writes that natural monopoly “does not 
refer to the actual number of sellers in a market but to the relationship between demand 
and the technology of supply.”  Carlton and Perloff (2004, p. 104) write that “When total 
production costs would rise if two or more firms produced instead of one, the single firm 
in a market is called a “natural monopoly.”  
These are simple expositions of the technological definition of natural monopoly:  
a firm producing a single homogeneous product is a natural monopoly when it is less 
costly to produce any level of output of this product within a single firm than with two or 
more firms.  In addition, this “cost dominance” relationship must hold over the full range 
of market demand for this product Q = D(p).   
Consider a market for a homogeneous product where each of k firms produces 
output qi and total output is given by Q = Σkqi.  Each firm has an identical cost function 
C(qi).  According to the technological or cost-based definition of natural monopoly, a 
natural monopoly will exist when: 
 
C(Q) < C(q1) + C(q2) +  . . . + C(qk) 
 
since it is less costly to supply output Q with a single firm rather than splitting  
production up between two or more competing firms.  Firm cost functions that have this 
attribute are said to be subadditive at output level Q (Sharkey, 1982, p.2).  When firm 
cost functions have this attribute for all values of Q (or all values consistent with 
supplying all of the demand for the product Q = D(p)) then the cost function is said to be 
globally subadditive.  As a result, according to the technological definition of natural 
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monopoly, a necessary condition for a natural monopoly to exist for output Q of some 
good is that the cost of producing that good is subadditive at Q. 
 Assume that firm i’s cost function is defined as:2 
Ci = F + cqi 
then the firm’s average cost of production 
  ACi = F/qi + c 
declines continuously as its output expands.  When a firm’s average cost of production  
declines as its output expands its production technology is characterized by economies of 
scale.  A cost function for a single-product firm characterized by declining average total 
cost over the relevant range of industry output from 0 to qi = Q is subadditive over this 
output range.  Accordingly, in the single product context economies of scale over the 
relevant range of q is a sufficient condition to meet the technological definition of natural 
monopoly.  Figure 1 depicts a firm with economies of scale that extend well beyond the 
total market demand (Q) depicted by the inverse demand function P = D(Q).  We note as 
well that when there are economies of scale up to q it will also be the case that average 
cost will be greater than marginal cost over this range of output (F/qi + c > c in the simple 
example above).3 
 In the single product case, economies of scale up to qi = Q is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for subadditivity over this range or, by the technological definition, 
for natural monopoly.  It may still be less costly for output to be produced in a single firm 
                                                 
2 It should be understood that cost functions utilized here are technically C = C(q, w) where w is a vector of 
input prices that we are holding constant at this point.  They also reflect cost-minimization by the firm in 
the sense that the marginal rate of transformation of one input into another is equal to the associated input 
price ratio. 
3 Some definitions of natural monopoly assert that the relevant characteristic is declining marginal cost.  
This is wrong. 
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rather than multiple firms even if the output of a single firm has expanded beyond the 
point where there are economies of scale.  Consider the total cost function for a firm C = 
1 + q2 and the associated average cost function AC = q + 1/q depicted as AC1 in Figure 
2.  There is a range of output where there are economies of scale (q < 1).  The cost 
function then flattens out (q = 1) and then enters a range of decreasing returns to scale ( q 
> 1).  However, this cost function is still subadditive for some values of q > 1, despite the 
fact that for q > 1 there is decreasing returns to scale.  This is the case because the market 
demand P = D(Q) is not large enough to support efficient production by two firms. 
Assume that firm 1 produces q1 = 1 to produce at minimum efficient scale.  
Consider a second firm 2 with the same costs that could also produce at minimum 
efficient scale q2 = 1.  If both firms produced at minimum efficient scale total output 
would be 2 and total cost would be 4.   If a single firm produced output q = 2, total cost 
would be 5, so it is more efficient to produce total industry output Q = 2 with two firms 
rather than one.  However, it is apparent that for total output levels between Q = 1 and Q 
= √2  it is less costly to allow the first firm to operate in a range of decreasing returns to 
scale than it is to supply with two firms, both producing at greater than minimum 
efficient scale.    Similarly for q > √2, it is less costly to supply with two firms rather than 
one and the cost function is not subadditive in this range.    
Accordingly, the set of firm cost functions that are subadditive encompasses a 
wider range of cost functions than those that exhibit economies of scale over the entire 
(relevant) range of industry output.   Specifically, in the single product case, the firm’s 
cost functions must exhibit economies of scale over some range of output but it will still 
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be subadditive in many cases beyond the point where economies of scale are exhausted 
and until industry output is large enough to make it economical to add a second firm. 
 There are some implicit assumptions regarding the firm’s cost function C(q) that 
should be noted here.  First, it is a long run “economic cost function” in the sense that it 
reflects the assumption that the firm produces any particular output efficiently (MRTKL = 
r/w), given the underlying production function and input prices, and that inputs are fully 
adjusted to prevailing input prices and  the quantity produced.   That is, there is no “X-
inefficiency” reflected in the firm’s costs.   Capital related costs in turn reflect the firm’s 
opportunity cost of capital (r), economic depreciation (d), and the value of the capital 
invested in productive assets (K) measured at the current competitive market value of the 
associated assets.  That is, the firm’s total costs of production include the current period 
rental cost of capital R = (r + d)K.  Accordingly, capital costs are not treated explicitly as 
being sunk costs for the technological definition of natural monopoly.  These implicit 
assumptions have important implications for issues for both the behavioral definition of 
natural monopoly and the social costs of unregulated natural monopoly.  I will turn to 
these issues presently. 
 The technological definition of natural monopoly can be generalized to take 
account of multiproduct firms.  For this purpose, multiproduct firms are firms that have 
technologies that make it more economical to produce two or more products within the 
same firm than in two or more firms.  Production technologies with this attribute are 
characterized by economies of scope. Consider two products q1 and q2 that can be 
produced by a firm with a cost function C(q1, q2).  Define qi  as a vector of the two 
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products  qi = (q1i, q2i).  There are N vectors of the two products with the attribute that 
Σq1i = q1 and Σq2i = q2 .  Then the cost function C(q1, q2) is subadditive if: 
 
C(Σq1i , Σq2i ) = C(Σ qi) < Σ C(qi) 
 
For all N vectors of the products. This definition can be generalized to any number of 
products.  
What attributes of a production technology/cost function will lead to multiproduct 
subadditivity?  The technology must be characterized by some form of economies or 
scope  and some form of  multiproduct economies of scale. 
 
By economies of scope we mean that it is  more economical to produce the two products 
in one firm rather than multiple firms:   
    C(q1, q2) < C(q1, 0) + C(0, q2) 
 
There are several concepts of multiproduct economies of scale depending upon how one 
slices the multiproduct cost function: 
a.  Declining average incremental cost for a specific product 
b. Declining ray average cost for varying quantities of a set of multiple 
products that are bundled in fixed proportion 
 
a1.  Declining Average Incremental Cost 
Define the incremental cost of producing product q1 holding q2 constant as 
   IC(q1|q2) = c(q1,q2) – c(0,q2)   
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and define the average incremental cost of producing q1 as  
   AIC(q1|q2) = [c(q1,q2) – c(0,q2)]/q1 
If the AIC declines as the output of q1 increases (holding q2 constant) then we have 
declining average incremental cost of q1.  This is a measure of single product economies 
of scale in a multiproduct context. We can perform the same exercise for changes in q2 
holding q1 constant to determine whether there are declining average incremental costs 
for q2 and, in this way, determine whether the cost function is characterized by declining 
average incremental cost for each product. 
a2.  Declining Ray Average Costs 
We can think of fixing the proportion of the multiple products that are produced 
at some level (e.g  q1/q2 = k) in the two-product case) and then ask what happens to costs 
as we increase the quantity of both outputs produced holding their relative output 
proportions constant.  Does the average cost of the bundle decline as the size of the 
bundle (holding the output proportions constant) increases.   
Let λ be a number greater than one.   If the total costs of producing this “bundle” 
of output increase less than proportionately with λ then there are multiproduct economies 
of scale along a ray defined by the product proportions k.  This is called declining ray 
average costs for q1/q2 = k.   
c(q1,q2׀q1/q2 = k) > λ c(q1,q2׀q1/q2 = k)/ λ 
 
By choosing different proportions of the products produced (alternative values for 
k) by the firm we can trace out the cost functions along different rays in q1, q2 space and 
determine whether there are economies of scale or declining ray average costs along each 
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ray.  Then there are multiproduct economies of scale in the sense of declining ray average 
cost for any combination of q1 and q2 when: 
  C(λq1, λq2) < λC(q1, q2)   
For example, consider the cost function (Sharkey, p. 5) 
  C = q1 + q2 + (q1q2)1/3 
This cost function exhibits multiproduct economies of scale since 
  λC(q1,q2) = λq1 + λq2 + λ(q1q2)1/3 
  C(λq1, λq2) =  λq1 + λq2 + λ2/3(q1q2)1/3 
and thus  
C(λq1, λq2)  < λC(q1,q2) 
However, this cost function exhibits diseconomies of scope rather than economies of 
scope since: 
  C(q1, 0) =  q1 
  C(0, q2) = q2 
  C(q1, 0) + C(0, q2) = q1 + q2 <  q1 + q2 +(q1q2)1/3 = c(q1,q2) 
As a result, this multiproduct cost function is not subadditive despite the fact that it 
exhibits declining ray average cost.  It would be less costly to produce the two products 
in separate firms.  
Subadditivity of the cost function, or natural monopoly, in the multiproduct 
context requires both a form of multiproduct cost complementarity (e.g. economies of 
scope4) and a form of multiproduct economies of scale over at least some range of the 
output of the products.  For example, the multiproduct cost function (discussed by 
Sharkey, 1982, p. 7) 
                                                 
4 Or one of a number of other measures of cost complementarity 
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C(q1,q2) = (q1)1/4 + (q2)1/4 – (q1q2)1/4 
 
exhibits economies of scope.  It also exhibits economies of scale in terms of both 
declining average incremental cost and declining ray average cost at every level of output 
of the two products.  It is obvious that costs are lower when the products are produced 
together rather than separately by virtue of the term (– (q1q2)1/4) in the cost function.  
There are also declining ray average cost and declining average incremental cost for each 
product.  This is the case because the cost of producing a particular combination of the 
two outputs increases less than proportionately with increases in the scale of the bundle 
of two products produced by virtue of the power ¼ in the cost function.  Similarly for the 
average incremental cost of q1 and q2 individually. It can be shown that this cost function 
is subadditive at every output level or globally subadditive. 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for global subadditivity of a multiproduct 
cost function are complex and it is not particularly useful to go into those details here.  
Interested readers should refer to Sharkey (1982) and to Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982).   As already discussed, economies of scope is a necessary condition for a 
multiproduct cost function to be subadditive.  One set of sufficient conditions for 
subadditivity of a multiproduct cost function is that it exhibit both economies of scope 
and declining average incremental cost for all products. An alternative set of sufficient 
conditions is that the cost function exhibit both declining average incremental cost for all 
products plus an alternative measure of multiproduct cost complementarity called trans-
ray convexity.  Trans-ray convexity requires that multiproduct economies outweigh any 
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single product diseconomies of scale.  For example, it may be that there are single 
product economies of scale for product 1, diseconomies of scale for product 2, but large 
multiproduct economies.  Then it could be less costly to produce q1 and q2 together 
despite the diseconomies of scale in producing q2 to take advantage of the multiproduct 
economies available from joint production.   A third alternative sufficient condition is 
that the cost function exhibit cost complementarity, defined as the property that  increased 
production of any output reduces (does not increase) marginal costs of all other outputs. 
As in the case of single product cost functions, the necessary conditions regarding scale 
economies are less strict and allow for output to expand into a range of diseconomies of 
scale or diseconomies of scope since it may be less costly to produce at a point where 
there are diseconomies than it is to incur the costs of suboptimal production from a 
second firm. 
b. Behavioral and market equilibrium considerations 
The previous section discussed the attributes of a firm’s cost function that would 
make it most efficient from a cost of production perspective (assuming costs are 
minimized given technology and input prices as discussed earlier) to concentrate 
production in a single firm rather than in multiple firms.   However, the intellectual 
evolution of the natural monopoly concept and public policy responses to it focused 
much more on the consequences of production technologies having such “natural 
monopoly” attributes for market outcomes.  Moreover, historical discussions of the 
natural monopoly problem focus on more than economies of scale and related 
multiproduct cost complementarity concepts as potential sources of market distortions.  
Sharkey (1982, pp. 12-20) discusses this aspect of the intellectual history of economic 
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analysis of natural monopoly as well. For example, in addition to economies of scale he 
notes that Thomas Farrer (1902, referenced by Sharkey, 1982, p. 15) associated natural 
monopoly with supply and demand characteristics that included (a) the product or service 
supplied must be essential, (b) the products must be non-storable, (c) the supplier must 
have a favorable production location.  In addition, Richard Ely (1937, referenced by 
Sharkey, 1982, page 15) added the criteria that (a) the proportion of fixed to variable 
costs must be high and (b) the products produced from competing firms must be close 
substitutes. Bonbright (1961, pp. 11-17) suggested that economies of scale was a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for natural monopoly and Posner (1969, p.548) 
observed that “network effects” could lead to subadditive costs even if the cost per 
customer increased as the number of customers connected to the network increased; as 
more subscribers are connected to a telephone network, the average cost per subscriber 
may rise, but it may still be less costly for a single firm to supply the network service.   
Kaysen and Turner (1959, p. 191, 195-96) note that economies of scale is a relative 
concept that depends on the proper definition of the relevant product and geographic 
markets and also argue that “ruinous competition” leading to monopoly may occur when 
the ratio of fixed to variable costs is high and identify what we would now call “sunk 
costs” as playing an important role leading to monopoly outcomes.   Kahn (1970, pp. 
119, 173) refers to both economies of scale and the presence of sunk or fixed costs that 
are a large fraction of total costs as attributes leading to destructive competition that will 
in turn lead a single firm or a very small number of firms in the market in the long run.  
He also recognizes the potential social costs of “duplicated facilities” when there are 
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economies of scale or related cost-side economic attributes that lead single firm 
production to be less costly than multiple firm production. 
These expanded definitions of the attributes of natural monopoly appear to me to 
confuse a set of different but related questions.  In particular, they go beyond the 
normative concept of natural monopoly as reflecting technological and associated cost 
attributes that imply that a single firm can produce at lower cost than multiple firms, to 
examine the factors that “naturally” lead a market to evolve to a point where there is a 
single supplier (or not).  That is, they include in their definition of natural monopoly the 
answer to the positive or behavioral question of what cost and demand attributes lead 
industries to evolve so that only a single firm survives in the long run? To some extent, 
some of these definitions also begin to raise normative questions about the consequences 
of the competitive process for costs, prices, and other aspects of social welfare in 
industries with natural monopoly characteristics.  For example, Kaysen and Turner (1959, 
p. 191) associated natural monopoly that “leaves the field to one firm … competition here 
is self-destructive.” They go on to assert that “The major prerequisites for competition to 
be destructive are fixed or sunk costs that bulk large as a percentage of total costs.” 
(Kaysen and Turner 1959, p. 173).  Kahn (1970) observes that sunk costs must be 
combined with significant economies of scale for monopoly to “naturally” emerge in the 
market.  So, the historical evolution of the natural monopoly doctrine reflects both a 
normative interest in identifying situations in which a single firm is necessary to achieve 
all economies of scale and multiproduct cost complementarities as well as a positive 
interest in identifying the attributes of costs and demand that lead to market conditions 
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that are “unsuitable for competition” to prevail and the associated normative performance 
implications for prices, costs and other attributes of social welfare. 
 Absent regulatory constraints on pricing and entry, the presence of subadditive 
costs per se do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a single firm --- a monopoly ---
will “naturally” emerge in equilibrium.  And if a monopoly “naturally” does emerge in 
equilibrium, a variety of alternative pricing patterns may result depending on cost, 
demand, and behavioral attributes that affect opportunities for price discrimination, 
competitive entry and the effects of potential entry on incumbent behavior.  After all, 
many models of imperfect competition with two or more firms are consistent with the 
assumption that the competing firms have cost functions that are characterized by 
economies of scale over at least some range of output.   Nor, as we shall see presently, if 
a single firm emerges in equilibrium is it necessarily the case that it will charge prices 
that yield revenues that exceed a breakeven level.  On the other, hand, if a single firm (or 
a small number of firms) emerges in equilibrium it may have market power and charge 
prices that yield revenues that exceed the breakeven level for at least some period of time, 
leading to lower output and higher unit costs than is either first-best or second-best 
efficient (i.e. given a break-even constraint).   
 In order to draw positive conclusions about the consequences of subadditive costs 
for the attributes of short run and long run firm and market behavior and performance we 
must make additional assumptions about other attributes of a firm’s costs and the nature 
of competitive interactions between firms in the market and interactions between firms in 
the market with potential entrants into the market when the firm’s long run production 
costs are subadditive.  Moreover, if more than one firm survives in equilibrium – e.g. a 
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duopoly --- the equilibrium prices, quantities and costs may be less desirable from an 
economic performance perspective than what is theoretically feasible given the presence 
of subadditive costs and other constraints (e.g. breakeven constraints).  This latter kind of 
result is the foundation for arguments for introducing price and entry regulation in 
industries with natural monopoly characteristics despite the fact that multiple firms may 
survive in equilibrium and compete imperfectly. 
c. Sunk costs  
The most important cost attribute that is not reflected explicitly in the traditional 
technological definitions of natural monopoly that turn on the presence of subadditive 
firm production costs is sunk costs.  Sunk cost considerations also provide the linkage 
between subadditivity, behavioral definitions of natural monopoly, and the economic 
performance problems that are thought to arise from unregulated natural monopolies.  
Sunk costs are associated with investments made in long-lived physical or human assets 
whose value in alternative uses (different products) or at different locations (when 
transportation costs are high) is lower than in its intended use.  At the extreme, an 
investment might be worthless in an alternative use.  Sunk costs are a “short run” cost 
concept in the sense that the associated assets eventually are valueless in their intended 
use and are retired.  However, because the assets are long-lived, the short run may be 
quite long from an economic perspective.  Sunk costs are not directly captured in long 
run neoclassical cost functions since these cost functions reflect the assumption that 
capital assets can be rented on a period by period basis and input proportions are fully 
adjusted to prevailing input prices and output levels.  Accordingly, sunk costs have not 
been considered directly in technological definitions of natural monopoly that turn only 
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on cost subadditivity.  Yet, sunk costs are quite important both theoretically and 
empirically for obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the natural monopoly 
problem as it has emerged in practice.  Sunk cost considerations are important both to 
explain why some industries “naturally” evolve to a point where one or a very small 
number of firms survive and to measure the social welfare consequences of the market 
structures and associated, price, cost and quality attributes of these markets in the absence 
of price and entry regulation (Sutton 1991).     
Most of the industries that have been regulated based on natural monopoly 
arguments --- railroads, electric power, telephone, gas pipelines, water networks, cable 
television networks, etc. --- have the attribute that a large fraction of their total costs are 
sunk capital costs.  Moreover, it has been argued that a meaningful economic definition 
of economies of scale requires that there be at least some  sunk costs and, for these 
purposes, thinking about there being fixed costs without there also being sunk costs is not 
particularly useful (Weitzman 1983).  Weitzman argues that sunk costs introduce a time 
dimension into the cost commitment and recovery process that is essential to obtaining a 
useful concept of economies of scale.  I will return to this issue presently. 
  c1.  Contestible markets: subadditivity without sunk costs 
In order to get a better feeling for the importance of sunk cost and the behavioral 
attributes of firms in the market and potential entrants into the market, it is useful to focus 
first on the model of contestable markets developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982) which assumes that costs are subadditive but generally ignores sunk costs.  The 
examples that follow will focus on a single product case, but the extension to multiple 
products is straightforward, at least conceptually.  Consider the single product situation in 
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which there are n identical firms (where n is large) with cost functions C(qi) = F + cqi . 
This cost function is assumed to exhibit economies of scale over the entire range of q and 
thus is subadditive.  One of the n firms (the incumbent) is in the market and the 
remaining (n-1) firms are potential entrants.  The declining average cost curve for the 
firm in the market is depicted in Figure 3 along with the inverse market demand for the 
product p = D(q) (where the market demand is Q = ∑qi = D(p) ).   F is assumed initially 
to be a fixed cost but not a sunk cost.  It is not a sunk cost in the sense that firms can enter 
or exit the market freely without facing the risk of losing any of these fixed costs up to 
the point that the firm actually produces output qi and incurs operating costs cqi.  If prices 
are not high enough to cover both a firm’s operating cost cqi and its associated fixed cost 
F, the firm will either not enter the market or will exit the market before committing to 
produce and avoiding incurring the associated costs.  Thus, assuming that fixed costs are 
not sunk costs is equivalent to assuming that there is hyper-free entry and exit into and 
out of this market --- there are no fixed commitment costs and the fixed costs of 
production can be avoided by a firm that has “entered” the market by simply not 
producing any output and effectively exiting the market without incurring any entry or 
exit costs.5 
We are looking for an equilibrium where it is (a) profitable for one or more firms 
to enter (or remain in) the market and produce output (pqi > C(qi)), (b) feasible in the 
sense that supply and demand are in balance (∑qi = Q = D(p)), and (c) sustainable in the 
sense that no entrant can make a profit given the price charged by the incumbent(s) --- 
there does not exist a price pa < p and an output Qa < D(pa) such that paqa > C(qa).   
                                                 
5 Weitzman (1983) argues that there are no economies of scale in any meaningful sense in this case.  Also 
see Tirole (1988), p.307.  This issue is discussed presently. 
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Figure 3 depicts an equilibrium that satisfies these conditions.  At price pc and 
output Qc (Qc = qc) the incumbent firm exactly covers its costs and earns zero economic 
profit since pc = F/qc + c = ACc.  It is not profitable for a second firm to enter with a price 
lower than pc since it could not break even at any output level at a price less that pc.  The 
incumbent cannot charge a price higher than pc (that is, pc is not sustainable) because if 
the incumbent committed to a higher price one of the potential entrants could profitably 
offer a lower price, enter the market and take all of the incumbent’s sales away.  
Moreover, with the incumbent committing to p > pc, competition among potential 
entrants would drive the price down to pc and it would be profitable for only one of them 
to supply in equilibrium due to economies of scale.  So, under these conditions the 
industry equilibrium is characterized by a single firm (a “natural monopoly”). However, 
the price pc is the lowest uniform per unit (linear) price consistent with a firm breakeven 
(zero profit) constraint; the equilibrium price is not the classical textbook monopoly price 
but the lowest uniform per unit price that allows the firm to just cover its total costs of 
production.  This price and output configuration is both feasible and sustainable.   Thus, 
the threat of entry effectively forces the single incumbent supplier to charge the lowest 
uniform (linear) per unit price consistent with a breakeven constraint.  As we shall see 
below, this equilibrium price equal to average total cost is the second-best efficient 
uniform (Ramsey-Boiteux) price when the firm is subject to a break-even constraint.  
Obviously, as I shall discuss in more detail below, it is not first best since the equilibrium 
price is greater than marginal cost (c). 
These are remarkable results.  They suggest that even with significant increasing 
returns we “naturally” get to a competitive equilibrium characterized by both a single 
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firm exploiting the cost savings associated with global subadditivity and the lowest price 
that just allows a single firm exploiting all economies of scale to break even.  This is as 
close to efficient uniform per unit (linear) pricing as we can expect in a market with 
private firms that are subject to a break-even constraint and have cost functions 
characterized by economies of scale.  The classical textbook problem of monopoly 
pricing by an incumbent monopoly does not emerge here in equilibrium.  In this case 
potential competition is extremely effective at constraining the ability of the incumbent to 
exercise market power when it sets prices, with no regulatory intervention at all.  If this 
situation accurately reflected the attributes of the industries that are generally thought of 
as having “natural monopoly” characteristics then they would not appear to be 
particularly interesting targets for regulatory intervention (see the next section) since a 
fully informed regulator relying on uniform per unit prices could do no better than this. 
Note, that even in this peculiar setting, an equilibrium with these attributes may 
not be sustainable.  Consider the average cost function depicted in Figure 4 that has 
increasing returns up to point qo and then enters a range of decreasing returns (perhaps 
due to managerial inefficiencies as the firm gets very large).  The market demand curve 
crosses the average cost curve at the output level qa and the average cost at this output 
level is equal to ACa.  In this case, the price that allows the single  firm supplying the 
entire market to break even and that balances supply and demand is pa = ACa.  However, 
this price is not sustainable against free entry.  An entrant could, for example, profitably 
enter the market by offering to supply qo at a price po equal to ACo + ε.  In this case, the 
entrant would have to ration demand to limit its output to qo.  The incumbent could 
continue to supply to meet the demand that has not been served by the new entrant, but 
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would incur very high average costs to do so and would have to charge higher prices to 
break even.  If we assume that the entrant supplied the consumers with the highest 
willingness to pay, there would not be any consumers willing to pay a price high enough 
for the incumbent to cover its average costs.  Thus, the zero profit “natural monopoly” 
equilibrium is unstable. 
In a multiproduct context, perfectly contestable markets (no sunk costs, free 
entry) have a symmetrical set of attributes.  Following, Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982), if a sustainable allocation exists, it has the following attributes: (a) there is a 
single firm to take advantage of cost subadditivity, (b) the firm earns zero profits, (c), the 
revenues that a firm earns from any subset of products is greater than or equal to the 
incremental cost of producing that subset of products --- there is no “cross-subsidization” 
in the sense that the prices charged for any product or set of products covers the 
incremental costs incurred to produce them, (d) the price of each product exceeds its 
(single product) marginal cost given the output of the other products, (e) under certain 
conditions the firm will voluntarily charge the second-best linear (Ramsey) prices (in the 
single product case P = AC is the Ramsey price (Baumol, Bailey and Willig, 1977).  As 
in the case of a single product firm, the existence of a subadditive multiproduct cost 
function does not guarantee that a sustainable single-firm zero profit (break-even) 
configuration exists. 
It seems to me that the primary point that emerges from the lengthy literature on 
contestable markets is that one cannot conclude that there are necessarily “monopoly 
problems” from the observation that there is one or a very small number of firms is 
producing in a market.  Prices may still be competitive in the second best sense (P = AC) 
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in the presence of increasing returns because entry is so easy that it constrains the 
incumbent’s prices.  A monopoly naturally emerges, but it may have no or small social 
costs compared to feasible alternative allocations.   
 
  c2. Sunk costs and barriers to entry  
As I have already noted, the assumption that there are fixed costs but no sunk 
costs does not make a lot of economic sense (Weitzman (1983), Tirole (1988, p. 307).  
Sunk costs introduce a time dimension into the analysis since sunk costs convey a stream 
of potential benefits over some period of time and once the associated cost commitments 
are made they cannot be shifted to alternative uses without reducing their value from that 
in the intended use.  Sunk costs are what make the distinction between incumbents and 
potential entrants meaningful.  Absent sunk costs there is no real difference between 
firms in the market and firms that are potentially in the market since entry and exit are 
costless.  Sunk costs also create potential opportunities for strategic behavior by the 
incumbent designed both to sustain prices about the break-even level while 
simultaneously discouraging entry.   If the fixed costs are fully avoidable up to the point 
that production actually takes place, a firm incurs no opportunity cost merely by entering 
the market.   Whether a firm is “in” the market or “out” of the market is in some sense 
irrelevant in this case since there is no time dimension to the fixed costs. Firms are only 
“in” when they start to produce and can avoid incurring any fixed costs if they don’t.    
From an entry and exit perspective, all costs are effectively variable over even the 
shortest time period relevant for determining prices and output. 
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An alternative approach that retains the notion that fixed costs are also at least 
partially sunk involves specifying a price competition game in which fixed cost 
(capacity) commitments can be adjusted more quickly than can the prices set by the firm 
and the associated quantities it commits to see. (Tirole, 1988, pp. 310-311].  The fixed 
costs are sunk, but they are sunk for a shorter period of time than it takes to adjust prices.  
In this case, the contestable market result emerges as a generalization of Bertrand 
competition to the case where there are economies of scale (Tirole, 1988, p. 310).  
However, for most industries, especially those that have typically been associated with 
the concept of natural monopoly, prices adjust much more quickly than can capacity. 
Accordingly, this approach to a contestable market equilibrium does not appear to be of 
much practical interest either.   
 A case for price and entry regulation therefore requires both significant 
increasing returns and long-lived sunk costs that represent a significant fraction of total 
costs are together important attributes to be associated with interesting cases of natural 
monopoly.  Indeed, this conclusion reflects a century of economic thinking about 
monopoly and oligopoly issues, with the development of contestible market theories 
being an intellectual diversion that clarifies the important role of sunk costs in theories of 
monopoly and oligopoly behavior.   
Models of “wars of attrition” represent an interesting approach to natural 
monopoly that allows for increasing returns, sunk costs, exit, textbook monopoly pricing, 
and no incentives for re-entry in the face of textbook monopoly pricing at the end of the 
war (e.g. Tirole 1988, p. 311).   In these models (to simplify considerably) there are two 
identical firms in the market at time 0.  They compete Bertrand (for a random length of 
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time) until one of them drops out of the market because the expected profits from 
continuing to stay in the market is zero.  The remaining firm charges the monopoly price 
until there is entry by a second firm.  However, re-entry by a competing firm is not 
profitable because the potential entrant sees that post-entry it will have to live through a 
war of attrition (p = c) and, even if it turned out to be the survivor, the expected profits 
from entry are zero.  In this kind of model there is a period of intense competition when 
prices are driven to marginal costs.6  There is also inefficient duplication of facilities 
during this time period.  Then there is a monopoly that “naturally” emerges at some point 
which charges textbook pure monopoly price since it is not profitable for an entrant to 
undercut this price when faced with the threat of a price war. (There remains the question 
of why both firms entered in the first place.) This kind of war of attrition has been 
observed repeatedly in the early history of a number of industries that are often 
considered to have natural monopoly attributes: competing electric power distribution 
companies, railroad and urban transit lines in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and 
competing cable TV companies more recently.   
War of attrition models also have interesting implications for the kind of “rent 
seeking” behavior identified by Posner (1975).  Monopolies are valuable to their owners 
because they produce monopoly profits.  These potential profits create incentives for 
firms to expend resources to attain or maintain a monopoly position.  These resource 
expenditures could include things like investments in excess capacity to deter entry, 
duplication of facilities in the face of increasing returns as multiple firms enter the market 
to compete to be the monopoly survivor, and expenditures to curry political favor to 
                                                 
6 Since this is a repeated game it is possible that there are dynamic equilibria where the firms tacitly collude 
and keep prices high or non-cooperative price games with fixed capacity which lead to Cournot outcomes 
with higher prices.   
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obtain a legal monopoly through patent or franchise.  In the extreme, all of the monopoly 
rents could be dissipated as a result of these types of expenditures being made as firms 
compete to secure a monopoly position.  The worst of all worlds from a welfare 
perspective is that all of the monopoly profits are competed away through wasteful 
expenditures and consumers end up paying the monopoly price.7   
The combination of increasing returns (and the multiproduct equivalents) 
combined with a significant component of long-lived sunk costs brings us naturally to 
more conventional monopoly and oligopoly models involving barriers to entry, entry 
deterrence and predation (Tirole 1988, Chapters 8 and 9).  The natural monopoly problem 
and general models of barriers to entry, entry deterrence and oligopoly behavior are 
linked together, with natural monopoly being an extreme case. Sunk “capacity” costs 
create an asymmetry between firms that are “in” the market and potential entrants.  This 
asymmetry can act as a barrier to entry by giving the first mover advantage to the firm 
that is the first to enter the market (the incumbent).  Once costs have been sunk by an 
entrant they no longer are included in the opportunity costs that are relevant to the 
incumbent firm’s pricing decisions. Sunk costs have commitment value because they 
cannot be reversed. This creates opportunities for an incumbent or first mover to behave 
strategically to deter entry or reduce the scale of entry.   
In the simplest models of sequential entry with sunk costs and increasing returns 
(Tirole, 1988, pp.314-323) firms compete in the long run by making capacity 
                                                 
7 The war of attrition model that I outlined above is not this bad.  There is wasteful “duplication” of 
facilities prior to the exit of one of the firms but prices are low so consumers benefit during the price war 
period.  After exit consumers must pay the monopoly price, but the costs of duplication are gone.  This 
outcome is worse than the second-best associated with the perfectly contestable market outcome with 
increasing returns by (effectively) no sunk costs.(Tirole 1988, pp. 311-314) 
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commitments, including how much capacity to accumulate upon entering a market and, 
for a potential entrant considering to enter to compete with an incumbent, whether or not 
it will commit capital to support even a modest quantity of capacity needed to enter the 
market at all.  In making this decision the potential entrant must take account of the 
nature of the competition that will determine prices and entry post entry, at post-entry 
capacity and output levels.  If the incumbent can profitably and credibly make 
commitments that indicate to the potential entrant that it will be unprofitable to enter due 
to the nature of the post-entry competition it will face, then competitive entry may be 
deterred.  In these sequential entry games, the presence of sunk costs alone does not 
generally deter entry, but rather the strategic behavior of the first mover can reduce the 
amount of capacity the entrant commits to the markets and as a result, sustain post-entry 
prices above competitive levels and post-entry output below competitive levels.  The 
combination of sunk costs and increasing returns can make small scale entry unprofitable 
so that the incumbent may deter entry completely. 
Joe Bain (1956) characterized alternative equilibria that may arise in the context 
of significant economies of scale (to which today we would add multiproduct cost 
complementarities and sunk costs as well) that were subsequently verified in the context 
of more precise game-theoretic models (Tirole 1988, Chapter 8).  These cases are: 
Blockaded entry:  Situations where there is a single firm in the market that can set 
the pure monopoly price without attracting entry.  The incumbent competes as if there is 
no threat of entry.  A situation like this may emerge where economies of scale are very 
important compared to the size of the market and where sunk costs are a large fraction of 
total costs.  In this case, potential entrants would have to believe that if they entered, the 
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post-entry competitive equilibrium would yield prices and a division of output that would 
not generate enough revenues to cover the entrant’s total costs.  This is the classic “pure 
monopoly” case depicted in microeconomics textbooks. 
Entry deterrence: There is still no entry to compete with the incumbent, but the 
incumbent had to take costly actions to convince potential entrants that entry would be 
unprofitable.  This might involve wasteful investments in excess capacity to signal a 
commitment to lower post-entry prices or long-term contracts with buyers to limit 
(“foreclose”) the market available for a new entrant profitable to serve(Aghion and 
Bolton). 
Accommodated entry:  It is more profitable for the incumbent to engage in 
strategic behavior that accommodates profitable entry but limits the profitability of entry 
at other than small scale.  Here the incumbent sacrifices some short-term pre-entry profits 
to reduce the scale of entry to keep prices higher than they would be if entry occurred at 
large scale.   
d.  Empirical evidence on cost subadditivity 
Despite the extensive theoretical literature on natural monopoly, there is 
surprisingly little empirical work that measures the extent to which the costs of producing 
services that are typically thought of as natural monopolies are in fact subadditive.  The 
most extensive research on the shape of firm level cost functions has been done for 
electricity (e.g. Christensen and Green 1976; Cowing 1974; Joskow and Rose 1985, 
1990; Jamasb and Pollitt 2003).  There has also been empirical work on cost attributes of 
water companies (Tepples and Glyer, 1987), telecommications (Evans 1983), cable 
television companies (Crawford 2000), urban transit enterprises (Gagnepain, P. and M. 
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Ivaldi, 2002), multi-product utilities (Fraquelli, G., M. Picenza, and D. Vannoni, 2004), 
and telecommunications (Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey, 2002).   Empirical analysis tends 
to find economies of scale (broadly defined) out to some level of output.  However, much 
of this work fails properly to distinguish between classical economies of scale and what is 
best thought of as economies of density.  Thus, for example, economies of scale in the 
distribution of natural gas may be exhausted by a firm serving let’s say 3 million 
customers on an exclusive basis in a specific geographic area.  However, whatever the 
size of the geographic area covered by the firm it would still be very costly to run two 
competing gas distribution systems down the same streets, because there are economies 
of scale or “density” associated with the installation and size of the pipes running down 
each street.   
 
III.  WHY REGULATE NATURAL MONOPOLIES? 
It is important to recognize that in reality there is not likely to be a bright line 
between industries that are “natural monopolies” and those that are “competitive.”  
Whether an industry is judged to have classical natural monopoly characteristics 
inevitably depends on judgments about the set of substitute products that are included in 
the definition of the relevant product market (e.g. are Cheerios and Rice Crispies close 
enough products to be considered to be in the same product market?  Are cable TV and 
Direct Broadcast Satellite in the same relevant product market?) and the geographic 
expanse over which the market is regulated (e.g. a supermarket may technically have 
natural monopoly characteristics if the geographic market is defined very narrowly, but 
may have no market power since consumers can easily switch between outlets at different 
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geographic locations and the market cannot discriminate between consumers with good 
substitutes and those without).  Moreover, many “competitive” industries are imperfectly 
competitive rather than perfectly competitive.  They may have production technologies 
that give individual firms economies of scale but there is little cost sacrifice if there are 
several firms in the market.  Or firms may have technologies that exhibit economies of 
scale over the production of a narrowly defined product or brand but there are many 
“natural monopolies” producing competing products or brands that are close substitutes 
for it and constrain the ability of suppliers to exercise market power.  In these cases, 
competition may be imperfect but the (theoretical) social welfare costs compared to the 
best feasible alternative industry configurations given economies of scale, differentiated 
products, and break-even constraints may be quite small.   This suggests that the technical 
definitions of natural monopoly employed (normative or positive) must be carefully 
separated from the questions of whether and how to regulate a particular industry. 
 The standard normative economic case for imposing price and entry regulations in 
industries where suppliers have natural monopoly characteristics is that (a) industries 
with natural monopoly characteristics will exhibit poor economic performance in a 
number of dimensions and (b) it is feasible in theory and practice for governments to 
implement price, entry and related supporting regulations in ways that improve 
performance (net) compared to the economic performance that would otherwise be 
associated with the unregulated market allocations.  That is, the case for government 
regulation is that there are costly market failures whose social costs (consequences) can 
in principle be mitigated by implementing appropriate government regulatory 
mechanisms. 
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This “market failures” case for government regulation naturally leads to four sets 
of questions.  First, what is the nature and magnitude of the performance problems that 
would emerge absent price and entry regulation in industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics?  Second, what regulatory instruments are practically available to 
stimulate performance improvements and what are their strengths and weaknesses?  
Third, what are the performance attributes of the industry configuration that would be 
expected to emerge in a regulated environment?  Fourth, are imperfect regulatory 
outcomes, on balance, likely to be superior to imperfect market outcomes taking all 
relevant performance criteria into account, including the direct and indirect costs of 
government regulation itself? 
 a. Economic efficiency considerations 
 The economic efficiency case for government regulation when an industry has 
natural monopoly characteristics has focused on a number of presumed attributes and the 
associated inefficiencies of market outcomes that are thought would arise in the absence 
of government regulation.  Figure 5A displays two potential equilibria for an industry 
supplied by one single-product firm with subadditive costs.  These equilibria provide 
normative benchmarks against which the performance attributes of “unregulated natural 
monopoly” can be compared. The firm’s costs (ACe and MCe) assume that the firm 
produces a given level of output efficiently given input prices and technology.  The price 
po reflects a second-best linear price that allows the firm just to cover its production costs 
and clears supply and demand.  The price pe is the first-best efficient price (p = MC) that 
leaves the regulated firm with a deficit and therefore requires government subsidies.  
Note that  pe is efficient in a broader general equilibrium sense only if we ignore the costs 
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the government incurs to raise the revenues required to raise the funds to pay subsidies 
these through taxation.  I will focus here on the case where the firm must break-even 
from the revenues it earns by selling services subject to price regulation to consumers. 
 Figure 5B depicts an alternative “unregulated natural monopoly” equilibrium 
where there are sunk costs and barriers to entry.  The firm’s production costs are now 
depicted as MCm (to keep the Figure from becoming too confused. I have left out the 
average cost curve ACM which we should think of as being higher than ACe and MCe), 
reflecting inefficient production by the monopoly, and the price charged by the firm is 
now pm > po > pe.  In the Figure X depicts the cost or “X-inefficiency” at output level QM 
associated with the monopoly configuration. The firm also spends real resources equal to 
R per year to maintain its monopoly position, say through lobbying activity or carrying 
excess capacity to deter entry.  The case for regulation turns initially on a comparison of 
the attributes of the unregulated natural monopoly equilibrium depicted in Figure 5B with 
the efficient (first or second best with linear prices) equilibria depicted in Figure 5A. 
 Inefficient Price Signals: Prices greater than marginal cost:  As have seen above, 
if a single or multiproduct monopoly naturally emerges (and is sustainable) in markets 
that are “contestable,” then the resulting monopoly will not have much market power.  At 
worst, the monopoly will set prices above marginal cost to satisfy a break-even constraint 
(p = AC in the single product case and under certain conditions Ramsey prices in the 
multiproduct case (Baumol, Bailey and Willig, 1977 --- more on this below).  This in turn 
leads to the standard dead- weight loss triangle associated with the gap between prices 
and marginal cost (DWL in Figure 5A).  However, these are the second-best linear prices 
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and, assuming that public policy requires regulated firms to break-even, a regulator could 
not do any better.  This is the second-best price po depicted in Figure 5A.   
It has been argued that even with contestable markets we could do even better by 
regulating the monopoly and forcing it to sell at prices equal to marginal cost, using 
government subsidies to make up the difference between revenues and total costs.  This is 
the first-best price pe depicted in Figure 5A.  This argument normally assumes that the 
government can raise funds to finance the deficit without incurring any distortionary 
costs from the tax system put in place to generate the associated government revenues.  
Since governments do not generally rely on non-distortionary lump sum taxes to raise 
revenues, the theoretical case for regulating a natural/legal monopoly so as to constrain 
prices to equal marginal cost must depend on a comparison between the costs of 
distortions created by prices charged for the regulated services that exceed marginal cost 
and the costs of distortionary taxes that are otherwise required to pay for the firm’s 
deficit.  If the demands for the products and services sold by the regulated firm are fairly 
inelastic, as is often the case, the distortions resulting from raising prices above marginal 
cost to balance revenues and costs may not be larger than the distortions caused by 
increasing taxes to raise the revenues required to close the gap between revenues and 
costs when prices for the regulated product are force set equal the relevant marginal costs 
(Laffont 1999).   
Putting the government subsidy arguments aside for the moment, if one believes 
that a monopoly has naturally emerged in a setting consistent with the assumptions 
associated with contestable markets then monopoly price distortions do not create a very 
good argument for price and/or entry regulation.  That is, if the prices in Figure 5B where 
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the same as those in 5A then from a pricing perspective there would be no loss from 
unregulated natural monopolies. 
 The more interesting “market failures” case for regulation to mitigate distortions 
associated with monopoly prices arise in situations in which there are significant barriers 
to entry and unregulated prices can be sustained at levels far above both marginal cost 
and average cost.  This is the case depicted in Figure 5B where pM>po .  Since the market 
power possessed by an incumbent monopoly depends on both the presence of entry 
barriers and the elasticity of demand for the products sold by the firm, the social costs of 
monopoly will be higher the more important are entry barriers and the more inelastic is 
the demand for the relevant products.  The polar case is one of blockaded entry (Bain, 
1956) where the incumbent dominant firm faces a market demand with elasticity εd and 
sets the monopoly price: 
    PM = MC/(1+ 1/εd) 
and the Lerner Index of monopoly power is given by 
    (PM – MC)/PM   =  1/εd 
In this case, PM is the highest price that a monopoly profitably can charge.  The 
incumbent may charge a lower price to accommodate entry or through contracts to deter 
entry.  After entry occurs, prices will likely fall as a result of there being more 
competition in the market, but they may not fall to the level where total revenues and 
total costs are equal (P = AC).   That is, oligopoly price distortions may remain for some 
period of time.  In all of these cases, the firm will charge prices greater than po, produce 
positive (“excess”) economic profits that it will have an incentive to invest resources in 
order to protect, and yield a dead-weight loss from excessive prices alone (area DWLM in 
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Figure 5B) relative to the dead-weight loss at the break-even uniform unit (linear) price 
level (P = AC in the single product case).  However, if the elasticity of demand is very 
large in absolute value, any distortion resulting from monopoly pricing will be small.     
 Inefficient costs of production (including inefficient entry and exit):  By definition, 
a natural monopoly involves production conditions such that it is less costly to produce 
output in a single firm than in two or more firms.  In a contestable markets environment 
the monopoly in the market has high powered incentives to minimize production costs 
since it can be replaced instantly by a firm that will to supply at a price equal to average 
“minimum” (efficient production) total cost.  Accordingly, firms are markets that are 
candidates for regulation must depart from the assumptions associated with contestable 
markets.  That is, we should focus on cases where there are significant scale and scope 
economies and sunk costs represent a significant fraction of total costs. 
In such cases, one potential source of increased production costs arises from the 
strategic behavior that an incumbent monopoly may engage in to deter entry and protect 
its monopoly position.  This may entail building excess capacity or spending resources in 
other ways (“rent seeking” behavior) to obtain or protect a monopoly position.  
Potentially all of the monopoly profits associated with the pure monopoly outcome may 
be “wasted” in this way.  This type of social cost is depicted as area R in Figure 5B.  
 A second potential source of higher production costs results from inefficient 
entry of competitors.  If the industry has natural monopoly attributes and multiple firms 
enter the market to supply output --- even if competitors eventually exit after a war of 
attrition --- excessive costs are naturally incurred due to duplication of facilities the 
failure to exploit all available economies of scale.  Even in a contestable market the 
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natural monopoly equilibrium may not be sustainable and inefficient entry may occur.  
The cost of duplicated facilities is not reflected in Figure 5B, but can be conceptualized 
as being related to the increase in average costs caused by each firm producing at a lower 
output level. 
 A third potential source of production cost inefficiencies is the failure of the 
incumbent monopoly to minimize production costs --- produce efficiently --- at the output 
level it is producing, given technology and input prices.  Cost minimization requires that 
the marginal rate of technical substitution between inputs equal the ratio of their 
respective prices.  If we have a two input production function q = F(K,L) where the prices 
of capital (K) and labor (L) are respectively r and w, then cost minimization at any output 
level requires that Fk/FL = r/w, where FK is the marginal product of capital and FL is the 
marginal product of labor.  Neoclassical profit maximizing monopoly firms minimize 
costs in this way.  However, when there is separation of ownership and management and 
management gets satisfaction from managerial emoluments and gets disutility from 
effort, monopoly firms that are insulated from competition may exhibit “X-inefficiency” 
or managerial slack that leads to higher production costs.  There is also some evidence 
that monopolies are more easily organized by unions which may extract some of the 
monopoly profits in the form of higher wages (wM > w). (Salinger (1984), Rose (1987), 
Hendricks (1977)).  If wages are driven above competitive levels this will lead firms 
inefficiently to substitute capital for labor in production.  These costs are depicted as  
MCM > MCe  and the associated social cost is depicted as area X in Figure 5B. 
  Product quality and dynamic inefficiencies:  Although, the issue has largely been 
unexplored in the context of natural monopoly per se, related literature in industrial 
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organization that examines research and development, adoption of innovations in the 
production and product dimensions and the choice of product quality suggests that 
monopoly outcomes are likely to differ from competitive outcomes.  Moreover, issues 
associated with the reliability of service (e.g. outages of the electric power network) and 
various aspects of the quality of service (e.g. queues for obtaining connections to the 
telephone network) are significant policy issues in many regulated industries.  As a 
general matter, we know that monopoly will introduce a bias in the selection of quality, 
the speed of adoption of innovations, and investment in R&D.  In simple static models of 
monopoly the bias turns on the fact that a profit maximizing monopoly looks at the 
willingness to pay for quality of the marginal consumer while social welfare is 
maximized by focusing on the surplus achieved by the average consumer (Spence 1975).      
However, the size and magnitude of any quality bias, compared to a social 
welfare-maximizing norm is ambiguous.  The monopoly may supply too much or too 
little quality or have too little or too much incentive to invest in R&D and adopt 
innovations depending on the circumstances, in particular whether the incumbent 
monopoly is threatened by potential entry, as well as the existence and nature of patent 
protection and spillovers from R&D (Tirole 1988, pp. 100 – 106, 361-414).  This is not 
the place to review the extensive literature on the relationship between market structure 
and innovation, but I note only that it raises potentially important efficiency issues with 
market structures that evolve into monopolies.  On the one hand, in situations where there 
are significant spillovers from R&D and innovation that would otherwise be captured by 
competing firms and lead to underinvestment in innovation in the product and process 
dimensions, regulatory policies that facilitate the internalization of these spillover effects, 
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for example, by having a single firm serving the entire sector or providing for the 
recovery of R&D costs in product prices, might increase social welfare.  On the other 
hand, depending on the circumstances, creating a monopoly and regulating the prices it 
can charge for new products could increase rather than decrease inefficiencies associated 
with product quality, R&D, and the adoption of product and process innovations. 
 Firm viability and breakeven constraints:  As I have already noted, if the 
regulated monopoly is a private firm and there are no government subsidies available to 
support it, the government may be able to regulate the firm’s prices and service quality, 
but it cannot compel it to supply output to balance supply and demand in the long run if it 
is unprofitable for it to do so.  Accordingly, price and entry regulation also must confront 
one important set of constraints even in an ideal world where regulators have full 
information about a firm’s cost opportunities, managerial effort levels, and attributes of 
demand faced by the regulated firm (we discuss regulation with asymmetric information 
in more detail below).  Private firms will only supply goods and services if they expect to 
at least recover the costs of providing these goods and services.  The relevant costs 
include the costs of materials and supplies, compensation necessary to attract suitable 
employees and to induce them to exert appropriate levels of effort, the direct cost of 
capital investments in the enterprise, a return on those investments reflected the 
opportunity cost of cost of capital, taxes, and other costs incurred to provide service.   If 
the process through which regulated prices are set does not lead private firms to expect to 
earn enough revenues to cover these production and distribution costs the firm will not 
voluntarily supply the services.  Since prices are regulated, supply and demand will not 
necessarily clear and prices that are set too low will lead to shortages in the short run 
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and/or the long run and the use of non-price rationing to allocate scarce supplies.  
Accordingly, if we are to rely on regulated private monopolies to provide services, the 
regulatory process must have a price-setting process that provides the regulated firm with 
adequate financial incentives to induce them to provide services whose value to 
consumers exceeds the costs of supplying them.   
 At this point I will simply refer to this requirement as a breakeven-constraint 
defined as: 
 Σpiqi  >  C(q1, …….. qn-1, qn ) 
where qi defines the total output of the different products supplied by the firm (or the 
same output supplied to different groups of consumers that are charged different prices or 
a combination of both) and C( *) defines the associated costs.  For now, let’s think about 
C(*) as being a static measure of the “efficient” level of costs.  We will address 
differences between expected costs and realized costs and issues of cost inefficiency in 
more detail below. 
 There is an inherent conflict between the firm viability constraint and efficient 
pricing when costs are subadditive.  Efficient pricing considerations would dictate that 
prices be set equal to marginal cost.  But marginal cost pricing will not produce enough 
revenues to cover total costs, thus violating the firm viability or break-even constraint.8  
A great deal of the literature on price regulation has focused on responding to this 
conflict by implementing price structures that achieve the break-even constraint in ways 
that minimize the efficiency losses associated with departures from marginal cost pricing. 
                                                 
8 In the single product case declining average cost is a necessary condition for marginal cost pricing to be 
unprofitable.  In the multiproduct case, declining ray average cost is a necessary condition for marginal cost 
pricing to yield revenues that are less than total costs. 
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 Moreover, because the interesting cases involve technologies where long-lived 
sunk costs are a significant fraction of total costs, the long-term credibility of regulatory 
rules plays an important role in convincing potential suppliers that the rules of the 
regulatory game will in fact fairly compensate them for the costs that they must incur to 
provide service (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter 10; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 
1994, pp. 85-91; Levy and Spiller, 1994).  This is the case because once costs are sunk, 
suppliers must be concerned that they will be “held-up” by the regulator.  That is, once 
the costs are sunk, the regulator is potentially in a position to lower prices to a point 
where they cover only avoidable costs, causing the firm that has committed the sunk 
costs to fail to recover them.  As I shall discuss presently, creating a regulatory process 
and judicial oversight system that constrains the ability of a regulatory agency to hold up 
a regulated firm in this way has proven to be a central component of regulatory systems 
that have been successful in attracting adequate investment and associated supplies to the 
regulated sectors. These “credibility” institutions include legal principles governing the 
formulas used to set prices and to review “allowable” costs, the structure of regulatory 
procedures and opportunities for judicial review, as well as de jure and de facto 
restrictions on competitive entry. 
 b. Other considerations  
 While this chapter will focus on the economic efficiency rationales for and 
consequences of the regulation of natural monopolies, we must recognize that the nature 
and performance of the institutions associated with regulated monopoly in practice reflect 
additional normative public policy goals and the outcomes of interest group politics.  
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 Income distribution, “essential services,” cross-subsidization and taxation by 
regulation: Although simple conceptualizations of economic efficiency are “indifferent” 
to the distribution of surplus between consumers and producers, public policy generally is 
not.  Thus, while the efficiency losses from classical monopoly pricing are measured by a 
welfare triangle reflecting the loss in the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus from 
higher prices and lower output, public policy has also been concerned with the transfer of 
income and wealth associated with the excess profits resulting from monopoly pricing as 
well.  Even ignoring the fact that some of the monopoly profits may be eaten up by 
wasteful “rent seeking” expenditures, and the difficulties of calculating the ultimate 
effects on the distribution of income and wealth from monopoly pricing, it is clear that 
regulatory policy has historically been very concerned with mitigating monopoly profits 
by keeping prices at a level that roughly reflect the regulated firm’s total production 
costs.  
It also is quite clear that several of the industries that have evolved as regulated 
monopolies produce products access to which has come to be viewed as being “essential” 
for all of a nation’s citizens.  I use the term “access” here broadly to reflect both physical 
access (e.g. “universal service”)9 as well as “affordability” considerations. Electricity, 
telephone, and clean water services fall in this category.  The argument is that absent 
price and entry regulation, suppliers of these services will not find it economical to 
expand into certain areas (e.g. rural areas) or if they do will charge prices that are too 
high given the incomes of the individuals living or firms producing (e.g. farms) in those 
areas.  While there are no clear definitions of what kinds of services are essential, how 
                                                 
9 A universal service rationale may also be justified by the desire to internalize network externalities (Katz 
and Shapiro).  Network externalities may also be a source of cost subadditivity.  
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much is essential, or what are the “reasonable” prices at which such services should be 
provided, these concepts have clearly played a role in the development of regulatory 
policies in many countries. This being said, it is hard to argue that food, for example, is 
any less essential than electricity. Yet there has been no interest in creating regulated 
legal monopolies for the production and distribution of food.  Low-income consumers or 
residents of rural areas could simply be given subsidies by the government to help them 
to pay for the costs of services deemed essential by policymakers, as is the case for food 
stamps. Accordingly, the case for regulated monopoly and the case for subsidies for 
particular geographic areas or types of consumers appear to be separable policy issues 
that can in principle be addressed with different policy instruments.  
 These issues are joined when an industry does have natural monopoly 
characteristics, and the introduction of government regulation of prices and entry creates 
opportunities to use the regulated monopoly itself as a vehicle for implementing a 
product-specific, geographic, customer-type specific internal subsidy program rather than 
relying on the government’s general budget to provide the subsidies directly.  With 
regulated legal monopoly that bars competitive entry, regulated prices in some 
geographic areas or the prices charged to some classes of consumers or for some products 
can be set at levels above what would prevail if economic efficiency criteria alone were 
applied to set prices (more on this presently).  The excess revenues generated by 
increasing these prices above their efficient level can then be used to reduce prices to the 
target classes of customers, leaving the overall level of revenues produced from the menu 
of regulated prices equal to the total costs incurred by the firm.  Richard Posner has 
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referred to this phenomenon as taxation by regulation (Posner 1974) and views 
government regulation of prices as one instrument of public finance.  
 This phenomenon is also often referred to loosely as cross-subsidization.  The 
notion is that one group of consumers subsidizes the provision of service to another group 
of customers by paying more than it costs to provide them with service while the other 
group pays less.  However, when a firm has natural monopoly characteristics, an 
objective definition of “cross-subsidization” is not straightforward.  When cost functions 
are subadditive and a natural monopoly is sustainable, break-even prices will generally be 
above the marginal cost of providing service to any individual or group of consumers.  At 
least some consumers of some products produced by the natural monopoly must pay 
more than the incremental cost of serving them to satisfy a break-even constraint for the 
regulated firm.  And, as we shall see below, efficient prices will generally vary from 
customer to customer when marginal cost-based prices do not yield sufficient revenues to 
cover total costs.  Are consumer’s paying higher margins necessarily “subsidizing” 
consumers paying lower margins?   
More refined definitions of cross-subsidization have evolved that better reflect the 
attributes of subadditive cost functions (Sharkey (1982), Faulhaber (1975)).  A price 
configuration does not involve cross-subsidies (it is “subsidy free”) if: 
a. All consumers pay at least the average incremental costs of providing them with 
service and 
b. No consumers or groups of consumers pay more than the “stand-alone costs” of 
providing them with service.  Stand-alone costs refer to the costs of supplying only 
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one or more groups of consumers that are a subset of the entire population of 
consumers that demand service at the prices at issue. 
If these conditions prevail, consumers who are charged relatively high prices may be no 
worse off as a consequence of other consumers being charged lower prices and may be 
made better off than if the latter consumers purchased less (or nothing) from the firm if 
the prices they are being charged were to increase. This the case because if the 
contribution to meeting the firm’s budget constraint made by the consumers being 
charged the lower prices is greater than or equal to zero then the remaining consumers 
will have to pay a smaller fraction of the firm’s total costs and are better off than if they 
had to support the costs of the enterprise on a stand-alone basis.  
 Moreover, if subsidy free prices exist the natural monopoly will also be 
sustainable (Baumol, Bailey and Willig, 1997; Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982).  On the 
other hand, if the government endeavors to engage in taxation by regulation in ways that 
involve setting prices that are not subsidy free, the resulting configuration may not be 
sustainable.  In this case, restrictions on entry --- legal monopoly --- will be necessary to 
keep entrants from cream skimming the high margin customers away from the incumbent 
when the stand-alone costs make it profitable to do so.  So, for example, when the U.S. 
federal government implemented policies in the 1920s to keep regulated local telephone 
service charges low in order to encourage universal service, subsidize customers in rural 
areas, etc., it simultaneously kept long-distance prices high to generate enough net 
revenues from long distance service to cover the costs of the local telephone network that 
were in excess of local service revenues (Palmer, 1992; Crandall and Hausman, 2000; 
Joskow and Noll, 2000).  This created potential opportunities for firms to enter the 
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market to supply some of the high-margin long-distance service (the prices were 
therefore greater than the stand alone costs), potentially undermining the government’s 
ability to utilize taxation by regulation to implement the universal service and income 
distribution goals.  When the costs of creating a competing long distance network were 
very high, this price structure was sustainable.  However, as the costs of long distance 
telecommunications facilities fell, it became economic for competing entrants to supply a 
subset of long distance services: the price structure was no longer sustainable. 
 Price Discrimination:  In the single product case price discrimination involves a 
firm charging different prices for identical products to different consumers.  The 
discrimination may involve distinguishing between different types of consumers (e.g. 
residential and commercial customers) and charging different per unit (linear) prices to 
each group for the same quantities purchased (third-degree price discrimination) or prices 
may vary depending on the quantities purchased by individual consumers (second-degree 
price discrimination).  In a multiproduct context, price discrimination also encompasses 
situations where prices are set to yield different “margins” between price and 
marginal/average incremental cost for different products or groups of products (a form of 
third-degree price discrimination).  The welfare/efficiency consequences of price 
discrimination by a monopoly in comparison to simple uniform monopoly pricing are 
ambiguous (Schmalensee, 1981).  Price discrimination could increase or reduce 
efficiency compared to uniform price-cost margins, depending on the shapes of the 
underlying demands for the services as well as attributes of the firm’s cost function.  In a 
regulated monopoly context, when firms are subject to a breakeven constraint, price 
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discrimination of various kinds can reduce the efficiency losses associated with 
departures from marginal cost pricing.  We will explore these issues presently. 
 Whatever the efficiency implications of price discrimination, it is important to 
recognize that real or imagined price discrimination by unregulated monopolies played an 
important political role in stimulating the introduction of price regulation of “natural 
monopolies” in the United States.   The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
in 1887 to supervise rail freight rates was heavily influenced by arguments made by 
shippers served by one railroad that they were being charged much higher prices per mile 
shipped for similar commodities than where shippers served by competing railroads or 
with transport alternatives that were close substitutes (e.g. barges) (Kolko (1965), Mullin 
(2000), Prager (1989a), Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast (1990)).  Many regulatory 
statutes passed in the U.S. in the last century have (or had) text saying something like 
“rates shall be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.” (Bonbright, 1961, p. 22; 
Clark, 1911)  The development of regulation in the U.S. has been heavily influenced by 
the perceived inequities of charging different consumers different prices for what appear 
to be the same products.   When combined with monopoly or very limited competition it 
has been both a source of political pressure to introduce price regulation and has led to 
legal and policy constraints on the nature of the price structures that regulatory agencies 
have at their disposal. 
 Political economy considerations:  By this point it should be obvious that the 
decision to introduce price and entry regulation, as well as the behavior and performance 
of regulatory agencies, reflects a broader set of considerations than simply a public 
interest goal of mitigating the distortions created by unregulated markets with natural 
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monopoly characteristics.  Price and entry regulation can and does convey benefits on 
some groups and impose costs on other groups compared to alternatives, whether these 
alternatives are no price and entry regulation or alternative mechanisms for implementing 
price and entry regulation.  The potential effects of price and entry regulation on the 
welfare of different interest groups --- different groups of consumers, different groups of 
suppliers, environmental and other “public interest” groups --- has played a significant 
role in where, when and how price and entry regulation are introduced, when and how 
regulatory mechanisms are changed, and when and how price and entry regulation may 
be removed (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, ; Noll, 1989; McNollgast, Chapter [X ]this 
volume).  The nature and magnitude of alternative configurations of price and entry 
regulation on different interest groups, the costs and benefits these groups face to 
organize to influence regulatory laws and the behavior of regulatory agencies, and how 
these groups can use the institutions of government (legislature, executive, judicial) to 
create regulatory (or deregulatory) laws and influence regulatory behavior and outcomes 
is a very complex subject.  The extensive relevant literature has been reviewed elsewhere 
(e.g. Noll, 1989) and much of it is covered as well in Chapter [X] (McNollgast) of this 
volume.  It is not my intention to review it again here.  However, there are a number of 
general lessons learned from this literature that are worth noting as background for the 
rest of the material in this chapter. 
 For many years students were taught that regulation had been introduced to 
respond to natural monopoly problems --- a “public interest” view of the introduction of 
price and entry regulation (Posner, 1974).  This view confused the normative market 
failures case for why price and entry regulation should be introduced to achieve public 
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interest goals with the positive question of why price and entry regulation was actually 
introduced in a particular industry at a particular time.  One cannot and should not 
assume that because an industry is subject to price and entry regulation it is necessarily a 
“natural monopoly” in any meaningful sense.  The introduction of price and entry 
regulation and the nature of the regulatory mechanisms used to implement it reflect 
political considerations that are the outcome of interest group politics. There are many 
industries that have been subject to price and entry regulation (e.g. trucking, oil and 
natural gas production, various agricultural commodities) where there is no evidence of 
natural monopoly characteristics or the associated economic performance problems.  
Because regulation typically involves regulation of both prices and entry, it can be and 
has been used in some cases to keep prices high rather than low and to restrict 
competition where it would otherwise lead to lower prices, lower costs, and other 
efficiency benefits.  Each situation must be judged on the merits based on empirical 
analysis. 
 Whatever the rationale for introducing price and entry regulation, we should not 
assume that regulatory agencies can and will use the most effective mechanisms for 
achieving public interest goals that may be available to them.  Political considerations 
driven by interest group politics not only play a role in the introduction of price and entry 
regulation, but in how it is implemented by regulatory authorities (Weingast and Moran, 
1983; Noll, 1989).  While, we frequently refer to “independent” regulatory agencies in 
the abstract, the reality is that no regulatory agency is completely independent of political 
influences. This political influence is articulated by who is appointed to lead regulatory 
authorities, by legislative oversight and budget control, by the election of commissioners 
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in states with elected commissions, and by the resources that different interest groups can 
bring to the regulatory process itself (McCubbins 1985; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 
1987; Joskow, Rose and Wolfram 1994; Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino 2002). 
 Even under the best of circumstances, regulatory institutions can respond 
effectively to the goals established for them only imperfectly.  Regulation leads to direct 
costs incurred by the agency and those groups who are involved with the regulatory 
process as well as indirect costs associated with distortions in regulated firm prices, costs, 
profits, etc., that may result from poorly designed or implemented regulatory 
mechanisms.  The direct costs are relatively small.  The indirect costs are potentially very 
large.   
 Firms may seek to enter an industry subject to price and entry regulation even if 
entry is inefficient.  This result may flow from political constraints that influence the 
level and structure of regulated prices and make entry look profitable even though it is 
inefficient because the regulated price signals are inefficient.  Distinguishing between 
efficient entry requests (e.g. due to technological change, new products, excessive costs 
of the regulated incumbent) and inefficient entry (e.g. responding to a price structure that 
reflects significant cross-subsidies) is a significant challenge that requires industry-
specific assessments of the presence of natural monopoly characteristics and the 
distortions that may be caused by inefficient regulation. 
 c. Regulatory goals 
 Since the focus of this essay is on the economic efficiency rationales for price and 
entry regulation, the regulatory goals that will guide the design of effective regulation and 
against which the performance of regulatory institutions will be evaluated should reflect 
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the same efficiency considerations.  In what follows I will focus on the following 
regulatory goals: 
 Efficient pricing of goods and services:  Regulated prices should provide 
consumers with efficient price signals to guide their consumption decisions. Ideally, 
prices will equal the relevant marginal or incremental costs. However, firm-viability and 
potentially other constraints will necessarily lead to departures from first-best prices.  
Accordingly, second-best pricing given these constraints will be the goal on the pricing 
front.   
 Efficient production costs:  The rationale for restricting entry to a single firm is to 
make it possible for the firm to exploit all economies of scale and economies of scope 
that are made feasible by the underlying technology, taking into account the 
organizational and related transactions costs associated with firms of different horizontal 
and vertical scales.  Textbook presentations of natural monopoly regulation typically take 
the firm’s cost function as given and focus on specification of optimal prices given the 
firm’s costs and break-even constraint.  However, by controlling a regulated firm’s prices 
and profits and eliminating the threat of competitive entry, we may simultaneously 
sharply curtail the incentives that lead firms to seek to minimize costs from both static 
and dynamic perspectives.  Moreover, regulation may significantly reduce the efficiency 
incentives that are potentially created by the market for corporate control by imposing 
lengthy regulatory review requirements and capturing the bulk of any cost savings 
resulting from mergers and acquisitions for consumers through lower regulated prices. 
Regulators need to be focused on creating substitute incentive mechanisms to induce 
regulated firms to minimize costs by adjusting inputs to reflect the relative input prices, 
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to exert the optimal amounts of managerial effort to control costs, to constrain costly 
managerial emoluments and other sources of X-inefficiency, and to adopt new process 
innovations in a timely and efficient manner.  
 Efficient levels of output and investment (firm participation and firm-viability 
constraints):  The regulated firm should supply the quantities of services demanded by 
consumers and make the investments in facilities necessary to do so in a timely and 
efficient levels.  If private firms are to be induced to supply efficiently they must perceive 
that it is privately profitable to do so. Accordingly, regulatory mechanisms need to 
respect the constraint that private firms will only invest if they expect the investment to 
be profitable ex ante and will only continue to produce if they can cover their avoidable 
costs ex post.        
 Efficient levels of service quality and product variety: Products may be provided 
with varying levels of service quality and reliability.  Different levels of service quality 
and reliability carry with them different costs.  Consumer valuations of service quality 
and reliability may vary widely as well.  Regulators should be concerned that the levels 
of service quality and reliability, and the variety of quality and reliability options 
available to consumers reflect consumer valuations and any costs associated with 
providing consumers with a variety of levels of quality and reliability from which they 
can choose.  Physical attributes of the networks which characterize industries that have 
often been subject to price and entry regulation may limit the array of product qualities 
that can be offered economically to consumers.  For example, on a typical electric 
distribution network, individual consumers cannot be offered different levels of network 
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reliability because the physical control of the distribution network is at the 
“neighborhood” rather than the individual levels (Joskow and Tirole 2004). 
 Monopoly profit and rent extraction considerations:  While simple models of 
social welfare (e.g. the sum of consumers’ plus producers’ surplus) are agnostic about the 
distribution of surplus between consumers and producers, it is clear that regulatory 
policies are not.  In addition to the efficiency distortions caused by monopoly pricing, 
extracting the excess profits associated with monopoly profits for the benefit of 
consumers is also an important goal of most regulatory laws.  It is the flip side of the firm 
viability constraint.  The regulated firm’s profits must be “high enough” to induce it to 
supply efficiently, but “no higher” than is necessary to do so.  This goal can be 
rationalized in a number of ways.  I prefer to view it as an articulation of a social welfare 
function that weights consumers’ surplus more than producers’ surplus subject to a firm 
viability or breakeven constraint.  Alternatively, one might rationalize it as reflecting a 
concern that some or all of the monopoly profits will be transformed into wasteful “rent 
seeking” expenditures by the regulated firm to enable it to retain its monopoly position. 
 Distributional Goals:  To the extent that other income distribution goals (e.g. 
universal service goals) are assigned to the regulated firm, price and quantity mechanisms 
should be adopted to achieve these goals at minimum cost. 
Ultimately, sound public policy must ask whether the potential improvements in 
performance along the various performance dimensions discussed above relative to 
unregulated market outcomes --- depicted in a simple fashion in Figures 5A and 5B --- 
are likely to be greater than the direct and indirect costs of government regulatory 
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mechanisms.  Accordingly, sensible decisions about whether and how to regulate should 
consider both the costs of imperfect markets and the costs of imperfect regulation. 
 
IV.   HISTORICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PRICE REGULATION 
Government regulation of prices can be traced back at least to the period of the 
Roman Empire when the emperor established maximum prices for roughly 800 items.  
These actions found support in the doctrine of “the just price” developed by Church 
authorities (Phillips 1993, p. 90).  During the Middle Ages, craft guilds developed which 
licensed and controlled the individuals who could work in specific occupations.  Because 
these guilds had monopoly control over who could work in particular crafts they were 
regulated. “The obligation of the guilds was to provide service to anyone who wanted it 
at reasonable prices.  The various crafts were known therefore as ‘common carriers,’ 
‘common innkeepers,’ ‘common tailors’ and so forth. Since each craft had a monopoly of 
its trade, they were closely regulated.” (Phillips 1993, p. 90)  During the 16th century, the 
French government began to issue Royal charters to trading companies and plantations 
which gave them special privileges, including monopoly status, and in turn subjected 
them to government regulation. (Phillips 1993, page 90).  These charters, analogous to 
modern franchises, have been rationalized as reflecting efforts by governments to induce 
private investment in activities that advanced various social goals. (Glaeser 1927, page 
201). 
The antecedents of American legal concepts of “public interest” and “public 
utilities” that were the initial legal foundations for government price and entry regulation 
can be found in English Common law. “Under the common law, certain occupations or 
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callings were singled out and subjected to special rights and duties.  These occupations 
became known as ‘common callings,’….. A person engaged in a common employment 
had special obligations …, particularly the duty to provide, at reasonable prices, adequate 
services and facilities to all who wanted them. ” (Phillips 1993, page 91) English 
common law regulations were carried over to the English colonies and during the 
Revolution several colonies regulated prices for many commodities and wages (Phillips 
1993, pp. 91-92).  However, after the American Revolution, government regulation of 
prices and entry faded away as the United States developed a free market philosophy that 
relied on competition and was hostile to government regulation of prices and entry 
(Phillips 1993, page 92).  Following the Civil War, and especially with the development 
of the railroads and the great merger wave of the late 1890s, policymakers and the courts 
began again to look favorably on price and entry regulation under certain circumstances.  
The Granger Movement of the 1870s focused on pressuring the states and then the federal 
government to regulate railroad freight rates.  State regulation of railroads by special 
commissions began in the Midwestern states and then spread to the rest of the country.  
(Philips 1993, p. 93)  The first federal economic regulatory agency, the Interstate 
Railroad Commission (ICC) was established in 1888 with limited authority to regulate 
the structure of interstate railroad rates.  This authority was greatly expanded during the 
first two decades of the 20th century (Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast 1989; Mullin 
2000; Prager 1989a; Kolko 1965; Clark 1911). 
In the U.S., it was widely accepted as a legal matter that a state or municipality 
(with state authorization) could issue franchises or concessions to firms seeking to 
provide certain services using rights of way owned by the municipality and to negotiate 
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the terms of the associated contracts with willing suppliers seeking to use such state and 
municipal rights of way (Hughes 1983; McDonald 1962).  These firms proposed to use 
state or municipal property and the state could define what the associated terms and 
conditions of contracts to use that property would be.  However, the notion that a 
municipal, state or the federal government could on its own initiative independently 
impose price regulations on otherwise unwilling private entities was a more hotly 
contested legal issue about which the Supreme Court’s views have changed over time.10     
Until the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court was generally fairly hostile to actions by 
state and federal authorities to restrict the ability of private enterprises to set prices freely 
without any restrictions imposed by government (Clemens 1950, pp. 12-37) except under 
very special circumstances.   Such actions were viewed as potentially violating 
Constitutional protections of private property rights, due process and contracts.   On the 
one hand, the commerce clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) gives the federal 
government the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
states ….”  On the other hand, the due process clause (Fifth Amendment) and the equal 
protection of the laws clause (Article Fourteen), and the obligation of contracts clause 
(Article 1, Section 10) restricts the regulatory powers of the government (Clemens 1950, 
pp 45-48).  The courts initially recognized some narrow exceptions to the general rule 
that the government could not regulate prices in light of the protections provided by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; for example when there were emergencies that 
threatened public health and safety (Bonbright 1961, p. 6).  And gradually over time the 
courts carved out additional exceptions “for certain types of business said to have been 
‘dedicated to a public use’ or ‘affected with the public interest,’…” (Bonbright, p. 6).  
                                                 
10 The relevant Court decisions are discussed in Clemens (pp. 49-54). 
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Railroads, municipal rail transit systems, local gas and electricity systems and other 
“public utilities” became covered by these exceptions.   
One would not have to be very creative to come up with a long list of industries 
that are “affected with the public interest” and where investments had been “dedicated to 
a public use.”  And if such vague criteria were applied to define industries that could be 
subject to price and entry regulation, there would be almost no limit to the government’s 
ability to regulate prices for reasons that go well beyond performance problems 
associated with natural monopoly characteristics.  However, at least up until the 1930s, 
the courts had in mind a much less expansive notion of what constituted a “public utility” 
whose prices and other terms and conditions of service could be legitimately regulated by 
state or federal authorities (or municipal authorities by virtue of power delegated to them 
by their state government).11  The two criteria where (a) the product had to be 
“important” or a “necessity” and (b) the production technology had natural monopoly 
characteristics. (Bonbright 1961, page 8).  Clemens (1959, page 25) argues that 
“[N]ecessity and monopoly are almost prerequisites of public utility status.”  One could 
read this as saying that the combination of relatively inelastic demand for a product that 
was highly valued by consumers and natural monopoly characteristics on the supply side 
leading to significant losses in social welfare are a necessary pre-condition for permitting 
government price and entry regulation.   An alternative interpretation is that the 
“necessity” refers not so much to the product itself, but rather for the “necessity of price 
                                                 
11 The landmark case is Munn v. Illinois 94 U.S. 113 (1877) where the Illinois state legislature passed a law 
that required grain elevators and warehouses in Chicago to obtain licenses and to charge prices that did not 
exceed levels specified in the stature.  The importance of the grain storage facilities to the grain shipping 
business in Chicago and that fact that the ownership of the facilities constituted a virtual monopoly were 
important factors in the Court’s decision.  See also Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892). 
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and entry regulation” to achieve acceptable price, output and service quality outcomes 
when industries had natural monopoly characteristics.  In either case, until the 1930s, it is 
clear that the Supreme Court intending the situations in which government price 
regulation would be constitutionally permissible were quite narrow.12 
 The conditions under which governments could regulate price, entry and other 
terms and conditions of service without violating constitutional protections were 
expanded during the 1930s.13  Since the 1930s, federal and state governments have 
imposed price regulation on a wide variety of industries that clearly do not meet the 
“necessity and natural monopoly” test discussed above  ---  milk, petroleum and natural 
gas, taxis, apartment rents, insurance, etc. --- without violating the Constitution.  
Nevertheless, the natural monopoly problem, the concept of the public utility developed 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the structure, rules and procedures governing 
state and federal regulatory commissions that are responsible for regulating industries 
that meet the traditional public utility criteria go hand in hand. 
It should also be recognized that just because an industry can as a legal matter be 
subject to government price and entry regulation does not mean that the owners of the 
enterprises affected give up their Constitutional protections under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendments.  The evolution of legal rules supporting the right of government 
to regulate prices and entry and impose various obligations on regulated monopolies were 
accompanied by a parallel set of legal rules that required government regulatory actions 
                                                 
12 In a serious subsequent cases the Court made it clear that the conditions under which states could 
regulate prices were narrow.  See German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis 233 U.S. 389 (1914), Wolff 
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 278 U.S. 
235 (1929). 
 
13 In Nebbia vs. New York 291 U.S. 502 (1934) the Supreme Court upheld a New York State law that 
created a milk control board that could set the maximum and minimum retail prices for milk sold in the 
State. 
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to adhere to these constitutional guarantees.  This requirement in turn has implications for 
regulatory procedures and regulatory mechanisms which must be consistent with the 
principle that private property cannot taken by government action without just 
compensation. This interrelationship between the conditions under which government 
may regulate prices and the Constitutional protections that the associated rules and 
procedures must adhere to are very fundamental attributes of U.S. regulatory law and 
policy.  In particular, they have important implications for the incentives regulated firms 
have to invest in facilities to expand supplies of services whose prices are subject to 
government regulation (Sidak and Spulber 1997; Kolbe and Tye 1991). 
 
V.  ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 
 a. Overview 
There are a variety of organizational arrangements through which prices, entry 
and other terms and conditions of service might be regulated by one or more government 
entities.   Legislatures may enact statutes that establish licensing conditions, maximum 
and minimum prices and other terms and conditions of trade in certain goods and 
services. This was the approach that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Munn v. 
Illinois where prices were regulated by a statute passed by the Illinois legislature.  Indeed, 
the first “public utilities” were created by legislative acts that granted franchises that 
specified maximum prices and/or profit rates and provide the first examples of rate of 
return regulation (Phillips, 129).  When changes in supply and demand conditions led to 
the need for price changes the legislature could, in principle, amend the statute to make 
these changes.  This type of regulation by legislative act was both clumsy and politically 
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inconvenient (McCubbins 1985; Fiorina 1982; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; 
Hughes 1983).    
Governments can also use the terms of the franchise contracts that they issue to 
firms requiring authorization to use public streets and other rights of way by including in 
the franchise contracts terms and conditions specifying prices and how they can be 
adjusted over time (McDonald 1962; Hughes 1983).  The sectors that are most often 
categorized as “public utilities” typically began life as local companies that received 
franchises from the individual municipal governments to whose streets and rights of way 
they required access to provide service.  City councils and agencies negotiated and 
monitored the associated franchise contracts and were effectively the regulators of these 
franchisees.  However, as contracts, the ability of the municipality to alter the terms and 
conditions of the franchise agreement without the consent of the franchisee was quite 
limited (National Civic Federation 1907).   Most gas, electric, telephone, water and cable 
TV companies that provide local service and use municipal streets and rights of way still 
must have municipal franchises, but these franchises typically are little more than 
mechanisms to collect fees for the use of municipal property as state and federal laws 
have transferred most regulation of prices and entry to state and/or federal regulatory 
agencies. The strengths and weaknesses of municipal franchise contracts allocated 
through competitive bidding are discussed further below.    
The “independent” regulatory commission eventually became the favored method 
for economic regulation in the U.S. at both the state and federal levels (Clemens 1950, 
Chapter 3; Kahn 1970, p. 10; Phillips 1993, Chapter 4). Regulatory commissions have 
been given the responsibility to set prices and other terms and conditions of service and 
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to establish rules regarding the organization of public utilities and their finances.  This 
approach creates a separate board or commission, typically with a staff of engineers, 
accountants, finance specialists and economists and gives it the responsibility to regulate 
prices and other terms and conditions of the companies that have been given charters, 
franchises, licenses or other permissions to provide a specific service “in the public 
interest.”  The responsibilities typically extend to the corporate forms of the regulated 
firms, their finances, the lines of business they may enter and their relationships with 
affiliates.  They are also given various authorities to establish accounting standards and 
access to the books, records and other information relevant for fulfilling their regulatory 
responsibilities, to approve investment plans and financings, and to establish service 
quality standards.  Regulated firms are required to file their schedules of prices or 
“tariffs” with the regulatory commission and all eligible consumers must be served at 
these prices.  Changes in price schedules or tariffs must be approved by the regulatory 
agency. We will discuss commission regulation in more detail presently. 
A final approach to “the natural monopoly problem” has been to rely on public 
ownership.  Under a public ownership model, the government owns the entity providing 
the services, is responsible for its governance, including the choice of senior 
management, and sets prices and other terms and conditions.  Public ownership may be 
affected through the creation of a bureau or department of the municipal or state 
government that provides the services or creating a separate corporate entity organized as 
a public benefit corporation with the government as its sole owner.   In the latter case, the 
state-owned company will typically then be “regulated” by a municipal or state 
department which will approve prices, budgets and external financing decisions.  In the 
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U.S. there are been only limited use of public ownership as a response to the natural 
monopoly problem.  The primary exceptions are electricity where roughly 20% of the 
electricity distributed or generated in the U.S. is accounted for by municipal or state 
public utility districts (e.g. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power) or federal 
power marketing agencies (e.g. TVA) and the public distribution of water where state-
owned enterprises play a much larger role.  Natural gas transmission and distribution, 
telephone and related communications, and cable television networks are almost entirely 
private in the U.S.  This has not been the case in many other countries in Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia where public enterprises dominated these sectors until the last decade 
or so.   
There is a long literature on public enterprise and privatization that covers both 
traditional natural monopoly industries and other sectors where public enterprise spread 
(e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994; Megginsen and 
Netter, 2001).  The literature covers price regulation as well as many other topics related 
to the performance of state-owed utilities.  I will not cover public enterprise or 
privatization in this essay.   
b. Franchise contracts and competition for the market 
 When the supply of a good or service has natural monopoly characteristics 
“competition within the market” will lead to a variety of performance failures as 
discussed above.  While “competition within the market” may lead to these types of 
inefficiencies, Harold Demsetz (1968) suggested that “competition for the market” could 
rely on competitive market processes, rather than regulation, to select the most efficient 
supplier and (perhaps) a second-best break-even price structure.  The essence of the 
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Demsetz proposal is to use competitive bidding to award monopoly franchise contracts 
between a government entity and the supplier, effectively to try to replicate the outcomes 
that would emerge in a perfectly contestable market.  The franchise could go to the bidder 
that offers to supply the service at the lowest price (for a single product monopoly) or the 
most efficient (second-best) price structure.  The franchising authority can add additional 
normative criteria to the bidding process.  Whatever the criteria, the idea is that the power 
of competitive markets can still be harnessed at the ex ante franchise contract execution 
stage even though ex post there is only a single firm in the market.  Ex post, regulation 
effectively takes place via the terms and conditions of the contract which are, in turn, 
determined by competition ex ante.   
 For a franchise bidding system to work well there must, at the very least, be an 
adequate number of ex ante competitors and they must act independently (no collusion).  
In this regard, one cannot presume that ex ante competition will be perfect competition 
due to differences among firms in access to productive resources, information and other 
attributes.  Competition among two or more potential suppliers may still be imperfect.  
The efficiency and rent distribution attributes of the auction will also depend on the 
specific auction rules used to select the winner and the distribution of information about 
costs and demand among the bidders (Klemperer 2002).  And, of course, the selection 
criteria used to choose the winner may be influenced by the same kinds of political 
economy considerations noted above.   
More recent theoretical developments in auction theory and incentive theory lead 
to a natural bridge between franchise bidding mechanisms and incentive regulation 
mechanisms, a subject that we will explore in more detail below.  Laffont and Tirole 
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(1993, Chapter 7) show that the primary benefit of the optimal auction compared to the 
outcome of optimal regulation with asymmetric information in this context is that 
competition lowers the prices (rents) at which the product is supplied.  In addition, as is 
the case for optimal regulation with asymmetric information (more below) the franchise 
contract resulting from an optimal auction is not necessarily a fixed price contract but 
rather a contract that is partially contingent on realized (audited) costs.  The latter result 
depends on the number of competitors.  As the number of competitors grows, the result 
of the optimal auction converges to a fixed price contract granted to the lowest cost 
supplier, who exerts optimal effort and leaves no excess profits on the table (Laffont and 
Tirole (1993), p. 318).  Armstrong and Sappington (2003) show (proposition 14) that the 
optimal franchise auction in a static setting with independent costs has the following 
features: (a) The franchise is awarded to the firm with the lowest costs; (b) A high-cost 
firm makes zero rent; (b) the rent enjoyed by a low-cost firm that wins the contest 
decreases with the number of bidders; (c) the total expected rent of the industry decreases 
with the number of bidders;  (d) the prices that the winning firm charges do not depend 
on the number of bidders and are the optimal prices in the single-firm setting.  That is, in 
theory, with a properly designed auction and a large number of competitors, the outcome 
converges to the one suggested by Demsetz.   
 The Demsetz proposal and the related theoretical research seems to be most 
relevant to natural monopoly services like community trash collection or ambulance 
services where assets are highly mobile from one community to another, the attributes of 
the service can be easily defined and suppliers are willing to offer services based on a 
series of repeated short-term contracts mediated through repeated use of competitive 
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bidding. That is, it is most relevant to market environments that are closer to being 
contestable.  It ignores the implications of significant long-lived sunk costs, asymmetric 
information between the incumbent and non-incumbent bidders, strategic actions 
changing input prices, changing technology, product quality and variety issues, and 
incomplete contracts.   As Williamson (1976) has observed, these attributes of real-world 
natural monopoly industries make once-and-for-all long-term contracts inefficient and 
not credible.  One alternative is to rely on repeated fixed-price short-term contracts.  But 
in the presence of sunk costs and asymmetric information, repeated fixed-price auctions 
for short-term franchise contracts lead to what are now well known ex ante investment 
and ex post adaptation problems associated with incomplete complex long-term contracts 
and opportunistic behavior by one or both parties to the franchise agreement 
(Williamson).   Where sunk costs are an important component of total costs, repeated 
auctions for short-term fixed-price contracts are unlikely to support efficient investments 
in long-lived assets and efficient prices for the associated services.  This in turn leads to 
the need for an institutional mechanism to adjudicate contractual disputes.  This could be 
a court or a government agency created by the government to monitor contractual 
performance, to negotiate adjustments to the franchise contract over time, and to resolve 
disputes with the franchisee.  Goldberg (1979) argues that in these circumstances the 
franchising agency effectively becomes a regulatory agency that deals with a single 
incumbent to enforce and adjust the terms of its contract.  Joskow and Schmalensee 
(1986) suggest that government regulation is productively viewed from this contract 
enforcement and adjustment perspective. For the kinds of industries that are typically 
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thought of a regulated natural monopolies, the complications identified by Williamson 
and Goldberg are likely to be important.   
 c.  Franchise contracts in practice 
In fact, franchise bidding for natural monopoly services is not a new idea but a 
rather old idea with which there is extensive historical experience. Many sectors with 
(arguably) natural monopoly characteristics in the U.S., Europe, Canada and other 
countries that started their lives during the late 19th and early part of the 20th century, 
started off life as suppliers under (typically) municipal franchise contracts that were 
issued through some type of competitive bidding process (Phillips 1993, 130-131; 
Hughes 1983, Chapter 9).  The franchise contracts were often exclusive to a geographic 
area, but in many cases there were multiple legal (and illegal) franchisees that competed 
with one another (Jarrell 1978; McDonald 1962) in the same geographic area.   
In many cases the initial long-term contracts between municipalities and suppliers 
broke down over time as economic conditions changed dramatically and the contracts did 
not contain enforceable conditions to adapt prices, services, and quality to changing 
conditions, including competitive conditions, and expectations (Hughes 1983; McDonald 
1962).  The historical evolution is consistent with the considerations raised by 
Williamson and Goldberg.14  Municipal corruption also played a role, as did wars of 
attrition when there were competing franchises and adverse public reaction to multiple 
companies stringing telephone and electric wires on poles and across city streets and 
disruptions caused by multiple suppliers opening up streets to bury pipes and wires 
(McDonald 1962; National Civic Federation 1907).   Utilities with municipal franchises 
                                                 
14 Though municipal franchise contracts for cable TV service appear to not have had the significant 
performance problems identified by Williamson (1976) (Prager 1989b;Zupan 1989a, 1989b) while federal 
efforts to regulate cable TV prices have encountered significant challenges (Crawford 2000). 
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began to expand to include many municipalities, unincorporated areas of the state and to 
cross state lines (Hughes 1983).  These expansions reflect further exploitation of 
economies of scale, growing demand for the services as costs and prices fell due to 
economies of scale, economies of density, technological change, and extensive merger 
and acquisition activity.  Municipalities faced increasing difficulties in regulating large 
corporate entities that provided service in many municipalities from common facilities 
(National Civic Federation 1907; Hughes 1983).  By around the turn of the 20th century, 
problems associated with the governance of municipal franchise contracts and their 
regulation led progressive economists like John R. Commons to favor state regulation by 
independent expert regulatory agencies that could be better insulated from interest group 
politics generally (McDonald 1962) and have access to better information and relevant 
expertise to more effectively determine reasonable prices, costs, service quality 
benchmarks, etc.  
d. Independent “expert” regulatory commission 
 d1. Historical evolution 
 Prior to the Civil War, several states established special commissions or boards to 
collect information and provide advice to state legislatures regarding railroads in their 
states.  These commissions were advisory and did not have authority to set prices or other 
terms and conditions of service.  (Phillips 1993, p. 132; Clemens 1950, page 38) The 
earliest state commissions with power over railroad rates were established by “the 
Granger laws” in several Midwestern states in the 1870s.15  These commissions had 
various powers to set maximum rates, limit price discrimination and to review mergers of 
competing railroads.  By 1887, twenty-five states had created commissions with various 
                                                 
15 Earlier state railroad commissions had fact finding and advisory roles. 
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powers over railroad rates and mergers and to assist state legislatures in the oversight of 
the railroads (Phillips 1993, p. 132;)  In 1887, the federal government created the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to oversee and potentially regulate certain 
aspects of interstate railroad freight rates, though the ICC initially had limited authority 
and shared responsibilities with the states. (Clemens, page 40).  The ICC’s regulatory 
authority over railroads was expanded considerable during the first two decades of the 
20th century (Mullin 2000, Prager 1989. Kolko 1965, Gillagan, Marshall and Weingast 
1989) and was extended to telephone and telegraph (until these responsibilities were 
taken over by the Federal Communications Commission in 1934) and to interstate 
trucking in 1935 and domestic water carriers in 1940. 
 State commission regulation of other “public utility” sectors spread much more 
slowly as they continued to be subject to local regulation through the franchise contract 
and renewal process.  Massachusetts established the Board of Gas Commissioners in 
1885 which had power to set maximum rates and to order improvements in service 
(Clemens 1950, p. 41).  Its power was extended to electric light companies two years 
later.  However, the transfer of regulatory power from local governments to state 
commissions began in earnest in 1907 when New York and Wisconsin created state 
commissions with jurisdiction over gas distribution, electric power, water, telephone and 
telegraph service prices.  By 1920 more than two-thirds of the states had created state 
public utility commissions (Stigler and Friedland 1962; Phillips 1993, p. 133; Jarrell 
1978), a very rapid rate of diffusion of a new form of government regulatory authority, 
and today all states have such commissions.  The authority of the early commissions over 
the firms they regulated was much less extensive than it is today, and their legal 
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authorities, organization and staffing evolved considerably over time (Clemens 1990, p. 
42). 
 Federal commission regulation expanded greatly during the 1930s with the 
Communications Act of 1934 and the associated creation of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) with authority over the radio spectrum and interstate telephone and 
telegraph rates, the expansion of the powers of the Federal Power Commission  by the 
Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPC, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or 
FERC) to include interstate sales of wholesale electric power and transmission service, 
and interstate transportation and sales of natural gas to gas distribution companies and 
large industrial consumers, the passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 which gave the new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulatory 
responsibilities for interstate gas and electric public utility holding companies, the 
expansion of the ICC’s authority to include rates for interstate freight transportation by 
trucks, and the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulated interstate air 
fares.   
It is hard to argue that the growth of federal regulation at this time reflected a 
renewed concern about performance problems associated with “natural monopolies.”  
The expansion of federal authority reflected a number of factors: the general expansion of 
federal authority over the economy during the Great Depression, eventually supported by 
decisions of the Supreme Court, and in particular the popularization of views that 
“destructive competition” and other types of market failure were a major source of the 
country’s economic problems; efforts by a number of industries to use federal regulatory 
authority to insulate themselves from competition, especially in the transportation areas 
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(railroads, trucks, airlines); as well as the growth of interstate gas pipelines, electric 
power networks, and telephone networks that could not be regulated effectively by 
individual states. 
  d2.  Evolution of regulatory practice 
 It became clear to students of regulation and policymakers that effective 
regulation by the government required expertise in areas such as engineering, accounting, 
finance, and economics.  Government regulators also needed information about the 
regulated firms’ costs, demand, investment, management, financing, productivity, 
reliability and safety attributes to regulate effectively.  Powerful interest groups were 
affected by decisions about prices, service quality, service extensions, investment, etc. 
and had incentives to exert any available political and other influence on regulators.  The 
regulated firms and larger industrial and commercial consumer groups were likely to be 
well organized to exert this kind of influence, but residential and small commercial 
consumers were likely to find it costly and difficult to organize to represent their interests 
effectively through the same political processes.  At the same time, the industries subject 
to regulation were capital intensive, incurred significant sunk investments in long-lived 
assets and were potentially subject to regulatory hold-ups.  The threat of such hold-ups 
would reduce or destroy incentives to make adequate investments to balance supply and 
demand efficiently.   
 The chosen organizational solution to this web of challenges for price and entry 
regulation in the U.S. during most of the 20th century was the independent regulatory 
commission (Philipps 1993).  The commission would have a quasi-judicial structure that 
applied transparent administrative procedures to establish prices, review investment and 
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financing plans, and to specify and monitor other terms and conditions of service.  At the 
top of the commission would be three to seven public utility “commissioners” who were 
responsible for voting “yes” or “no” on all major regulatory actions.  In most jurisdictions 
the commissioners are appointed by the executive (governor or the President) and 
approved by the legislature.  They are often appointed for fixed terms and sometimes for 
terms that are coterminous with the term of the governor.  At the federal level and in a 
number of states no more than a simple majority of the commissioners can be registered 
in the same political party.   In about a dozen states the public utility commissioners are 
elected by popular vote (Joskow, Rose and Wolfram, 1994). 
Underneath the commissioners is a commission staff which consists of 
professionals with training in engineering, accounting, finance, and economics and often 
a set of administrative law judges who are responsible for conducting public hearings and 
making recommendations to the commissioners.  The composition and size of 
commission staffs varies widely across the states.   Commissions adopt uniform systems 
of accounts and require regulated firms to report extensive financial and operating date to 
the commission on a continuing basis consistent with these accounting and reporting 
protocols.  Each commission adopts a set of administrative procedures that specifies how 
the commission will go about making decisions.  These procedures are designed to give 
all interest groups the opportunity to participate in hearing and other administrative 
procedures, to make information and decisions transparent, and generally to provide due 
process to all affected interest groups.  These procedures include rules governing private 
meetings between groups that may be affected by regulatory commission proceedings 
(so-called ex parte rules), rules about the number of commissioners who may meet 
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together privately, and various “sunshine” and “open meeting” rules that require 
commissioners to make their deliberations public.  Regulatory decisions must be based 
on a reasonable assessment of the relevant facts in light of the agency’s statutory 
responsibilities.  Prices must be  “just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory,”  
insuring the consumers are charged no more than necessary to give the regulated firms a 
reasonable opportunity to recover efficiently incurred costs, including a fair rate of return 
of and on their investments (Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas 320 U.S. 
591 (1944)).   
In light of the evolution of constitutional principles governing economic 
regulation, providing adequate protection for the investments made by regulated firms in 
assets dedicated to public use plays an important role in the regulatory process and has 
important implications for attracting investments to regulated sectors.  Not surprisingly, 
these administrative procedures have evolved considerably over time, with the general 
trend being to provide more opportunities for interest group participation, more 
transparency, and fewer opportunities for closed-door influence peddling (McNollgast).  
Regulatory decisions may be appealed to state or federal appeals courts as the case may 
be. 
 Of course this idealized vision of the independent regulatory commission making 
reasoned decisions based on an expert assessment of all of the relevant information 
available often does not match the reality very well.  No regulatory agency can be 
completely independent of political influences.  Commissioners and senior staff members 
are political appointments and while they cannot be fired without just cause they are also 
unlikely to be appointed if their general policy views are not acceptable to the executive 
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or the public (where commissioners are elected).  Regulatory agencies are also subject to 
legislative oversight and their behavior may be constrained through the legislative 
budgetary process (Weingast and Moran 1983).  Regulators may have career ambitions 
that may lead them to curry favor with one interest group or another (Laffont and Tirole 
1993), Chapter 16).   Staffs may be underfunded and weak.  Reporting requirements may 
not be adequate and/or the staff may have inadequate resources properly to analyze data 
and evaluate reports submitted by the parties to regulatory proceedings.  Ex parte rules 
may be difficult to enforce.  The administrative process may be too slow and 
cumbersome to allow actions to be taken in a timely way.  Under extreme economic 
conditions, regulatory principles that evolved to protect investments in regulated 
enterprises from regulatory expropriation come under great stress (Joskow 1974; Kolbe 
and Tye 1991;Sidak and Spulber 1997).  On the other hand both the executive branch and 
the legislature may find it politically attractive to devolve complicated and controversial 
decisions to agencies that are both expert and arguably independent (McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast 1987) 
 All things considered, the performance of the U.S. institution of the independent 
expert regulatory agency turns on several attributes:  a reasonable level of independence 
of the commission and its staff from the legislative and executive branches supported by 
detailed due process and transparency requirements included in enforceable 
administrative procedures, the power to specify uniform accounting rules and to require 
regulated firms to make their books and operating records available to the commission, a 
professional staff with the expertise and resources necessary to analyze and evaluate this 
information, constitutional protections against unreasonable “takings” of investments 
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made by regulated firms, and the opportunity to appeal regulatory decisions to an 
independent judiciary. 
 
VI.  PRICE REGULATION BY A FULLY INFORMED REGULATOR 
 Much of the traditional theoretical literature on price regulation of natural 
monopolies assumes that there is a legal monopoly providing one or more services and a 
regulatory agency whose job it is to set prices.  The regulated firm has natural monopoly 
characteristics (generally economies of scale in its single product and multiproduct 
variations) and the firm is assumed to minimize costs.  That is, the firm’s cost function is 
taken as given and issues of production inefficiency are ignored.  In the presence of scale 
economies, marginal cost pricing will typically not yield sufficient revenues to cover total 
cost.  Fully efficient pricing is typically not feasible for a private firm that must meet a 
break-even constraint in the presence of economies of scale (even with government 
transfers since government taxation required to raise revenues to transfer).  Accordingly, 
the literature focused on normative issues related to the development of second-best 
pricing rules for the regulated firm given a break-even constraint (or given a cost of 
government subsidies that ultimately rely on a tax system that also creates inefficiencies).  
A secondary focus of the literature has been on pricing of services like electricity which 
are non-storable, have widely varying temporal demand, have high capital intensities and 
capital must be invested to provide enough capacity  to meet the peak demand --- the so-
called peak-load of variable-load pricing (PLP) problem. 
 The traditional literature on second-best pricing for natural monopolies assumes 
that the regulator is fully informed about the regulated firm’s costs and knows as much 
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about the attributes of the demand for the services that the firm supplies as does the 
regulated firm.  The regulator’s goal is to identify and implement normative pricing rules 
that maximize total surplus given a budget constraint faced by the regulated firm.  
Neither the regulated firm nor the regulator acts strategically.  This literature represents a 
normative view of what regulators should do if they are fully informed.  It is a theory of 
what fully informed regulators should do.  It is not a positive theory of what regulators or 
regulated firms actually do in practice.  (Although there is a sense of “normative as 
positive theory of regulation” in much of the pre-1970s literature on price regulation.) 
 
a. Optimal linear prices: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing  
In order for the firm with increasing returns to break-even it appears that the 
prices the firm charges for the services it provides will have to exceed marginal cost.  
One way to proceed in the single product context is simply to set a single price for each 
unit of the product equal to its average cost (pAC).  Then the expenditures made by each 
consumer i will be equal to Ei = pACqi.  In this case pAC is a uniform linear price schedule 
since the firm charges the same price for each unit consumed and each consumer’s 
expenditures on the product varies proportionately with the output she consumes.  In the 
multiproduct context, we could charge a uniform price per unit for each product supplied 
by the firm that departs from its marginal or average incremental cost by a common 
percentage mark-up consistent with meeting the regulated firm’s budget constraint.  
Again the prices charged for each product are linear in the sense that the unit price for 
each product is a constant and yields a linear expenditure schedule for consumers of each 
product.   
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The first question to address is whether, within the class of linear prices, we can 
do better than charging a uniform price per unit supplied that embodies an equal mark-up 
over marginal cost to all consumers for all products sold by the regulated firm?  
Alternatively, can we do better by engaging in third degree price discrimination:  in the 
case of a single product firm, by charging different unit prices to different types of 
consumers (e.g. residential and industrial and assuming that resale is restricted) or in the 
case of multiproduct firms charging a constant unit price for each product but where each 
unit price embodies a different markup over its incremental cost? 
Following Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 64), the regulated firm produces n 
products whose quantities supplied are represented by the vector q = (q1, … qn).  Assume 
that the demand functions for the price vector p = (p1,… pn) are qk = Dk(p1, … pn).  The 
firm’s total revenue function is then R(q)   = Σ(i = 1, n) pkqk .  Let the firm’s total cost 
function be C(q) = C(q1, … qn) and denote the marginal cost for each product k as Ck(q1, 
… qn). 
Let S(q) denote the gross surplus for output vector q with kp
kq
S =∂
∂ .  The Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing problem (Ramsey 1927; Boiteux 1971 (1956)) is then to find the vector 
of constant unit (linear) prices for the n products that maximizes net social surplus subject 
to the regulated firm’s break-even or balanced budget constraint: 
 
 maxq {S(q) – C(q)}  subject to      (1) 
 R(q) – C(q) >   0        (2) 
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or equivalently, maximizing the firm’s profit subject to achieving the Ramsey-Boiteux 
level of net social surplus: 
 maxq {R(q) – C(q)} subject to      (3) 
 S(q) – C(q) > S(q*) – C(q*)   (4) 
Where q* represent the Ramsey-Boiteux levels of output. 
Let 1/λ represent the shadow price of the constraint in the second formulation 
above.  Then the first order condition for the maximization of (3) subject to (4) for each 
qk is given by: 
 λ(pk - ck + j
k
jn
j qq
p
∂
∂Σ =1 ) + pk – ck = 0  (5) 
When the demands for the products produced by the regulated firm are independent this 
reduces to: 
  
kk
kk
p
cp
ηλ
λ 1
1+=
−        (6) 
for all products k = 1…n and where ηk is the own-price elasticity of demand for product 
k.  This is often referred to as the inverse elasticity rule (Baumol and Bradford 1970).  
Prices are set so that the difference between a product’s price and its marginal cost vary 
inversely with the elasticity of demand for the product.  The margin is higher for products 
that have less elastic demands than for products that have more elastic demand (at the 
equilibrium prices).   
When the products produced by the regulated firm are not independent --- they 
are substitutes for complements --- the own-price elasticities in (6) must be replaced with 
“super-elasticities” that reflect the cross-price effects as well as own-price effects.  If the 
products are substitutes, the Ramsey-Boiteux prices are higher than would be implied by 
 80
ignoring the substitution effect (the relevant superelasticity is less elastic than the own-
price elasticity of good k) and vice versa.   
Note that Ramsey-Boiteux prices involve third-degree price discrimination that 
results in a set of prices that lie between marginal cost pricing and the prices that would 
be set by a pure monopoly engaging in third-degree price discrimination.  For example, 
rather than being different products, assume that q1 and q2 are the same product 
consumed by two groups of consumers who have different demand elasticities (e.g. 
residential and industrial consumers) and that resale can be blocked eliminating the 
opportunity to arbitrage away differences in prices charged to the two groups of 
consumers.  Then the price will be higher for the group with the less elastic demand 
despite the fact that the product and the associated marginal cost of producing it are the 
same.   Note as well that the structure, though not the level, of the Ramsey-Boiteux prices 
is the same as the prices that would be charged by an unregulated monopoly with the 
opportunity to engage in third-degree price discrimination. 
b. Non-linear Prices: Simple Two-part tariffs 
Ramsey-Boiteux prices are still only second-best prices because the unit prices 
are not equal to marginal cost.  The distortion is smaller than for uniform (p = AC in the 
single product case) pricing since we are taking advantage of differences in the 
elasticities of demand for different types of consumers or different products to satisfy the 
budget constraint with a smaller dead-weight loss from departures from marginal cost 
pricing.  That is, there is still a wedge between the price for a product and its marginal 
cost leading to an associated dead-weight loss.  The question is whether we can do better 
by further relaxing the restriction on the kinds of prices that the regulated firm can 
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charge.  Specifically, can we do better if we were to allow the regulated firm to charge a 
“two-part” price that includes a non-distortionary  uniform fixed “access charge” (F) and 
then a separate per unit usage charge (p).  A price schedule or tariff of this form would 
yield a consumer expenditure or outlay schedule of the form: 
   Ti = F + pqi 
Such a price schedule is “non-linear” because the average expenditure per unit consumed 
Ti/qi is not longer constant, but falls as qi increases.  We can indeed do (much) better 
from an efficiency perspective with two-part prices than we can with second-best 
(Ramsey-Boiteux) linear prices (Brown and Sibley 1986, pp. 167-183). 
 Assume that there are N identical consumers in the market each with demand qi = 
d(p) and gross surplus of Si evaluated at p = 0.  The regulated firm’s total cost function is 
given by C = fo + cq.   That is, there is a fixed cost fo and a marginal cost c.  Consider a 
tariff structure that requires each consumer to pay an access charge A = fo/N and then a 
unit charge p = c.  Consumer i’s expenditure schedule is then: 
  Ti = A + pqi  = fo/N + cqi 
This two-part tariff structure is first-best (ignoring income effects).  On the margin, each 
consumer pays a usage price equal to marginal cost and the difference between the 
revenues generated from the usage charges and the firm’s total costs are covered with a 
fixed fee that acts as a lump sum tax.  As long as A < (Si – pqi) then consumers will pay 
the access fee and consume at the efficient level.  If A > (Si – pqi) then it is not 
economical to supply the service at all because the gross surplus is less than the total cost 
of supplying the service (recall Si is the same for all consumers and pi  = c). 
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 Two-part tariffs provide a neat solution to the problem of setting efficient prices 
in this context when consumers are identical (or almost identical) or A is very small 
compared to the net surplus (i.e. after paying pqi = cqi).  However, in reality consumers 
may have very different demands for the regulated service and A may be large relative to 
(Si – cqi) for at least some consumers.  In this case, if a single access fee A = fo/N is 
charged consumers with relatively low valuations will choose not to pay the access fee 
and consumer zero units of the regulated service even though their net surplus exceeds 
cqi  and they would be willing to make at least some contribution to the firm’s fixed costs.  
A uniform two-part tariff would not be efficient in this case.  However, if the regulator 
were truly fully informed about each consumer’s individual demand and could prevent 
consumers from reselling the service, then a “discriminatory” two-part tariff could be 
tailored to match each consumer’s valuation.  In this case the customized /access fee Ai 
charged to each consumer would simply have to satisfy the condition Ai < (Si – cqi ) and 
there will exist at least one vector of Ai values that will allow the firm to satisfy the 
break-even constraint as long as it is efficient to supply the service at all. 
 If any of the conditions are met for two-part tariffs to be an efficient solution, the 
welfare gains compared to Ramsey-Boiteux pricing are likely to be relatively large 
(Brown and Sibley (1986), Chapter 7). 
c. Optimal Non-linear Prices  
In reality, consumers are likely to be quite diverse and the regulator will not know 
each individual consumer’s demand for the services whose prices they regulate.  Can we 
use a variant of two-part tariffs to realize efficiency gains compared to either Ramsey-
Boiteux prices or uniform two-part tariffs?  In general, we can do better with non-linear 
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pricing than with simple Ramsey-Boiteux pricing as long as the regulator is informed 
about the distribution of consumer demands/valuations for the regulated service in the 
population.   
Consider the case where there are two types of consumers, one type (of which 
there are n1 consumers) with a “low demand” and another type (of which there are n2 
consumers) with a “high demand.”  The inverse demand functions for representative type 
1 and type 2 consumers are depicted in Figure 6 as p = d1(q1) and p = d2(q2) .  The cost 
function is as before with marginal cost = c.  If we charge a uniform unit price of  p = c, 
the net surplus for a low-type consumer is CS1 = (S1 – cq1)  and the net surplus for a 
high-type consumer is CS2 = (S2 – cq2) where CS1 < CS2 and n1CS1 + n2CS2 > fo.  If the 
regulator were restricted to only a uniform two-part tariff, the highest access charge that 
could be assessed without forcing the low-cost types off of the network would be A = 
CS1.  If the total revenues generated when all consumers are charged an access fee equal 
to CS1 is less than fo then the break-even constraint would not be satisfied and the product 
would not be supplied even if it’s total value is greater than its total cost.  How can we 
extract more of the consumer’s surplus out of the high demand types to cover the 
regulated firm’s budget constraint with the minimum distortion to consumption decisions 
of both consumer types?   
This is a simple example of the more general non-linear pricing problem.   
Intuitively, we can think of offering a menu of two-part tariffs of the form: 
T1 = A1 + p1q1 
T2 = A2 + p2q2 
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Where A1 < A2 and p1 > p2  > c as in Figure 7 so that the low demand consumers find it 
most economical to choose T1 and the high demand types choose T2.  In order to achieve 
this incentive compatibility property, the tariff T1 with the low access fee must have a 
price p1 that is sufficiently greater than p2 to make T1 unattractive to the high demand 
type.  At the same time we would like to keep p1 and p2 as close to c as we can to 
minimize the distortion in consumption arising from prices being greater than marginal 
cost.  The low-demand and high-demand types face a different price on the margin and 
the optimal prices are chosen to meet the break-even constraint with the minimum 
distortion.  Note, that the menu above is equivalent to a single price schedule that has a 
single fixed fee A* and then a usage fee that declines as consumption increases: 
 
T(q) = A* + p1q1 + p2(q2 – q1*)   
 
for q1 between 0 and q1* and q2 > q1*. 
Let us turn to a more general case.  Following Laffont and Tirole (2000, pp. 70-
71) assume that the regulated firm’s cost function is as before: 
  C = f0 + cq  
There is then a continuum of consumers with different demands for the regulated service 
and the consumer types are indexed by the parameter θ.  A consumer of type θ will be 
confronted with a non-linear tariff T(q) which has the property that the average 
expenditure on the service declines as q increases.  Assume that the consumer of type θ 
consumes q(θ) when she faces T(q) and has net utility U(θ) = θV[q(θ)] – T[q(θ)].  (Note, 
this effectively assumes that the distribution of consumer demands shifts outward as θ 
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increases and that the associated individual consumer demand curves do not cross.  See 
Brauetigam (1989) and Brown and Sibley (1986) for more general treatments.) 
 Assume next that the parameter θ is distributed according to the c.d.f. G(θ) with 
density g(θ) with lower and upper bounds on θ of θL and θH  respectively with the hazard 
rate g(θ)/[1 – G(θ)] increasing with θ.  Let (1+λ) denote the shadow cost of the firm’s 
budget constraint.  Then maximizing social welfare (gross consumers’ surplus net of the 
total costs of production) is equivalent to maximizing: 
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Let U(θ) ≡ θV[q(θ)] – T[q(θ)] and we obtain the constrained maximization problem for 
deriving the properties of the optimal non-linear prices 
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where the first constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint and the second 
constraint is the constraint that all consumers with positive net surplus participate in the 
market.  
 Letting )(')()( qTqpq ==θ  denote the marginal price that characterizes the 
optimal non-linear tariff, we obtain 
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which implies that the optimal two-part tariff has the property that the marginal price falls 
toward marginal cost as θ increases or, alternatively we move from lower to higher 
demand types.  (Alternative presentations can be found in Brauetigam (1989) and in 
Brown and Sibley (1986)). 
 Willig (1978) shows that any second-best (Ramsey-Boiteux) uniform price 
schedule can be dominated from a welfare perspective by a non-linear price schedule.  In 
some sense this should not be surprising.  By capturing some infra-marginal surplus to 
help to cover the regulated firm’s fixed costs, marginal prices can be moved closer to 
marginal cost, reducing the pricing distortion, while still satisfying the firm’s budget 
balance constraint. 
In fact, non-linear pricing has been used in the pricing of electricity, gas and 
telephone service since early in the 20th century (Clark, 1911, 1913).  Early proponents of 
non-linear pricing such as Samuel Insull viewed these pricing methods as a way to 
expand demand and lower average costs while meeting a break-even constraint (Hughes 
1983, pp 218-226).  As is the case for uniform prices, the basic structure, though not the 
level, of the optimal non-linear prices is identical to the structure that would bed chosen 
be a profit maximizing monopoly. 
d. Peak-Load or Variable Load Pricing 
Many public utility services cannot be stored and the demand for these services 
may vary widely from hour to hour, day to day and season to season.  Because these 
services cannot be stored, the physical capacity of the network must be expanded 
sufficiently to meet peak demand.  Services like electricity distribution and generation, 
gas distribution, and telephone networks are very capital intensive and the carrying costs 
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(depreciation, interest, return on equity investment) of the capital invested in this capacity 
is a relatively large fraction of total cost.  For example, the demand for electricity varies 
widely between day and night, between weekdays and weekends and between days with 
extreme rather than moderate temperatures.  Over the course of a year, the difference in 
demand between peak and trough may be on the order of a factor of three or more.  The 
demand during the peak hour of a very hot day may be double the demand at night on 
that same day.  Since electricity cannot be stored economically, the generating, 
transmission and distribution capacity of an electric power system must be sufficient to 
meet these peak demand days, taking into account equipment outages as well as 
variations in demand.  Traditional telephone and natural gas distribution network have 
similar attributes. 
The “peak load pricing” literature, which has been developed primarily in 
connection with the pricing of electricity, has focused on the specification of efficient 
prices and investment levels that take account of the variability of demand, the non-
storability of the service, the attributes of alternative types of capital equipment available 
to supply electricity, equipment outages, and the types of metering equipment this is 
available and at what cost.  There is a very extensive theoretical literature on efficient 
pricing and investment programs for electric power services that was developed mostly 
during the period 1950-1980 and primarily by French, British and American economists 
(Nelson 1964; Turvey 1968b; Kahn 1970; Crew and Kleinforder 1986; Dreze 1964; 
Joskow 1976; Brown and Sibley 1986; Panzar 1976; Carlton 1977).    This theoretical 
work was applied extensively to the pricing of electricity in France and in England during 
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the 1950s and 1960s.  There is little new of late on this topic and I refer interested readers 
to the references cited above. 
The intuition behind the basic peak load pricing results is quite straightforward.  If 
capacity must be built to meet peak demand then when demand is below the peak there 
will be surplus capacity available.  The long run marginal cost of increasing supply to 
meet an increment in peak demand includes both the additional capital and operating 
costs of building and operating an increment of peak capacity.  The long run marginal 
cost of increasing supply to meet an increment of off peak demand reflects only the 
additional operating costs or short run marginal cost of running more of the surplus 
capacity to meet the higher demand as long as off-peak demand does not increase to a 
level greater than the peak capacity on the system.  Accordingly, the marginal social cost 
of increasing supply to meet an increase in peak demand will be much higher than the 
marginal cost of increasing supply to meet an increment of off-peak demand.  Efficient 
price signals should convey these different marginal costs to consumers.  Accordingly,  
the peak price should be relatively high, reflecting both marginal operating and capital 
costs, and the off-peak prices low to reflect only the off-peak marginal costs of operating 
the surplus capacity more intensively. 
The following simple model demonstrates this intuitive result and one of several 
interesting twists to it.  
 
Let  qD = qD(pD)  =  the demand for electricity during day-time hours 
and qN = qD(pN) =  the demand for electricity during night-time hours 
 89
for any pD = pN  day-time demand is higher than night-time demand (qD(pD) > qN(pD)).  
The gross surplus during each period (area under the demand curve) is given by S(qi) and 
i
i
i p
q
S =∂
∂
.  
Assume that the production of electricity is characterized by a simple fixed-proportions 
technology composed of a unit rental cost CK for each unit of generating capacity (K) and 
a marginal operating cost cE for each unit of electricity produced.  We will assume that 
there are no economies of scale, recognizing that any budget balance constraints can be 
handled with second-best linear or non-linear prices.  Demand in any period must be less 
than or equal to the amount of capacity installed so that qD < K and qN < K. 
The optimal prices are then given by solving the following program which 
maximizes net surplus subject to the constraints that output during each period must be 
less than or equal to the quantity of capacity that has been installed : 
L* = S(qD) + S(qN) – CKK – CE (qD + qN) +  λD(K – qD) + λN (K – qN)  (12) 
where λD  and λN are the shadow prices on capacity  The first order conditions are then 
given by: 
pD – CE - λD = 0         
pN – CE - λN = 0 
λD + λN – CK = 0 
with complementary slackness conditions 
 λD (K – qD) = 0 
 λN (K – qN) = 0 
There are then two interesting cases: 
Case 1:   Classic peak load pricing results. 
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 PD = CE + Ck  (λD = CK)     (13) 
 PN = CE  (λN = 0)     (14) 
 qN < qD        (15) 
In this case, the optimal price during the peak period equals the sum of marginal 
operating costs and marginal capacity costs.  In the off-peak period the optimal price 
equals only marginal operating costs.  The result is depicted in Figure 8. 
Case 2:  Shifting peak case: 
 PD = CE + λD  (λD > 0)     (16) 
 PN = CE + λN  (λN > 0)     (17) 
λD + λN – CK = 0       (18) 
qD = qN        (19) 
Here, the optimal prices during the peak and off peak periods effectively share the 
marginal cost of capacity plus the marginal cost of producing electricity.  The peak 
period price includes a larger share of the marginal cost of capacity than the off-peak 
price reflecting the differences in the marginal willingness to pay between the two 
periods.  This result is reflected in Figure 9. 
 The standard case is where λD > 0 and λN =0.  The peak price now equals the 
marginal capital and operating cost of the equipment and the off-peak price equals only 
the marginal operating costs.  Investment in capacity K is made sufficient to meet peak 
demand (K = qD  > qN ) and consumers buying power during the peak period pay all of 
the capital costs.  Consumption during the day then carries a higher price than 
consumption at night.  Does this imply that there is price discrimination at work here?  
The answer is no.  Peak and off-peak consumption are essentially separate products and 
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supply in both periods each pay their respective marginal supply costs.  What is true, is 
that the production of peak and off peak supplies are “joint products” that incur joint 
costs.  That is, off-peak supply could not be provided so inexpensively if peak demand 
was not there to pay all of the capital costs.   
The role of joint costs becomes evident when we look at the second potential 
solution of the simple problem above.  This potential solution has the following 
properties: 
   qD = qN 
and   λD + λN = CK 
In this potential equilibrium, peak and off-peak consumption each bear a share of 
the capital or capacity costs.  This situation arises when the peak and off-peak demands 
are so elastic that applying the simple peak load pricing rule that the peak demand pays 
for all capital costs and the off-peak demand for none, ends up shifting the peak demand 
to the off-peak (night) period.  This problem was realized in a number of countries that 
instituted simple peak load pricing models for electricity during the 1960s and 1970s.  
The off-peak price was set so low that many consumers installed electric heating 
equipment that on cold winter nights led electricity demand to reach its peak levels.  The 
solution to the problem is to share the joint capacity costs in a way that reflects the 
relative valuations of peak and off-peak consumption (at the equilibrium prices).  Figure 
9.  The off-peak price still is lower than the peak price, but now all consumption makes 
pays a share of the network’s capacity costs.  The implementation of efficient prices now 
requires information about the elasticity of demand in different time periods. 
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 There are numerous realistic complications that can and have been introduced into 
simple peak load pricing models such as the one above.  Suppliers can choose among 
different production techniques with different (in the case of electricity) capital/fuel 
ratios.  In addition, demand cannot be divided simply between “peak” and “off-peak.”  
Rather the system is characterized by continuously varying demands that lie between 
some lower and upper bound.  In this case, since some of the capacity is utilized 
relatively few hours each year, some during all hours and some for say half the hours of 
the year, it is economical to install a mix of “base load,” “intermediate” and “peak load” 
capacity (Turvey 1986b; Crew and Kleindorfer 1976; Joskow 1976) and by allowing 
prices to vary with marginal production costs, produce infra-marginal quasi rents to cover 
some of the costs of investments in production facilities.  In addition, it turns out that 
even ignoring the “shifting peak” issue discussed above, when consumption is priced at 
marginal operating cost during most time periods, consumers during this hours make a 
contribution to the capital costs of the network because the marginal operating costs of 
the now diverse electricity production technologies on the network increases as the 
demand on the network increases.  Enhancements of these models have also considered 
the stochastic attributes of demand and equipment (unplanned outages and planned 
maintenance requirements) to derive both optimal levels of reserve capacity and the 
associated optimal prices with and without real time price variations (Carlton 1977).  
 The marginal cost of producing electricity varies almost continuously in real time.  
And when short run capacity constraints are reached the social marginal cost can jump to 
the valuation of the marginal consumer who is not served (the value of lost load or the 
value of unserved energy --- Joskow and Tirole 2004a).  Many economists of argue that 
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electricity prices should vary in real time to convey better price signals (Borenstein 
2005).  However, any judgment about which consumers should pay real time prices must 
take into account the transactions costs associated with recording consumption in real 
time, collecting and analyzing the associated data.  It is generally thought that for larger 
customers the welfare gains from better pricing exceed the costs of installing and 
utilizing more sophisticated meters.  
 Variable demand, diverse technologies, reliability and real time pricing can all be 
integrated with the “budget balance” constraint considerations discussed earlier.  The 
same basic second-best pricing results hold, though the relevant marginal costs are now 
more complicated as is the implementation of the budget balance constraint since when 
stochastic demand and supply attributes are introduced, the firm’s revenues, costs and 
profits also become uncertain (Crew and Kleindorfer 1986). 
   
VII.   COST OF SERVICE REGULATION:  RESPONSE TO LIMITED 
 INFORMATION 
 The discussion of optimal pricing for a natural monopoly in the last section 
assumes that the regulator knows all there is to know about the regulated firm’s costs and 
demand.  In addition, the regulated firm does not act strategically by changing its 
managerial effort to increase costs or to distort the information the regulator possesses 
about its cost opportunities and the demand it faces for the services it provides.  In reality, 
regulators are not inherently well informed about the attributes of the firm’s cost 
opportunities, its demand, or its management’s effort and performance.  The regulated 
firm knows much more about these variables than does the regulator and, if given the 
opportunity, may have incentives to act strategically.  The firm may provide incorrect 
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information about the its cost, demand and managerial effort attributes to the regulator or 
the firm may respond to poorly designed regulatory incentives by reducing managerial 
effort, increasing costs, or reducing the quality of service.  Much of the evolution of 
regulatory agencies and regulatory procedures in the U.S. during the last hundred years 
has focused on making it possible for the regulator to obtain better information about 
these variables and to use this information more effectively in the regulatory process.   
More recent theoretical and empirical research has focused on the development of more 
efficient regulatory mechanisms that reflect these information asymmetries and 
associated opportunities for strategic behavior as well as to better exploit opportunities 
for the regulator to reduce its information disadvantages. 
 I have chosen to begin the discussion of regulation when the regulator has limited 
information about the attributes of the firm and its customers with a discussion of 
traditional “cost of service” or “rate of return” regulation that has been the basic 
framework for commission regulation in the U.S. during most of the 20th century.  The 
performance of this regulatory process (real and imagined) is the “benchmark” against 
which alternative mechanisms are compared.  The “traditional” cost of service regulation 
model is frequently criticized as being very inefficient but the way it works in practice is 
also poorly understood by many of its critics.  Its application in fact reflects efforts to 
respond to imperfect and asymmetric information problems that all regulatory processes 
must confront.  Moreover, the application of modern “incentive regulation” mechanisms 
is frequently an addition to rather than a replacement for cost-of-service regulation.  After 
outlining the attributes of cost of service regulation in practice I proceed to discuss the 
“Averch-Johnson” model, first articulated in 1962 and developed extensively in the 
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1970s and 1980s, which endeavors to examine theoretically the efficiency implications of 
rate of return regulation and variations in its application.   
 a .  Cost-of-service or rate-of-return regulation in practice 
 U.S. regulatory processes have approached the challenges created by asymmetric 
information in a number of ways.  First, regulators have adopted a uniform system of 
accounts for each regulated industry.  These cost-reporting protocols require regulated 
firms to report their capital and operating costs according to specific accounting rules 
regarding  the valuation of capital assets, depreciation schedules, the treatment of taxes, 
operating cost categories, allocation of costs between lines of business and between 
regulated and unregulated activities, and the financial instruments and their costs used by 
the firm to finance capital investments.  These reports are audited and false reports can 
lead to significant sanctions.  Since most U.S. states and federal regulatory agencies use 
the same uniform system of accounts for firms in a particular industry, the opportunity to 
perform comparative analyses of firm costs and to apply “yardstick regulation” concepts 
also becomes a distinct possibility (more on this below).  Regulatory agencies also have 
broad power to seek additional information from regulated firms that would not normally 
be included in the annual reports under the uniform system of accounts; for example data 
on equipment outage and other performance indicia, customer outages, consumer demand 
patterns, etc., and to perform special studies such as demand forecasting and demand 
elasticity measurement.  These data collection and analysis requirements are one way that 
U.S. regulators can seek to increase the quality of the information they have about the 
firms they regulate and reduce the asymmetry of information between the regulator and 
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the firms that it regulates.  Whether they use these data and authorities wisely is another 
matter   
 Regulators in the U.S. and other countries have long known, however, that better 
data and analysis cannot fully resolve the asymmetric information problem.  There are 
inherent differences between firms in terms of their cost opportunities and the managerial 
skill and effort extended by their managements and traditional accounting methods for 
measuring capital costs may create more confusion than light.   Accordingly, the 
regulatory process does not require regulators to accept the firms’ reported and audited 
accounting costs as “just and reasonable” when they set prices.  They can “disallow” 
costs that they determine are unreasonably through, for example, independent 
assessments of firm behavior and comparisons with other comparable firms (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1986).  Moreover, contrary to popular misconceptions, regulated prices are 
not adjusted to assure that revenues and costs are exactly in balance continuously.  There 
are sometimes lengthy periods of “regulatory lag” during which prices are fixed or adjust 
only partially in response to realized costs the regulated firm shares in the benefits and 
burdens of unit cost increases or decreases (Joskow 1973, 1974; Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1986).  And regulators may specify simple “incentive regulation” 
mechanisms that share variations in profitability between the regulated firm and its 
customers.  These are generally called “sliding scale” regulatory mechanisms (Lyon 
1996), a topic that will be explored presently.  
 The “fixed point” of traditional U.S. regulatory practice is the rate case (Phillips 
1993).  The rate case is a public quasi judicial proceeding in which a regulated firm’s 
prices or “tariffs” may adjusted by the regulatory agency.  Once a new set of prices and 
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price adjustment formulas are agreed to with the regulator (and sustains any court 
challenges) they remain in force until they are adjusted through a subsequent rate case.   
Contrary to popular characterizations, regulated prices are not adjusted continuously as 
cost and demand conditions change, but rather are “tested” from time to time through the 
regulatory prices. Rate cases do not proceed on a fixed schedule but are triggered by 
requests from the regulated firm, regulators, or third-parties for an examination of the 
level or structure of prevailing tariffs (Joskow 1973).  Accordingly, base prices are fixed 
until they are adjusted by the regulator through a process initiated by the regulated firm 
or by the regulator on its own initiative (perhaps responding to complaints from 
interested parties (Joskow 1972).  This “regulatory lag” between rate cases may be quite 
long and has implications for the incentives regulated firms have to control costs (Joskow 
1974) and the distribution of surplus between the regulated firm and consumers . 
 A typical rate case in the U.S. has two phases.  The first phase determines the 
firm’s total revenue requirement or its total cost of service.  It is convenient to think of 
the revenue requirements or cost of service as the firm’s budget constraint.  The second 
phase is the rate design or tariff structure phase.  In this phase the actual prices that will 
be charged for different quantities consumed or to different types of consumers or for 
different products is determined.  It is in the rate design phase where concepts of Ramsey 
pricing, non-linear pricing and peak load pricing would be applied in practice. 
The firm’s revenue requirements or cost of service has numerous individual 
components which can be grouped into a few major categories: 
 a.  Operating costs (e.g. fuel, labor, materials and supplies) --- OC 
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 b. Capital related costs that define the effective “rental price” for capital that will 
be included in the firm’s total “cost of service” for any given time period .  These capital 
related charges are a function of:  
  i.  the value of the firm’s “regulatory asset base” or its “rate base” (RAV) 
  ii. the annual amount of depreciation on the regulatory asset base (D) 
  iii. the allowed rate of return (s) on the regulatory asset base 
  iv. income tax rate (t) on the firm’s gross profits 
 c.  Other costs (e.g. property taxes, franchise fees) --- F 
 
  a1. Regulated revenue requirement or total cost of service 
 The regulated firm’s total revenue requirements or cost of service in year t is then 
given by 
Rt = OCt + Dt + r(1+t)RAV + Ft 
 These cost components are initially drawn from the regulated firm’s books and 
records based on a uniform system of accounts adopted by the regulator.  An important 
part of the formal rate case is to evaluate whether the firm’s costs as reported on its books 
or projected into the future are “reasonable.”  The regulatory agency may rely on its own 
staff’s evaluations to identify costs that were “unreasonable” or unrepresentative of a 
typical year, or the regulator may also rely on studies presented by third-party 
“intervenors” in the rate case (Joskow 1972).  Interested third-parties are permitted to 
participate fully in a rate case and representatives of different types of consumers, a 
public advocate, and non-government public interest groups often participate in these 
cases, as well as in any settlement negotiations that are increasingly relied upon to cut the 
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administrative process short.  Costs that the regulatory agency determines are 
unreasonable are then “disallowed” and deducted from the regulated firm’s cost of 
service.   
 There are a number of methods available to assess the “reasonableness” of a 
firm’s expenditures.  One type of approach that is sometimes used is a “yardstick” 
approach in which a particular firm’s costs are compared to the costs of comparable firms 
and significant deviations subject to some disallowance (e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt 2001, 
2003; Carrington, Coeli and Groom 2002; Schleifer 1985).  Such an approach has been 
used to evaluate fuel costs, labor productivity, wages, executive compensation, 
construction costs and other costs. A related approach is to retain outside experts to 
review the firm’s expenditure experience in specific areas and to opine on whether they 
were reasonably efficient given industry norms.  The regulator may question assumptions 
about future demand growth, the timing of replacements of capital equipment, wage 
growth, etc.  Finally, accountants comb through the regulated firm’s books to search for 
expenditures that are either prohibited (e.g. Red Sox tickets for the CEO’s family) or that 
may be of questionable value to the regulated firm’s customers (e.g. a large fleet of 
corporate jets).   These reasonableness review processes historically tended to be rather 
arbitrary and ad hoc in practice, but have become more scientific over time as 
benchmarking methods have been developed and applied.   Since the regulated firm 
always knows more about its own cost opportunities and the reasons why it made certain 
expenditures than does the regulator, this process highlights the importance of thinking 
about regulation from an asymmetric information perspective. 
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 From the earliest days of rate or return regulation, a major issue that has been 
addressed by academics, regulators and the courts is the proper way to value the firm’s 
assets and how the associated depreciation rates and allowed rate of return on investment 
should be determined (Sharfman 1928; Phillips 1993; Bonbright 1961; Clemens 1950).  
A regulated firm makes investments in long-lived capital facilities.  Regulators must 
determine how consumers will pay for the costs of these facilities over their economic 
lives.  A stock (the value of capital investments) must be transformed into a stream of 
cash flows or annual rental charges over the life of the assets in which the regulated firm 
has invested in order to set the prices that the firm can charge and the associated revenues 
that it will realize to meet the firm’s overall budget constraint. The basic legal principle 
that governs price regulation in the U.S. is that regulated prices must be set at levels that 
give the regulated firm a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of the investments it 
makes efficiently to meet its service obligations and no more than is necessary to do so.16  
One way of operationalizing this legal principle is to reduce it to the rule that the present 
discounted value of future cash flows that flow back to investors in the firm (equity, debt, 
preferred stock) should be at least equal to the cost of the capital facilities in which the 
firm has invested,. Where the discount rate is the firm’s risk adjusted cost of capital “r.”  
Let: 
Πt = cash flow in year t = Revenues – operating costs – taxes and other expenses 
 Ko = the “reasonable” cost of an asset added by the utility in year t 
 r =  the firm’s after tax opportunity cost of capital   
The basic rule for setting prices to provide an appropriate return of and on an investment 
in an asset with a cost of Ko made by the regulated firm can then be defined as: 
                                                 
16 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). 
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 Ko <    ∑ +n ttr1 )1( π         (12) 
where n is the useful/economic life of the asset.  If this condition holds, then the regulated 
firm should be willing to make the investment since it will cover its costs, including a 
return on its investment greater than or equal to its opportunity cost of capital.  If the 
relationship holds with equality then consumers are asked to pay no more than is 
necessary to attract investments in assets required to provide services efficiently. Since a 
regulated firm will typically be composed of many assets reflecting investments in capital 
facilities made at many different times in the past, this relationship must hold both on the 
margin and in the aggregate for all assets.  However, it is easiest to address the relevant 
issues by considering a single-asset firm, say a natural gas pipeline company, with a 
single productive asset that works perfectly for n years and then no longer works at all (a 
one-horse-shay model). 
 There are many (infinite) different streams of cash flows that satisfy the NPV 
condition in (12) for a single asset firm that invests in the asset in year 1 and uses it 
productively until it is retired in year n.  These cash flows can have many different time 
profiles.  Cash flows could start high and decline over time.  Cash flows could start low 
and rise over time.  Cash flows could be constant over the life of the asset.  Much of the 
historical debate about the valuation of the regulatory asset base, the depreciation rate and 
rate of return values to be used to turn the value of the capital invested by the regulated 
monopoly firm in productive assets into an appropriate stream of cash flows over time, 
has reflected alternative views about the appropriate time profile and (perhaps 
unintended) the ultimate level of the  present value of these cash flows.   Unfortunately, 
this debate about asset valuation, depreciation and allowed return was long on rhetoric 
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and short on mathematical analysis, had difficulty dealing with inflation in general and 
confused real and nominal interest rates in particular (Sharfman 1928; Clemens 1950, 
Chapter 7).  The discussion and resulting regulatory accounting rules also assume that the 
regulated firm is a monopoly, does not face competition, and will be in a position to 
charge prices that recover the cost of the investment over the accounting life of the asset.  
Giving customers the option to switch back and forth from the regulated firms effectively 
imbeds a costly option into the “regulatory contract” and requires alternative formulas for 
calculating prices that yield revenues with an expected value equal to the cost of the 
investment (Pindyck 2004; Hausman  1997; Hausman and Myers 2002). 
 A natural starting point for an economist is to rely on economic principles to 
value the regulated firm’s assets.  We would try to calculate a pattern of rental prices for 
the firm’s assets that simulates the trajectory of rental prices that would emerge if the 
associated capital services were sold in a competitive market.  This approach implies 
valuing assets at their competitive market values, using economic depreciation concepts, 
and taking appropriate account of inflation in the calculation of real and nominal interest 
rates.  Consider the following simple example: 
Assume that a machine producing a homogeneous product depreciates 
(physically) at a rate d per period.  You can think of this as the number of units of output 
from the machine declining at a rate d over time.  Assume that operating costs are zero. 
Define the competitive rental value for a new machine at any time s by v(s).  Then in year 
s the rental value on an old machine bought in a previous year t would be 
   v(s)e-d(s-t) 
since (s-t) is the number of years the machine has been decaying. 
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The price of a new machine purchased in year t [P(t)] is the present discounted 
value of future rental values.  Let r be the firm’s discount rate (cost of capital).  Then the 
present value of the rental income in year s discounted back to year t is 
 
  e-r(s-t)v(s)e-d(s-t) = e(r+d)tv(s)e-(r+d)s  
 
and the present value of the machine in year t is: 
  PDV(t) =  ∫∞ +−+t dssdresvtdre )()()(     (13) 
        =  competitive market price for a new  
                                    machine in year t 
 
          = P(t) 
Rewrite this equation as: 
  P(t) =  ∫∞ +−+ t dssdresvtdre )()()(       (14) 
and differentiate with respect to t 
  dP(t)/dt = (r+d)P(t) – v(t) 
or 
  v(t) = (r+d)P(t) – dP(t)/dt 
where dP(t)/dt reflects exogenous changes in the price of new machines over time.  These 
price changes reflect general inflation (i) and technological change (δ) leading to lower 
cost machines (or more productive machines).  The changes in the prices of new 
machines affect the value of old machines because new machines must compete with old 
machines producing the same product. 
  v(t) = (r+d)P(t) – (i - δ)P(t)      (15) 
   = (r + d - i + δ)P(t) 
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The economic depreciation rate is then (d - i + δ) and the allowed rate of return consistent 
with it is given by r the firm’s nominal cost of capital.  Both are applied to the current 
competitive market value of the asset P(t).  Equation (15) provides the basic formula for 
setting both the level and time profile of the capital cost component of user prices for this 
single-asset regulated firm assuming that there is a credible regulatory commitment to 
compensate the firm in this way over the entire economic life of the asset.  Even though 
the value of the regulatory asset is effectively marked to market on a continuing basis, the 
combination of sunk costs and asset specificity considerations would require a different 
pricing arrangement if, for example, customers were free to turn to competing suppliers if 
changing supply and demand conditions made it economical to do so (Pindyck 2004; 
Hausman  1997; Hausman and Myers 2002). 
 The earliest efforts to develop capital valuation and pricing principles indeed 
focused on “fair value” rate base approaches in which the regulated firm’s assets would 
be revalued each year based on the consideration of “reproduction cost,” and other “fair 
market value” methods, including giving some consideration to “original cost” (Troxel 
1947, Chapters 12 and 13, Clemens 1950, Chapter 7; Kahn 1970; pp. 35-45).   
Implementing these concepts in practice turned out to be very difficult with rapid 
technological change and widely varying rates of inflation.  Regulated firms liked 
“reproduction cost new” methods for valuing assets when there was robust inflation (as 
during the 1920s), but not when the nominal prices of equipment were falling (as in the 
1930s) (Sharfman 1928).  Moreover, “fair market value” rules led regulated firms to 
engage in “daisy chains” in which they would trade assets back and forth at inflated 
prices and then seek to increase the value of their rate bases accordingly. Methods to 
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measure a firm’s cost of capital were poorly developed (Troxel 1950, Chapters 17, 18, 
19).  Many regulated firm asset valuation cases were litigated in court.  The guidance 
given by the courts was not what one could call crystal clear (Troxel 1950, Chapter 12). 
 Beginning in the early 1920s, alternatives to the “fair value” concept began to be 
promoted.  In a dissenting opinion in 1923,17 Justice Louis Brandeis criticized the “fair 
valuation” approach.  He proposed instead a formula that is based on what he called the 
prudent investment standard.  Regulators would first determine whether an investment 
and its associated costs reflected “prudent” or reasonable decisions by the regulated firm.  
If they did, investors were to be permitted to earn a return of and on the “original cost” of 
this investment.  The earning formula specified that regulators should use straight line 
depreciation of the original cost of the investment, value the regulatory asset base at the 
original cost of plant and equipment prudently incurred less the accumulated depreciation 
associated with it at any particular point in time, and apply an allowed rate of return equal 
to the firm’s nominal cost of capital.    
 Consider a single asset firm with a prudent investment cost of Ko at time zero.  
The Brandeis formula would choose an accounting life N for the asset.  The annual 
depreciation was then given by Dt = Ko/N.  The regulatory asset base in any year was 
then given by RAVt = Ko - ∑t tD0 .  Then prices are set to produce net cash flows (after 
operating costs, taxes and other allowable fees) based on the following net cash flow 
formula 
  Πt = Dt + rRAVt = Ko/N + r(K0 - ∑t tD0 )    (16) 
                                                 
17 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri 262 U.S. 276 (1923). 
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which can be easily extended to multiple assets with different in-service dates and service 
lives.  The cash flow profile for a single-asset firm is displayed in Figure 10.  Brandeis 
argued that this approach would make it possible for regulators and the courts to “avoid 
the ‘delusive’ calculations, ‘shifting theories,” and varying estimates that the engineers 
use as they measure the reproduction costs and present values of utility properties.” 
(Troxel 1950, page 271) while providing regulated firms with a fair return on the prudent 
cost of investments that they have made to support the provisions of regulated services. 
 The Brandeis formula is quite straightforward, and the prudent investment 
standard compatible with a regulatory system that guards against regulatory hold-ups of 
investors ex post.  However, does it satisfy the NPV criterion discussed earlier and, in 
this way provide an expected return that is high enough to attract investment, but not so 
high that it yield prices significantly higher than necessary to attract investment?   It turns 
out that the Brandeis formula satisfies the NPV criterion (Schmalensee 1989a).  The 
present discounted value of cash flows calculated using the Brandeis formula (including 
an allowed rate of return that is equal to the regulated firm’s nominal opportunity cost of 
capital) is exactly equal to the original cost of the investment; investors get a return of 
their investment and a return on their investment equal to their opportunity cost of 
capital.  As Brandeis suggested, it provide a simple and consistent method for 
compensating investors for capital costs and eliminates the uncertainties and 
opportunities for manipulation that characterized the earlier application of “fair 
valuation” concepts.   
Beginning in the 1930s, regulators began to adopt and the courts began to accept 
the prudent investment/ original cost approach and by the end of World War II it became 
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the primary method for determining the capital charge component of regulated prices.  In 
the Hope decision in 1944, the Supreme Court concluded that from a Constitutional 
perspective it was the “result” that mattered rather than the choice of a particular method 
and, in this way, getting the courts disentangled from deciding whether or not specific 
details of the regulatory formulas chosen by state and federal regulators passed 
Constitutional muster. 
“Under the statutory standard of ‘just and reasonable it is the result reached not 
the method employed which is controlling.”18 
“Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial 
integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risk assumed 
certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a 
meager return on the so-called ‘fair value’ rate base.”19 
 
While the prudent investment/depreciated original cost standard satisfies the NPV 
criterion, and may have other attractive properties for attracting investment to regulated 
industries, it also has some peculiarities.  These can be seen most clearly for the single 
asset company (e.g. a pipeline) with a “one horse shay” physical depreciation profile that 
we have been focusing on.  The time pattern of capital charges has the property of 
starting at a particular level defined by the undepreciated (or barely depreciated) RAB 
equal to a value close to K0 and then declining continuously over the life of the asset until 
it approaches zero at the end of its useful life. (See Figure 10).  However, there is no 
particular reason to believe that the annual capital charges defined by the formula at any 
particular point in time reflect the “competitive” capital charges or rental rates that would 
emerge in a competitive market.  For example, if we apply the economic depreciation and 
                                                 
18 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) 
19 Ibid at 605. 
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competitive market value RAV formula discussed earlier, if there is inflation but no 
technological change, the capital charges for the asset should increase at the rate of 
inflation over time rather than decrease steadily as they do with the Brandeis formula.  In 
this case if we use the Brandeis formula, regulated prices start out too high and end up 
too low when the Brandeis formula is applied in this case.  If the asset is replaced in year 
n+1 and the Brandeis forma applied de novo to the new asset, the price for capital related 
charges will jump back to the value in year 1 (assuming zero inflation and no 
technological change) and then gradually decline again over time.  Thus, while the 
Brandeis formula gives the correct NPV and investment, it may also yield the wrong 
prices (rental charges associated with capital costs) at every point in time.  This in turn 
can lead to the standard consumption distortions resulting from prices that are too high or 
too low.   
Moreover, because assets do not reflect their market value at any particular point 
in time, the Brandeis formula can and has led to other problems.  Regulated prices for 
otherwise identical firms may be very different because the ages of their assets happen to 
be different from one another even if their market values are the same.  An old coal-fired 
power plant may have a much higher market value than a new oil-fired power plant, but 
the prices charged to consumers of the regulated firm with the old coal plants will be low 
while those of the utility with the oil-fired plant may be high.  As an asset ages, the 
capital charges associated with it approach zero.  For a single asset company, when this 
asset is replaced at an original cost reflecting current prices, the application of the 
Brandeis formula leads to a sudden large price increase (known as “rate shock”) which 
creates both consumption distortions and political problems for regulators.  Finally, when 
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assets are carried at values significantly greater than their market values, it may create 
incentives for inefficient entry as well as transition problems when competition is 
introduced into formerly regulated industries.   Who pays for the undepreciated portion of 
the new oil plant that has a low competitive market value and who gets the benefits from 
deregulating the old coal plant whose market value is much higher than its RAV when 
competition replaces regulated monopoly?  These so-called “stranded cost” and “stranded 
benefit” (Joskow 2000) attributes of the Brandeis formula have plagued the transitions to 
competition in telecommunications (mechanical switches that were depreciated too 
slowly in the face of rapid technological change) and electric power (costly nuclear 
power plants that were “prudent” investments when they were made). 
 It turns out that any formula for calculating the annual capital or rental charge 
component of regulated prices that has the property (a) the firm earns its cost of capital 
each period on a rate base equal to the depreciated original cost of its investments and (b) 
earns the book depreciation deducted from the rate base in each period, satisfies the NPV 
and investment attraction properties of the Brandeis formula (Schmalensee 1989a).  
There is nothing special about the Brandeis formula in this regard.  Alternative formulas 
that have capital charges for an asset rise, fall or remain constant over time can be 
specified with the same NPV property.  So, in principle, the Brandeis formula could be 
adjusted to take account of physical depreciation, technological change and inflation to 
better match both the capital attraction goals and the efficient pricing goals of good 
regulation. 
 Note that if a capital investment amortization formula of this type is used, the 
present discounted value of the firm’s net cash flows using the firm’s cost of capital as 
 110
the discount rate should equal its regulatory asset base (RAV) or what is often referred to 
as its regulatory “book value” B.  If investors value the firm based on the net present 
value of its expected future cash flows using the firm’s discount rate then the regulated 
firm’s market value M should be equal to its book value B at any point in time.  
Accordingly, a simple empirical test is available to determine whether the regulatory 
process is expected by investors to yield returns that are greater than, less than or equal to 
the firm’s cost of capital.  This test involves calculating the ratio of the firm’s market 
value to its book value: 
M/B  = 1 =Î Expected returns equal to the cost of capital 
M/B   > 1 =Î Expected returns greater than the cost of capital 
M/B <  1 =Î Expected returns less than the cost of capital   
 In the presence of regulatory lag, we would not expect the M/B always to be equal 
to one.  Moreover, as we shall discuss presently, there may be very good incentive 
reasons to adopt incentive regulatory mechanisms that, on average, will yield returns that 
exceed a typical firm’s cost of capital.  In fact, M/B ratios for regulated electric utilities 
have varied widely over time (Joskow 1989, Greene and Smiley 1984) though during 
most periods of time they have exceeded 1.   This is consistent with the observation I 
made earlier.  Due to regulatory lag, a regulated firm’s prices are not adjusted 
continuously to equal its actual costs of production.  Deviations between prices and costs 
may persist for long periods of time (Joskow 1972, 1974) and have significant effects on 
the regulated firm’s market value (Joskow 1989).  Accordingly, regulatory lag has both 
incentive effects and rent extraction effects that are often ignored in uniformed 
discussions of traditional cost of service regulation. 
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 The final component of the computation of the capital charges that are to be 
included in regulated prices involves the calculation of the allowed rate of return on 
investment.  Regulatory practice is to set a “fair rate of return” that reflects the firm’s 
nominal cost of capital.  Regulated firms are typically financed with a combination of 
debt, equity and preferred stock (Spiegel and Spulber 1994; Myers 1972a, 1972b).  The 
allowed rate of return is typically calculated as the weighted average of the interest rate 
on debt, preferred stock and an estimate of the firm’s opportunity cost of capital, taking 
the tax treatment of interest payments and the taxability of net income that flows to 
equity investors.  So consider a regulated firm with the following capital structure: 
 
Instrument average coupon rate  fraction of capitalization 
Debt   8.0%    50% 
Preferred stock 6.0%    10% 
Equity    N/A    40% 
 
Then the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (net of taxes) is given by 
r  =  8.0*0.5 + 6.0*0.1 + re*0.4 
where re is the firm’s opportunity cost of equity capital which must then be estimated.  
Rate cases focus primarily on estimating the firm’s opportunity cost of equity capital and, 
to a lesser degree, determining the appropriate mix of debt, preferred stock, and equity 
that composes the firm’s capital structure.  A variety of methods have been employed to 
measure the regulated firm’s cost of equity capital (Myers 1972a, 1972b), including the 
so-called discounted cash flow model, the capital asset pricing model, and other “risk 
premium” approaches (Phillips 1993, pp. 383-412).  At least in the U.S., the methods that 
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are typically used to estimate the regulated firm’s cost of capital are surprisingly 
unsophisticated given the advances that have been made in theoretical and empirical 
finance in the last thirty years. 
 With all of these cost components computed the regulator adds them together to 
determine the firm’s “revenue requirement” or total “cost of service” R.  This is 
effectively the budget balance constraint used by the regulator to establish the level and 
structure of prices --- the firm’s “tariff” ---- for the services sold by the regulated firm. 
   a2.  Rate design or tariff structure 
In establishing the firm’s tariff structure or rate design, regulators typically 
identify different “classes” of customers, e.g. residential, commercial, farm, and 
industrial, which may be further divided into further sub-classes (small commercial, large 
commercial, voltage level differentiation) (Phillips 1993, Chapter 10).  Since regulatory 
statutes often require that prices not be “unduly discriminatory,” the definition of tariff 
classes typically is justified by differences in the costs of serving the different groups.  In 
reality, the arbitrariness of allocating joint costs among different groups of customers 
provides significant flexibility for regulators to take non-cost factors into account 
(Bonbright 1961; Clemens 1950, Chapter 11; Salinger 1998).  For example, residential 
electricity customers require a costly low-voltage distribution system while large 
industrial customers take power from the network at higher voltages and install their own 
equipment to step down the voltage for use in their facilities.  Accordingly, since the 
services provided to residential customers have different costs from those provided to 
large industrial customers it makes economic sense to charge residential and industrial 
customers different prices.  At the same time, large industrial customers may have 
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competitive alternatives (e.g. self-generation of electricity, shifting production to another 
state with lower prices) that residential customers do not have and this sets the stage for 
third-degree price discrimination.  Many states have special rates for low-income 
consumers and may have special tariffs for particular groups of customers (e.g. steel 
mills), reflecting income distribution and political economy considerations.  Historically, 
income redistribution and political economy considerations played a very important role 
in the specification of telephone services.  Local rates were generally set low and long 
distance rates high, just the opposite of what theories of optimal pricing would suggest 
(Hausman, Tardiff and Belinfante 1993; Crandall and Hausman 2000) and prices in rural 
areas where set low relative to the cost of serving these customers compared to the price 
cost margins in urban areas.  The joint costs associated with providing both local and 
long distance services using the same local telephone network made it relatively easy for 
federal and state regulators to use arbitrary allocations of these costs to “cost justify” 
almost any tariff structure that they thought met a variety of redistributional and interest 
group politics driven goals (Salinger 1998).  Non-linear prices have been a component of 
regulated tariffs for electricity, gas and telephone services since these services first 
became available.  What is clear, however, is that the formal application of the theoretical 
principles behind Ramsey pricing, non-linear pricing, and peak-load pricing has been 
used infrequently by U.S. regulators, while these concepts have been used extensively in 
France since the 1950s (Nelson 1964). 
 
 b. The Averch-Johnson Model 
 
 What has come to be known as the Averch-Johnson or “A-J” model (Averch and 
Johnson 1962; Baumol and Klevorick 1970; Bailey 1973) represents an early effort to 
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capture analytically the potential effects of rate of return regulation on the behavior of a 
regulated monopoly.  The A-J model begins with a profit-maximizing monopoly firm 
with a neoclassical production function q = F(K,L) and facing an inverse market demand 
curve p = D(q).  The firm invests in capital (K) with an opportunity cost of capital r (the 
price of capital is normalized to unity and there is no depreciation) and labor L at a wage 
w.  The monopoly’s profits are given by: 
 
  Π = D(q)q – wL - rK  
 
It is convenient to write the firm’s revenues in terms of the inputs K and L that are 
utilized to produce output q.  Let  the firms total revenue R = R(K,L) and then 
  Π = R(K,L) – wL – rK      (17) 
The regulator has one instrument at it’s disposal to control the monopoly’s prices.  It can 
set the firm’s “allowed rate of return” on capital s at a level greater than or equal to the 
firm’s opportunity cost of capital r and less than the rate of return rm that would be earned 
by an unregulated monopoly.  The firm’s variable costs wL and its capital costs sK are 
passed through into prices continuously and automatically without any further regulatory 
review or delay.  The regulator has no particular objective function and is assumed only 
to know the firm’s cost of capital r.  It has no other information about the firm’s 
production function, it’s costs or its demand.  The rate of return constraint applied to the 
firm is then given by: 
[R(K,L) – wL –sK]  < 0  where  r < s < rm      
  or rewriting 
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   Π  <  (s-r)K         (18) 
The regulated firm is then assumed to maximizes profits (1) subject to this rate of return 
constraint (2).  Assuming that the rate of return constraint is binding and that a solution 
with  q >0, K >0 and L >0 exists, the firm’s constrained maximization problem becomes: 
 
Max Π* = R(K,L) – wL – rK – λ [R(K,L) – wL – sK]    (19) 
(K, L, λ) 
 
where λ is the shadow price of the constraint.  The first order conditions are 
 
0)(* =−−−=∂
Π∂ sRrR
K KK
λ         (20) 
0)(* =−−−=∂
Π∂ wRwR
L LL
λ        (21) 
0),(* =−−=∂
Π∂ sKwLLKRλ        (22) 
where RK and RL are the marginal revenue products of capital and labor respectively (Ri =  
MRqFi) .  We can rewrite these conditions as 
RK = r + [λ/(1+λ)](r –s) 
RL = w 
and (using the second order conditions) 0 < λ < 1.  From the first order conditions we can 
derive the regulated firm’s marginal rate of technical substitution of capital for labor as 
 
MRTKL =  FK/FL = r/w + λ/(1+λ)[(r-s)/w]    (23) 
 
This leads to the primary A-J results.  A cost minimizing firm would equate the marginal 
rate of substitution of capital for labor to the input price ratio.  Accordingly, the regulated 
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monopoly operating subject to a rate of return constraint does not minimize costs --- input 
proportions are distorted.  Indeed with 0 < λ < 1, the distortion is in a particular direction 
since MRTKL < r/w which implies that for any given level of output the regulated firm 
uses too much capital relative to labor.  This is sometimes referred to as the capital using 
bias of rate of return regulation.   Basically, the rate of return constraint drives a wedge 
between the firm’s actual cost of capital and its effective net cost of capital after taking 
account of the net benefits associated with increasing the amount of capital used when 
there is a net return of (s-r) on the margin from adding capital, other things equal. 
During the 1970s, many variations on the original A-J model appeared in the 
literature to extend these results.  The reader is referred to Baumol and Klevorick (1970), 
Klevorick (1973) and Bailey (1973) for a number of these extension.  Among the 
additional results of interest are: 
a. The A-J firm does not “waste” inputs in the sense that inputs are hired but are not 
put to productive use (Bailey 1973).  The firm produces on the boundary of its 
production function and there is no “X-inefficiency” or waste in that sense.  The 
inefficiency is entirely in terms of inefficient input proportions. 
b. As the allowed rate of return s approaches the cost of capital r, the magnitude of 
the input distortion increases (Baumol and Klevorick 1970). 
c. There is an optimal value s* for the allowed rate of return that balances the 
benefits of lower prices against the increased input distortions from a lower 
allowed rate of return (Klevorick 1971; Sheshinski 1971).  However, to calculate 
the optimal rate of return the regulator would have to know the attributes of the 
firm’s production function, input prices and demand, information that the 
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regulator is assumed not to possess.  If the regulator did have this information she 
could simply calculate the optimal input proportions and penalize the firm from 
deviating from them. 
d. Introducing “regulatory lag” into the model (in a somewhat clumsy fashion) 
reduces the magnitude of the input bias (Baumol and Klevorick 1970, Bailey and 
Coleman 1971, Klevorick 1973).  This is the case because if prices are fixed 
between rate cases, the firm can increase its profits by reducing its costs (Joskow 
(1974) until the next rate review when the rate of return constraint would be 
applied again.  If rate of return reviews are few and far between the firm 
essentially becomes a residual claimant on cost reductions and has powerful 
incentives to minimize costs.  In this case, rate of return regulation has incentive 
properties similar to “price cap” regulation with “resets” every few years.  Price 
cap regulation will be discussed further below. 
e. Rate of return regulation of this type can affect the profitability of peak load 
pricing.  In particular, under certain conditions peak load pricing may reduce the 
firm’s capital/labor ratio and it could be more profitable for the firm not to level 
out demand variations.  However, the A-J effect could go in the other direction as 
well. 
A lot of ink was used in the papers that have developed variations on the A-J model 
and to test its implications empirically during the 1970s and 1980s.  The major 
conceptual innovation of this literature was to highlight the possibility that regulatory 
mechanisms could create incentives for regulated firms to produce inefficiently and, 
perhaps, to adopt organization forms (e.g. vertical integration) and pricing strategies (e.g. 
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peak load pricing) that are not optimal.  Moreover, these results depend upon an extreme 
asymmetry of information between the regulated firm and the regulator (or just the 
opposite if we assume that the regulator can set the optimal s*).  In the A-J type models, 
the regulator knows essentially nothing about the firm’s cost opportunities, realized costs, 
or demand.  It just sets an allowed rate of return and the firm does its thing.  Imperfect 
and asymmetric information important attributes of regulation from both a normative and 
a positive perspective.  However, implicitly assuming the regulators have no information 
is an extreme case.  Beyond this, there are significant deviations between the model’s 
assumptions (as advanced through the literature) and how regulators actually regulate.  
Efforts to introduce dynamics and incentive effects through regulatory lag have been 
cumbersome within this modeling framework.  Empirical tests have not been particularly 
successful (Joskow and Rose 1989).  Moreover, the particular kind of inefficiency 
identified by the model (inefficient input proportions) is quite different from the kind of 
waste and inefficiency that concerns policymakers and has been revealed in the empirical 
literature on the effects of regulation and privatization --- X-inefficiency of various types 
arising from imperfections in managerial efforts to minimize the costs of production, 
leading to production inside the production frontier and not just at the wrong location on 
the production frontier. 
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 XIII.   INCENTIVE REGULATION: THEORY 
 a. Introduction 
 It should be clear by now that regulators face a number of challenges in achieving 
the public interest goals identified earlier.  The conventional theories of optimal pricing, 
production and investment by regulated firms assume that regulators are completely 
informed about the technology, costs and consumer demand attributes facing the firms 
they regulate.  This is clearly not the case in reality.  Regulators have imperfect 
information about the cost opportunities and behavior of the regulated firm and the 
attributes of the demand for its services that it faces.  Moreover, the regulated firm 
generally has more information about these attributes than does the regulator or third 
parties which may have incentives to provide the regulator with additional information 
(truthful or untruthful) about the regulated firm.  Accordingly, the regulated firm may use 
its information advantage strategically in the regulatory process to increase its profits or 
to pursue other managerial goals, to the disadvantage of consumers (Owen and 
Braeutigam 1978).  These problems may be further exacerbated if the regulated firm can 
“capture” the regulatory agency and induce it to give more weight to its interests (Posner 
1974; McCubbins 1985; Spiller 1990; Laffont and Tirole 1993, Chapter 5).  
Alternatively, other interest groups may be able to “capture” the regulator and, in the 
presence of long-lived sunk investments, engage in “regulatory holdups” or expropriation 
of the regulated firm’s assets. Higher levels of government, such as the courts and the 
legislature, also have imperfect information about both the regulator and the regulated 
firm and can monitor their behavior only imperfectly (McNollgast). 
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The evolution of regulatory practices in the U.S. reflects efforts to mitigate the 
information disadvantages that regulators must deal with, as well as broader issues of 
regulatory capture and monitoring by other levels of government and consumers.  As 
already noted, these institutions and practices are reflected in laws and regulations that 
require firms to adhere to a uniform system of accounts, gives regulators access to the 
books and records of the regulated firm and the right to request additional information on 
a case by case basis, auditing requirements, staff resources to evaluate this information, 
transparency requirements such as public hearings and written decisions, ex parte 
communications rules, opportunities for third parties to participate in regulatory 
proceedings to (in theory)20 assist the regulatory agency in developing better information 
and reducing its regulatory disadvantage, appeals court review, and legislative oversight 
processes.  In addition, since regulation is a repeated game, regulators (as well as 
legislators and appeals courts) can learn about the firm’s attributes as it observes its 
behavioral and performance responses to regulatory decisions over time and, as a result, 
the regulated firm naturally develops a reputation for the credibility of its claims and the 
information that it uses to support them.  However, although U.S. regulatory practice 
focused on improving the information available to regulators, the regulatory mechanisms 
adopted typically did not utilize this information as effectively as it could have until 
relatively recently. 
 The A-J model and its progeny are, in a sense, the first crude analytical efforts to 
understand how, when regulators are poorly informed and have limited instruments at 
their disposal, the application of particular mechanisms to constrain the prices charged by 
                                                 
20 Of course, third parties may have an incentive to inject inaccurate information into the regulatory process 
as well. 
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a regulated firm may create incentives for a firm to respond in ways that lead to 
inefficiencies in other dimensions; in the AJ-type models to depart from cost-minimizing 
input proportions with a bias towards using more capital.  However, in the A-J model the 
regulator has essentially no information about the regulated firm’s costs or demand, there 
is no specification of the objectives of and incentives faced by the firm’s managers that 
might lead the firm to exhibit inefficiencies in other dimensions, the instruments 
available to the regulatory are very limited, and indeed the choice of mechanisms by the 
regulator does not flow from a clear specification of managerial objectives and 
constraints. 
 More recent work on the theory of optimal incentive regulation deals with 
asymmetric information problems, contracting constraints, regulatory credibility issues, 
dynamic considerations, regulatory capture, and other issues that regulatory processes 
have been trying to respond to for decades much more directly  and effectively (Laffont 
and Tirole 1993; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994; Armstrong and Sappington 
2003).  This has been accomplished by applying modern theories of the firm, incentive 
mechanism design theory , auction theory,  contract theory, and political economy in the 
context of adverse selection, moral hazard, hold-up and other considerations to derive 
optimal (in a second best sense) mechanisms to achieve public interest regulatory goals.  
This has become a vast literature; some of which is relevant to actual regulatory problems 
and practice, though much of it is not.  
 Let us start with the simplest characterization of the nature of the regulator’s 
information disadvantages.  A firm’s costs may be high or low based on inherent 
attributes of its technical production opportunities, exogenous input cost variations over 
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time and space, inherent differences in the costs of serving locations with different 
attributes (e.g. urban or rural), etc.  While the regulator may not know the firm’s true cost 
opportunities she will typically have some information about them.  The regulator’s 
imperfect information can be summarized by a probability distribution defined over a 
range of possible cost opportunities between some upper and lower bound within which 
the regulated firms actual cost opportunities lie.  Second, the firm’s actual costs will not 
only depend on its underlying cost opportunities but also on the behavioral decisions 
made by managers to exploit these cost opportunities.  Managers may exert varying 
levels of effort to get more (or less) out of the cost opportunities that the firm has 
available to it.  The greater the managerial effort the lower will be the firm’s costs, other 
things equal.  However, exerting more managerial effort imposes costs on managers and 
on society.  Other things equal, managers will prefer to exert less effort than more to 
increase their own satisfaction, but less effort will lead to higher costs and more “x-
inefficiency.”  Unfortunately, the regulator cannot observe managerial effort directly and 
may be uncertain about its quality and impacts on costs. 
 The uncertainties the regulator faces about the firm’s inherent cost opportunities 
gives the regulated firm a strategic advantage.  It would like to convince the regulator that 
it is a “higher cost” firm that it actually is, in the belief that the regulator will then set 
higher prices for service as it satisfies the firm’s long-run viability (firm participation or 
budget-balance constraint), increasing the regulated firm’s profits, creating dead-weight 
losses from (second-best) prices that are two high, and allowing the firm to capture social 
surplus from consumers.  Thus, the social welfare maximizing regulator faces a potential 
adverse selection problem as it seeks to distinguish between firms with high cost 
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opportunities and firms with low cost opportunities while adhering to the firm viability or 
participation constraint. 
 The uncertainties that the regulator faces about the quantity and impact of 
managerial effort creates another potential problem.  Since the regulator typically has or 
can obtain good information about the regulated firm’s actual costs (i.e. it’s actual 
expenditures), at least in the aggregate, one approach to dealing with the adverse 
selection problem outlined above would simply be to set (or reset after a year) prices 
equal to the firm’s realized costs ex post.  This would solve the adverse selection problem 
since the regulator’s information disadvantage would be resolved by auditing the firm’s 
costs.21  However, if managerial effort increases with the firm’s profitability, this kind of 
“cost plus” regulation may lead management to exert too little effort to control costs, 
increasing the realized costs above their efficient levels.  If the “rat doesn’t smell the 
cheese and sometimes get a bit of it to eat” he may play golf rather than working hard to 
achieve efficiencies for the regulated firm.  Thus, the regulator faces a potential moral 
hazard problem associated with variations in managerial effort in response to regulatory 
incentives (Laffont and Tirole 1986; Baron and Besanko 1987b). 
 Faced with these information disadvantages, the social welfare maximizing 
regulator will seek a regulatory mechanism that takes the social costs of adverse selection 
and moral hazard into account, subject to the firm participation or budget-balance 
constraint that it faces, balancing the costs associated with adverse selection and the costs 
associated with moral hazard.  The regulator may also take actions that reduce her 
                                                 
21 Of course, the auditing of costs may not be perfect and in a multiproduct context the allocation of 
accounting costs between different products is likely to reflect some arbitrary joint cost allocation 
decisions.  
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information disadvantages by, for example, increasing the quality of the information that 
the regulator has about the firm’s cost opportunities.   
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 10-19), to illuminate the issues at stake 
we can think of two polar case regulatory mechanisms that might be applied to a 
monopoly firm producing a single product.  The first regulatory mechanism involves 
setting a fixed price ex ante that the regulated firm will be permitted to charge going 
forward.  Alternatively, we can think of this as a pricing formula that starts with a 
particular price and then adjusts this price for exogenous changes in input price indices 
and other exogenous indices of cost drivers.  This regulatory mechanism can be 
characterized as a fixed price regulatory contract or a price cap regulatory mechanism.  
There are two important attributes of this regulatory mechanism.  Because prices are 
fixed (or vary based only  on exogenous indices of cost drivers) and do not respond to 
changes in managerial effort, the firm and its managers are the residual claimants on 
production cost reductions and the costs of increases in managerial effort (and vice 
versa).  That is, the firm and its managers have the highest powered incentives fully to 
exploit their cost opportunities by exerting the optimal amount of effort (Brennan 1989; 
Cabral and Riordan 1989; Isaac 1989; Sibley 1989; Kwoka 1993).  Accordingly, this 
mechanism provides optimal incentives for inducing managerial effort and eliminates the 
costs associated with managerial moral hazard.  However, because the regulator must 
adhere to a firm participation or viability constraint, when there is uncertainty about the 
regulated firm’s cost opportunities the regulator will have to set a relatively high fixed 
price to ensure that if the firm is indeed inherently high cost, the prices under the fixed 
price contract or price cap will be high enough to cover the firm’s costs.  Accordingly, 
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while the fixed price mechanism may deal well with the potential moral hazard problem 
by providing high powered incentives for cost reduction, it is potentially very poor at 
“rent extraction” for the benefit of consumers and society, potentially leaving a lot of rent 
to the firm due to the regulator’s uncertainties about the firm’s inherent costs and its need 
to adhere to the firm viability or participation constraint.  Thus, while a fixed price 
contract solves the moral hazard problem it incurs the full costs of adverse selection. 
 At the other extreme, the regulator could implement a “cost of service” contract or 
regulatory mechanism where the firm is assured that it will be compensated for all of the 
costs of production that it incurs.  Assume for now that this is a credible commitment --- 
there is no ex post renegotiation --- and that audits of costs are accurate.  When the firm 
produces it will then reveal whether it is a high cost or a low cost firm to the regulator.  
Since the regulator compensates the firm for all of its costs, there is no “rent” left to the 
firm as excess profits.  This solves the adverse selection problem.  However, this kind of 
cost of service recovery mechanism does not provide any incentives for the management 
to exert effort.  If the firm’s profitability is not sensitive to managerial effort, the 
managers will exert the minimum effort that they can get away with.  While there are no 
“excess profits” left on the table, consumers are now paying higher costs than they would 
have to pay if the firm were better managed.  Indeed, it is this kind of managerial slack 
and associated x-inefficiencies that most policymakers have in mind when they discuss 
the “inefficiencies” associated with regulated firms.  Thus, the adverse selection problem 
can be solved in this way, but the costs associated with moral hazard are fully realized. 
 Accordingly, these two polar case regulatory mechanisms each has benefits and 
costs.  One is good at providing incentives for managerial efficiency and cost 
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minimization, but it is bad at extracting the benefits of the lower costs associated with 
single firm production for consumers when costs are subadditive.  The other is good at 
rent extraction but leads to costs from moral hazard.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
optimal regulatory mechanism (in a second best sense) will lie somewhere between these 
two extremes.  In general, it will have the form of a profit sharing contract or a sliding 
scale regulatory mechanism where the price that the regulated firm can charge is partially 
responsive to changes in realized costs and partially fixed ex ante (Schmalensee 1989; 
Lyon 1996).  As we shall see, by offering a menu of regulatory contracts with different 
cost sharing provisions, the regulatory can do even better than if it offers only a single 
profit sharing contract (Laffont and Tirole 1993).  The basic idea here is to make it 
profitable for a firm with low cost opportunities to choose a relatively high powered 
incentive scheme and a firm with high cost opportunities a relatively low-powered 
scheme.  Some managerial inefficiencies are incurred if the firm turns out to have high 
cost opportunities, but these costs are balanced by reducing the rent left to the firm if it 
turns out to have low cost opportunities. 
We can capture the nature of the range of options in the following fashion.  
Consider a general formulation of a regulatory process in which the firm’s revenue 
requirements “R” are determined based on a fixed component “a” and a second 
component that is contingent on the firm’s realized costs “C” and where “b” is the 
sharing parameter that defines the responsiveness of the firm’s revenues to realized costs. 
 R =  a + (1-b)C   
Under a fixed price contract or price cap regulation: 
 a = C* where C* is the regulators assessment of the “efficient” costs of the 
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 highest cost type 
 b = 1 
Under cost of Service regulation: 
 a = 0 
 b = 0 
Under profit sharing contract or sliding scale regulation(Performance Based Regulaion) 
 0 < b < 1 
 0 < a < C* 
These different mechanisms then have the properties summarized in Table 1: 
The challenges then are to find the optimal performance based mechanism given 
the information structure faced by the regulator and for the regulator to find ways to 
reduce its information disadvantages vis a vis the regulated firm and to use the additional 
information effectively.  As we shall see, it is optimal for the regulator to offer a menu of 
contracts with different combinations of a and b that meet certain conditions driven by 
the firm participation constraint and an incentive compatibility constraint that leads firms 
with low cost opportunities to choose a high powered scheme (b is closer to 1 and a is 
closer to the efficient cost level for a  firm with low cost opportunities) and firms with 
high cost opportunities to choose a lower powered incentive scheme (a and b are closer to 
zero).  The lower powered scheme is offered to satisfy the firm participation constraint, 
sacrificing some costs associated with moral hazard, in order to reduce the rents that must 
be left to the high cost as it is induced to exert the optimal amount of managerial effort. 
(So far, this discussion has ignored quality issues.  Clearly if a regulatory mechanism 
focuses only on reducing costs and ignores quality it will lead to firm to provide too little 
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quality.  This is a classic problem with price cap mechanisms and will be discussed 
further below.) 
b. Performance Based Regulation Typology 
 As I have already indicated, there is a very extensive theoretical literature on 
incentive regulation, or as it is commonly called by policymakers, performance based 
regulation or PBR.  The papers that comprise this literature reflect a wide range of 
assumptions about the nature of the information possessed by the regulator and the firm 
about costs, cost reducing managerial effort, demand and product quality, the attributes of 
the regulatory instruments available to the regulator, the risk preferences of the firm, 
regulatory capture by interest groups, regulatory commitment, flexibility, and other 
dynamic considerations.  These alternative sets of assumption can be applied in both a 
single or multiproduct context.  One strand of the literature initially focused primarily on 
adverse selection problems motivated by the assumption that regulators could not observe 
a firm’s costs and ignoring the role of managerial effort (Baron-Meyerson 1982; Lewis 
and Sappington 1988a, 1988b). Another strand of the literature focused on both adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems motivated by the assumption that regulators could 
observe a firm’s realized cost ex post, had information about the probability distribution 
of a firm’s cost ex ante, and that managerial effort did affect costs but that this effort was 
not observable by the regulator (Laffont and Tirole (1986)).  Over time, these approaches 
have evolved to cover a similar range of assumptions about these basic information and 
behavioral conditions and lead to qualitatively similar conclusions.  Armstrong and 
Sappington (2003, forthcoming) provides a detailed and thoughtful review and synthesis 
of this entire literature and I refer readers interested in a very detailed treatment of the full 
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range specifications of incentive regulation problems to their paper.  Here I will simply 
lay out a “typology” of how these issues have been developed in the literature and then 
provide some simple theoretical examples to illustrate what I consider to be the 
literature’s primary conclusions of potential relevance for regulation in practice.   
 What are the regulator’s objectives?  Much of the literature assumes that the 
regulator seeks to maximize a social welfare function that reflects the goal of limiting the 
rents that are transferred from consumers and taxpayers to the firm’s owners and 
managers subject to a firm participation or breakeven constraint.  Armstrong and 
Sappington (2003) articulate this by specifying an objective function W = S + αR where 
W is expected social welfare, S equals expected consumers’ (including consumers as 
taxpayers) surplus,  R equals the expected rents earned by the owners and managers of 
the firm (over and above what is needed to compensate them for the total costs of 
production and the disutility of managerial effort to satisfy the participation constraint), 
and where α < 1 implies that the regulator places more weight on consumers surplus than 
on rents earned by the firm.  That is, the regulator seeks to extract rent from the firm for 
the benefit of consumers, subject as always to a firm participation or break-even 
constraint.  In addition, W will be reduced if excessive rents are left to the firm since this 
will require higher (second-best) prices and greater allocative inefficiency.   
Laffont and Tirole (1988, 1993, 2000)) create a social benefit from reducing the 
rents left to the firm in a different way.  In their basic model, consumer welfare and the 
welfare of the owners and managers of the firm are generally weighted equally.  
However, one of the instruments available to the regulator is the provision of transfer 
payments to the firm which affect the rents earned by the firm.  These transfer payments 
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come out of the government’s budget and carry a social cost resulting from the 
inefficiencies of the tax system used to raise these revenues.  Thus, for every dollar of 
transfer payments given to the firm to increase its rent, effectively (1+k) dollars of taxes 
must be raised, where k reflects the inefficiency of the tax system.  Accordingly, by 
reducing the transfers to the firm over and above what is required to compensate it for its 
efficient production costs and the associated managerial disutility of effort, welfare can 
be increased.   This set-up which allows for the use of costly government transfer 
payments also leads to a nice dichotomy between incentive arrangements that effectively 
establish the formula for determining the firm’s revenues in a way that deals with adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems in the context of asymmetric information and price 
setting which establishes the second-best prices for the services sold by the firm given 
consumer demand attributes and the regulator’s knowledge of them.  That is, regulators 
first establish compensation arrangements (define how the firm’s budget constraint or 
“revenue requirements” will be defined) to deal as effectively as possible with adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems given the information structure assumed.  The 
regulator separately establishes a second best price structure to deal with allocational 
efficiency considerations which may not cover all of the firm’s costs, with the difference 
coming from net government transfers. In addition, Laffont and Tirole introduce 
managerial effort as a variable that affects costs.  Managers have a disutility of effort and 
must be compensated for it.  Accordingly, the utility of management also appears in the 
social welfare function. 
 What does the regulator know about the firm ex ante and ex post?  In what 
follows I will use the term “cost” to refer to the firm’s marginal costs and ignore fixed 
 131
costs (or normalize them to zero).  This allows me to ignore in the discussion of incentive 
issues in this section, the second-best pricing (rather than incentive) options available to 
deal with budget-balance constraints created by increasing returns since the major issues 
associated with these pricing problems have been discussed above and are not affected in 
important ways by introducing asymmetric information about the firm’s costs and 
managerial effort.  Carrying these issues forward here would simply complicate the 
presentation of the key incentive regulation results of interest.  Accordingly, in what 
follows the full information benchmark is marginal cost pricing with zero rents left for 
the firm.  Armstrong and Sappington (2003) distinguish between fixed costs and marginal 
costs, what the regulator knows about each and allow the regulator to make non-
distortionary lump sum transfers to the firm.  In this context, if the regulator can only 
make distortionary transfer payments, the full information benchmark with linear prices 
is Ramsey pricing and otherwise it is the optimal non-linear prices given the regulator’s 
information about consumer demand.   
The literature that focuses on adverse selection builds on the fundamental paper 
by Baron and Myerson (1982). The regulator does not know the firm’s cost opportunities 
ex ante but has information about the probability distribution over the firm’s possible cost 
opportunities.22  Nor can the regulator observe or audit the firm’s costs ex post.  The firm 
does know its own cost opportunities ex ante and ex post.  The firm’s demand is known 
by both the regulator and the firm.  There is no managerial effort in these early models.  
Accordingly, the analysis deals with a pure adverse selection problem with no potential 
inefficiencies or moral hazard associated with inadequate managerial effort.  The 
                                                 
22 In models that distinguish between fixed and variable costs, the regulator may know the fixed costs but 
not the variable costs.  See Armstrong and Sappington (2003). 
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regulation in the presence of adverse selection literature then proceeds to consider 
asymmetric information about the firm’s demand function, where the firm knows its 
demand but either the regulator does not observe demand ex ante or ex post or learns 
about demand only ex post (Lewis and Sappington 1988a; Riordan 1984).  Combining 
asymmetric information about costs and demand, introducing a multidimensional 
characterization of asymmetric information, was then a natural extension of the 
regulation to respond to adverse selection literature (Lewis and Sappington 1988b;Dana 
1993; Armstrong and Rochet 1999).   
In light of common regulatory practice, a natural extension of these models is to 
assume that the regulated firm’s actual realized costs are observable ex post, at least with 
uncertainty. Baron and Besanko (1984) considers cases where a firm’s costs are 
“audited” ex post, but the actual realized costs resulting from the audit are observable by 
the regulator with a probability less than one.  The regulator can use this information to 
reduce the costs of adverse selection.   Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993) consider cases 
where the firm’s realized costs are fully observable by the regulator.  However, absent the 
simultaneous introduction of an uncertain scope for cost reductions through managerial 
effort, the regulatory problem then becomes trivial --- just set prices equal to the firm’s 
realized costs.  Accordingly, Laffont and Tirole (1986a, 1993) introduce managers of the 
firm who can choose the amount of cost reducing effort that they expend.  Managerial 
effort is not observable by the regulator ex ante or ex post, but realized production costs 
are fully known to the regulator as are the managerial “production function” that 
transforms managerial effort into cost reductions and the managers’ utility over effort 
function.  The regulated firm fully observes managerial effort, the cost reducing effects of 
 133
managerial effort, and demand.  It also knows what managerial utility would be at 
different levels of effort.  Armstrong and Sappington (2003) advance this analysis by 
considering cases where the regulated firm is uncertain about the operating costs that will 
be realized but knows that it can reduce costs by increasing managerial effort, though in a 
way that creates a moral hazard problem but no adverse selection problem.  In the face of 
uncertainty over its costs, they consider cases where the firm may be either risk-neutral or 
risk averse.  With moral hazard alone only high-powered incentive mechanisms are 
optimal.   
 The literature also examines situations in which the regulator is captured by an 
interest group and no longer seeks to maximize social welfare W.  For example, the 
regulator may be bribed not to use or reveal information that would reduce the rents 
available to the firm (Laffont and Tirole 1993, Chapter 11)  and the regulator may 
effectively collude with the firm if she can be compensated in some way (monetary, 
future employment, jobs for friends and relatives) for doing so.  The possibility of 
regulatory capture may affect the choice of the power of the incentive schemes used by 
the regulator.  High powered incentive schemes are more susceptible to regulatory 
capture than are lower powered schemes (Laffont and Tirole 1993, pp. 57-58). To 
counteract the possibility of regulatory collusion, the analysis can also be expanded to 
include another level in which the government imposes an incentive scheme on the 
regulator to provide incentives to reveal and use all relevant information possessed by the 
regulator and more generally not to collude with interest groups (Sappington 1987).   
 What instruments are available to the regulator and how do the regulator and the 
regulated firm interact over time?  Much of the incentive regulation literature is static.  
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The regulator (or the government through the regulator) can offer a menu of prices (or 
fixed price contracts) with or without a fixed fee or transfer payment.  The menu may 
contain prices that are contingent on realized costs (which can be thought of as penalties 
or rewards for performance) in those models where regulators observe costs ex post.  
Some of these instruments may be costly to utilize (e.g. transfer payments and auditing 
efforts).  The more instruments the regulator has at its disposal and the lower the costs of 
using them, the closer the regulator will be able to get to the full information benchmark. 
 Of more interest are issues that arise as we consider the dynamic interactions 
between the regulated firm and the regulator and the availability and utilization of 
mechanisms that the regulator potentially has available to reduce its information 
disadvantage.  It is inevitable that the regulator will learn more about the regulated firm 
as they interact over time.  So, for example, if the regulator can observe a firm’s realized 
costs ex post, should the regulator use that information to reset the prices that the 
regulated firm receives (commonly known as a “ratchet” --- Weitzman 1980)?  Or is it 
better for the regulator to commit to a particular contract ex ante, which may be 
contingent on realized costs, but the regulator is not permitted to use the information 
gained from observing realized costs to change the terms and conditions of the regulatory 
contract offered to the firm?  Is it credible for the regulator to commit not to renegotiate 
the contract, especially in light of U.S. regulatory legal doctrines that have been 
interpreted as foreclosing the ability of a regulatory commission to bind future 
commissions?  Clearly, if the regulated firm knows that information about its realized 
costs can be used to renegotiate the terms of its contract, this will affect its behavior ex 
ante.  It may have incentives to engage in less cost reduction in period 1 or try to fool the 
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regulator into thinking it is a high cost firm so that it can continue to earn rents in period 
2.  Of if the regulated firm has a choice between technologies that involve sunk cost 
commitments, will the possibility of ex post opportunism or regulatory expropriation, 
perhaps driven by the capture of the regulator by other interest groups, affect its 
willingness to invest in the lowest cost technologies when they involve more significant 
sunk cost commitments (leading to the opposite of the A-J effect).    
These dynamic issues have been examined more intensively over time and 
represent a merging of the literature on regulation with the literature on contracts and 
dynamic incentive mechanisms more generally. (Laffont and Tirole 1988b, 1990a, 1993; 
Baron and Besanko 1987a; Armstrong and Vickers 1991, 2000; Armstrong, Cowan and 
Vickers 1995)   The impacts of regulatory lag of different durations (Baumol and 
Klevorick 1970, Klevorick 1973, Joskow 1974) and other price adjustment procedures 
have been analyzed extensively as well (Vogelsang and Finsinger 1979; Sappington and 
Sibley 1988, 1990).   
c.  Some examples of incentive regulation mechanism design 
This section is based on Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 2).  We will examine 
the case of a regulated monopoly firm producing a single private good and which is 
restricted to charging linear prices.  A specific firm’s cost opportunities depend on the 
best technology and input prices that it has access to and which will characterize it’s 
“type” denoted by β.  The firm knows its type but the regulator is uncertain about the 
firm’s type.  We will begin with a two-type case where the firm can be either a low cost 
type denoted by βL with probability v or a high cost type βH with probability 1-v.  The 
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firm’s management can exert effort e but managerial utility declines as effort increases.  
The firm’s cost function is then given by: 
C(q) = F + (β - e)q  
Assume that F is known by the regulator and we normalize it to zero for simplicity.   The 
regulator cannot observe β or e, but can observe the firm’s actual production costs ex 
post.   Then the firm’s marginal cost is given by 
c  =  (β - e ) 
and the disutility of managers with respect to effort e  is defined as 
U = t - ψ(e)  where ψ’(e) > 0   
This function is known to the firm and to the regulator, but the regulator cannot observe e 
or U directly. 
Define: 
S(q) =  gross consumers’ surplus 
q  = D(p) = market demand curve for the product 
P = P(q)  = inverse market demand curve for the product 
R(q) = qP(q) = market revenue generated by the firm   
Laffont and Tirole (1993) allow the government to make financial transfers to the 
firm with a social cost of λ per dollar transferred, so that to transfer one dollar to the firm 
costs the government (and society) (1+ λ) dollars.  To keep the accounting straight we 
adopt Laffont and Tirole’s accounting convention.  All revenues from sales of the product 
go to the government and then the government reimburses the firm for its actual 
production costs plus an additional transfer payment that is greater than or equal to zero.  
Thus, the firm’s costs are covered (breakeven constraint is satisfied) and the (net) transfer 
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payment t must be large enough at least to compensate the managers for the disutility of 
effort to satisfy the participation constraint.  Then social welfare W is given by: 
W  =  V(q) - (1+λ)(C + t) + U     (24) 
  = V(q) – (1+λ)(C + ψ(e)) – λU 
where : 
V(q) = [S(q) – R(q)] + (1+ λ)R(q) 
  = S(q) + λqP(q) 
 
The full information benchmark is then derived as follows : 
Max W = S(q) + λqP(q) – (1+ λ)[(β - e)q + ψ(e)] – λU   (25) 
(e, q) 
 
s.t.  U > 0 
 
The first order conditions are: 
U = 0 [no rent left to the firm/managers, but participation constraint is   (26) 
 satisfied] 
 
ψ’(e) = q [marginal disutility of effort equals marginal cost savings from (27) 
 additional effort] 
 
 
P(q) + λP(q) + λqP’(q)  = (1+ λ)(β - e)  =  (1+ λ)c 
 
or 
 
(p(q) - c)/p(q) = [λ/(1+ λ)](1/η)  [Ramsey pricing]   (28) 
 
where η is the elasticity of demand for the product supplied by the regulated firm.  
Condition (28) requires some explanation.  It looks like the Ramsey pricing formula that 
we discussed earlier and, in a sense, it is.  However, here λ is not the shadow price of the 
firm’s budget constraint but rather the marginal cost of raising government revenues 
through the tax system and then distributing government revenues to the firm to cover its 
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costs and a transfer payment to compensate managers for their disutility of effort.  The 
optimal prices here serve a pure social allocation function that take into account the cost 
of using public funds to compensate the firm for its costs and managers for their disutility 
of effort.  These “Ramsey prices” are equivalent to adding the optimal commodity taxes 
to the marginal cost of supplying these services.  This is the essence of Laffont and 
Tirole’s separation of or dichotomy between “incentives to deal with moral hazard and 
adverse selection” and “prices” to deal with consumption allocational considerations. 
 To summarized, with full information, the regulator would compensate the firm 
for its costs and the manager’s disutility of effort leaving no rents to the firm (26).  It 
would also require the managers of the firm to exert the optimal effort e*, which in turn 
yields the optimal level of total and marginal costs (b).  Let q*(c) denote the solution to 
(27) and (28) and call it the Ramsey output.  Then P(q*(c)) is the Ramsey price. 
 Now we consider the characteristics of (second-best) optimal regulatory 
mechanism when there is asymmetric information.  Everything is common knowledge 
except the regulator cannot observe the firm’s type β or the quantity of managerial effort 
e expended.  In the most simple case, the regulator does know that the firm is either a 
high cost type with βL with probability v or a high cost type βH with probability (1-v).  
The attributes of the optimal regulatory mechanism are then derived by maximizing 
expected social welfare given the probability of each type subject to a firm viability 
constraint (U > 0) for each type and an incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that 
each type chooses the regulatory contract that is optimal given asymmetric information.  
Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that the binding incentive compatibility constraint is 
given by the low-cost type’s rent which in turn is determined by the high cost type’s 
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marginal cost.  Basically, the contract designed for the high cost type leaves no rent to the 
high-cost firm and its managers while the contract designed for the low cost type must 
leave  enough rent to the low cost type so that it does not choose the contract designed for 
the high cost type.  This rent is the difference in their realized marginal costs at the effort 
levels they choose given the contract they take up. 
 The expected welfare seen by the regulator is 
Max W  =  v[V(qL) – (1+λ)[βL – eL)q +ψ(eL)] -  λΦ(eH)]   (29) 
(UL, UH, qH,qL,eH,eL) 
   + (1-v)[V(qH) – (1+ λ)[ βH – eH)qH + ψ(eH)]] 
 
(subject to firm participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints) 
where Φ(⋅) is an increasing function of e = ψ(e) - ψ(e – (βH - βL)).  Maximizing expected 
welfare subject to the firm participation and incentive compatibility constraints yields the 
first order conditions are: 
qL = q*(βL- eL)           (30) 
ψ’(eL) = qL          (31) 
qH = q*(βH- eH)         (32) 
ψ’(eH) = qH – [λ/(1+ λ)][v/((1-v)] Φ’(eH)        (33) 
  
First order conditions (30) and (32) are simply the Ramsey quantities given the 
realization of marginal cost and the associated Ramsey prices are optimal for each type.  
That is, they are the same as under full information.  First order condition (31) shows that 
the optimal contract for the low-cost type will induce the low cost type to exert the 
optimal amount of effort as it would under full information.  First order condition (33) 
shows that the effort exerted by the high cost type will be less than optimal.  The firm 
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participation constraint is also binding for the high cost type (U = 0) but not for the low-
cost type (U > 0).  Thus, while the low cost type chooses the optimal amount of effort, it 
gains an information rent U > 0 = Φ(βH - βL).  The reason that the effort of the high cost 
type is optimally distorted from the full information optimal level is to reduce the rent 
that must be left to the low cost type to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint 
which is binding for the high cost type.  Reducing eH by a small amount has two effects.  
It reduces the disutility of effort and increases the cost of production.  The net effect on 
the firm’s unit cost, including managerial disutility of effort, is 1 - ψ(eH).  But this also 
reduces the rent that must be left to the low cost firm by Φ’(eH) to satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint.  So the expected increase in the net unit cost to the high cost 
firm are (1-v)(1+ λ)(1 - ψ(eH)) and the reduction in the unit cost of rent transfers to the 
low cost firm is vλΦ’(eL).  The amount of the distortion in eL is then chosen to equate 
these costs on the margin. 
The optimal regulatory mechanism involves offering the regulated firm a choice 
between two regulatory contract options.  One is a fixed price option that leaves some 
rent if the firm is a low-cost type but negative rent if it is a high cost type.  The second is 
a cost-contingent contract that distorts the firm’s effort if it is a high cost type but leaves 
it no rent.  The high powered scheme is the most attractive to the low-cost type and the 
low-powered scheme is the most attractive to the high cost type.  The expected cost of the 
distortion of effort if the firm is a high cost type is balanced against the expected cost of 
leaving additional rent top the firm if it is a low cost type --- the fundamental tradeoff 
between incentives and rent extraction. 
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The two-type example can be generalized to a continuum of types (Laffont and 
Tirole (1993, pp. 137ff).  Here we assume that β has a continuous distribution from some 
lower bound βL to some upper bound βH with a cumulative distribution F(β) and a strictly 
positive density f(β) where F is assumed to satisfy a monotone hazard rate condition and 
F(β)/f(β) is non-decreasing in β .  The regulator maximizes expected social welfare 
subject to the firm participation and incentive compatibility constraints as before and 
incentive compatibility requires a mechanism that leaves more rent to the firm the lower 
is its type β, with the highest cost type getting no rent, the lowest cost type getting the 
most rent and intermediate type’s rent defined by the difference in their marginal costs.  
Similarly, the effort of the lowest cost type is optimal and the effort of the highest cost 
type is distorted the most, with intermediate types having smaller levels of distortion (and 
more rents) as β declines toward βL.  In the case of a continuous distribution of types, the 
optimality conditions are directly analogous to those for the two-type case. 
 
q(β) = q*(β - e(β))  [Ramsey Pricing]     (34) 
Ψ’(e(β)) = q(β) - [λ/(1+ λ)][F(β)/f(β)]Ψ’’(e(β))     (35) 
 
Where (34) shows that Ramsey pricing is optimal given realized costs and (35) shows 
that effort is distorted as β increases to constrain the rents that are left to lower cost firms. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that these optimality conditions can be 
implemented by offering the firm a menu of linear contracts, which in their model are 
transfer or incentive payments in excess of realized costs (which are also reimbursed), of 
the form:  
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 t(β, c) = a(β) – b(β)c  
where a is a fixed payment, b is a cost contingent payment, and a and b are decreasing in 
β.   
We can rewrite the transfer payment equation in terms of the gross transfer to the firm 
including the unit cost reimbursement: 
 Rf = a(β) – b(β)c + c = a(β) + (1-b(β))c     (36) 
where da/db > 0   
(for a given β a unit increase in the slope of the incentive payment must be compensated 
by an increase in the fixed payment to cover the increase in production costs) 
and d2a/db2 < 0 
(the fixed payment is a concave function of the slope of the incentive scheme.) 
(See Figure 11)  The lowest cost type chooses a fixed price contract with a transfer net of 
costs equal to UL and the firm is the residual claimant on cost reducing effort (b = 1).  As 
β increases, the transfer is less sensitive to the firm’s realized costs (b declines) and the 
rent is lower (a declines).       
Note that if one were to try empirically to relate the firms’ realized costs to the 
power of the incentive scheme they had selected, a correlation between the power of the 
contract and the firm’s realized costs would not tell us anything directly about the 
incentive effects of higher-powered schemes in terms of inducing optimal effort and 
mitigating moral hazard problems.  This is the case because the firms with the lower 
inherent costs will rationally choose the higher powered contracts. Assume that we had 
data for regulated firms serving different geographic regions (e.g. different states) which 
had different inherent cost opportunities (a range of possible values for β).  If the 
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regulators in each state offered the optimal menu of incentive contracts, the low β firms 
would choose high powered contracts and the high β firms would choose lower powered 
contracts.  Accordingly, the effects of the mechanisms on mitigating the rents that would 
accrue to a low cost firm’s information advantage from the effects on inducing optimal 
effort are not easily distinguished.  I know of only one empirical paper that has 
endeavored to tackle this challenge directly (Gannepin and Ivalidi) and it is discussed 
further below. 
  c.1  The value of information 
This framework also provides us with insights into the value to the regulator of 
reducing her information disadvantage.  Consider the two-type case.  Let’s say that the 
regulator is able to obtain information that increases her assessment of the probability 
that the firm is a low cost type from v to vH.  If the regulator’s assessment of v increases 
there are two effects.  The first effect is that the rent left to the low cost type falls.  By 
increasing v, more weight in the social welfare function is placed on the realization of the 
firm being a low cost type and this increases the expected cost of rent transfers other 
things equal.  Similarly, the optimal distortion induced in the high-cost type increases 
since less weight is placed on this realization in the expected welfare function.  These 
intuitive results carry through for the continuous type case.  Overall, as the regulator’s 
information becomes more favorable as defined in Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 76-81), 
the higher is welfare even though for a given realization of β we will observe firm’s 
choosing (being offered) a lower powered incentive scheme.   This latter result, does not 
appear to be generalizable to models where there are no government transfers and where 
revenues the firm earns from sales must be relied upon entirely  to achieve both incentive 
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goals (adverse selection and moral hazard) and allocational goals (Armstrong, Cowing 
and Vickers (1994, pp. 39-43), Schmalensee (1989b).  Without government transfers as 
an instrument,  if the regulator’s uncertainty about firm types declines she will choose a 
higher powered scheme, because the budget balance constraint effectively becomes less 
binding, allowing the regulator to tolerate more variation in a firm’s realized net 
revenues. 
One way in which regulators can effectively reduce their information advantage is 
by using competitive benchmarks or “yardstick regulation” in the price setting process.  
Shleifer shows that if there are multiple non-competing but otherwise identical firms (e.g. 
gas distribution companies in firms in different states), an efficient regulatory mechanism 
involves setting the price for each firm based on the costs of the other firms.  Each 
individual firm has no control over the price it will be allowed to charge (unless the firms 
can collude) since it is based on the realized costs of (n-1) other firms.  So, effectively 
each firm has a fixed price contract and the regulator can be assured that the budget 
balance constraint will be satisfied since if the firms are identical prices will never fall 
below their “efficient” realized costs.  This mechanism effectively induces each firm to 
compete against the others.  The equilibrium is a price that just covers all of the firm’s 
efficient costs as if they competed directly with one another. 
Of course, it is unlikely to be able to find a large set of truly identical firms.  
However, hedonic regression, frontier cost function estimation and related statistical 
techniques can be used to normalize cost variations for exogenous differences in firm 
attributes to develop normalized benchmark costs (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001, 2003; 
Estache, Rossi, Ruzzier 2004).  These benchmark costs can then be used by the regulator 
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in a yardstick framework or in other ways to reduce its information advantage, allowing it 
to use high powered incentive mechanisms without incurring the cost of excessive rents 
that would accrue if the regulator had a greater cost disadvantage. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 84-86.) offer a simple model that characterizes the 
issues as stake here. Let’s say that the regulator is responsible for two non-competing 
firms (i = 1, 2) that each produce one unit of output supplied in separate geographic areas.  
Their costs are given by: 
Ci = βa + βi -  ei 
Where βa is an aggregate shock to both firms and βi is an idiosyncratic shock that is 
independent of βj and ei is firm i’s effort.  As before the firm’s rent is given by 
Ui - ψ(ei) 
and the regulator can observe only realized costs.  Each firm learns the realizations of its 
own shocks before choosing from the regulator contracts offered to it.  Laffont and Tirole 
develop several cases: 
Case 1:  In the case of purely idiosyncratic shocks (βa = 0), the firms are unrelated 
and we are back to the standard case where they must be regulated separately. 
Case 2:  In the case of purely aggregate shocks (βi = 0) the regulator can achieve 
the first best outcome by offering the firms only a fixed price contract based on their 
relative performance or “yardstick regulation.”  The transfer or incentive payment is then 
given by  ti = Ψ(e*) – (Ci – Cj).   Firm i maximizes { Ψ(e*) – [(βa – ei) – (βa – ej)]} - Ψ(ei) 
and chooses ei = e*. Since the other firm is identical it also chooses e*.  Neither firm 
earns any rents and they both exert the optimal amount of effort (they are identical).  By 
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filtering aggregate uncertainty out of each firm’s realized costs we can get to the first 
best. 
Case 3:  In the case of general shocks that cannot be separated into aggregate and 
idiosyncratic components, a mechanism can be designed that is based in part on relative 
performance that has superior welfare properties to the Laffont-Tirole menu of contracts 
c.2 Ratchet Effects or Regulatory Lag   
  So far, this analysis assumes the regulator establishes a regulatory contract once 
and for all.  This assumption is important for the results because it is assumed that the 
regulator can observe the firm’s realized costs ex post – a “ratchet.”  If the regulator then 
used this information to reset the firm’s prices, the firm would have a less powerful 
incentive to engage in cost reducing effort (Weitzman 1980).  More generally, as we 
discussed earlier, the behavior of a firm will depend on the information that its behavior 
reveals to the regulator ex post and how the regulator uses that information in subsequent 
regulatory reviews.  The effects of this kind of interaction between the regulated firm and 
the regulator can be captured in the Laffont-Tirole model in a straightforward manner 
(Laffont-Tirole, Chapter 9). 
Consider the two-type case again and ignore discounting.  The low cost type will 
choose the high powered incentive contract and will earn a rent of Φ(eH) until the 
regulator resets its prices to equal its realized costs at which time its rents will fall to zero.  
This is not incentive compatible.  The low cost type would do better by exerting less 
effort in the first period, reducing its disutility of effort, leading its realized production 
costs to increase, effectively mimicking the observable production costs expected by the 
regulator for the high cost type (effectively leading the regulator to believe incorrectly 
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that the low cost type is a high cost firm).  The low cost firm still earns rents in period 1, 
but through a lower disutility of effort.  Post-ratchet, the firm faces a fixed price set equal 
to its realized production costs in period 2 and can now exert optimal effort and earn rents 
again post ratchet by reducing its production costs.   
To restore incentive compatibility with a ratchet, the low-cost type would have to 
be given a larger rent in period 1, at least as large as the rent it can get in period 2 after 
mimicking the production costs of the high cost type in period 1.  However, if the first 
period rents are high enough, the high cost firm may find it attractive to choose the high 
powered incentive scheme in period 1 and then go out of business in period 2.  Laffont 
and Tirole call this the “take the money and run” strategy. 
These simple examples are obviously rather contrived.  However, we can find 
examples of them in the real world.  The regulatory mechanism utilized extensively in the 
UK since its utility sectors were privatized is effectively a fixed price contract (actually a 
price cap that adjusted for general movements in input prices and an assumed target rate 
of productivity growth --- a so-called RPI-X mechanism as discussed further below) with 
a ratchet every five (or so) years when the level of the price cap is reset to reflect the 
current realized (or forecast) cost of service (Beesley and Littlechild 1989; Brennan 1989; 
Isaac 1989; Sibley 1989; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994) .   It has been observed 
that regulated firms made their greatest cost reduction efforts during the early years of the 
cap and then exerted less effort at reducing costs as the review approached (OFGEM 
2004a, 2004b).  More generally, the examples make the important point that the dynamic 
attributes of the regulatory process and how regulators use information about costs 
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revealed by the regulated firm’s behavior over time have significant effects on the 
incentives the regulated firm faces and on its behavior (Gilbert and Newbery 1994). 
c.3 No government transfers 
How do the basic results developed with the Laffont-Tirole framework change if 
no government transfers are permitted?  Clearly, regulated prices alone must now serve to 
deal with adverse selection, moral hazard, and allocational issues.  The dichotomy 
between prices and incentives no longer holds.  However, the same basic attributes of 
incentive contracting continue to apply.  Focusing on linear pricing, it is optimal for the 
regulator to offer a menu of cost contingent price options --- cost sharing or sliding scale 
contracts --- where the attributes of the menu are chosen to balance the firms budget 
(production cost plus incentive payment) in a way that trades off rent extraction, effort 
incentives, and allocation distortions subject to participation and incentive compatibility 
constraints. (Laffont and Tirole 1993, pp. 151-153).  The lowest price in the menu is a 
fixed price designed to be chosen by the low-cost opportunity firm.  The price gives that 
firm high powered incentives to exert cost-reducing effort, but it also leaves the most rent 
to the firm and involves the greatest departure of price from marginal cost.  As we move 
to higher cost types the price increases as does the sensitivity of the price level to changes 
in costs.  Incentives for cost reducing effort decline as β increases, rents left to the firm 
fall, and prices are closer to the firm’s realized marginal cost, though this cost is too high 
due to suboptimal effort.   
d.  Price regulation when cost is not observable 
As noted earlier, the earliest modern theoretical work on incentive regulation 
(Baron and Meyerson 1982) assumed that the regulator could not observe costs at all, 
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could observe demand, and that there were no moral hazard problems.23  The regulator 
cares about rent extraction and must adhere to a firm participation or viability constraint.  
In this context, the regulatory problem is an adverse selection problem and cost 
contingent contracts are not available instruments since costs are assumed not to be 
observable.  I do not find this to be a particularly realistic characterization of regulation in 
many developed countries, but especially in developing countries, regulators often have 
difficulty getting credible cost information from the firms they regulate.  Moreover, 
accurate and meaningful cost measurement may be very difficult for multiproduct firms 
that have joint costs.  Accordingly, I will conclude this section with a brief discussion of 
this literature. 
Let us begin with Baron and Myerson (1982), using the development in Laffont 
and Tirole (1993, pp. 155-158).  Consider a firm that has cost 
C = βq 
where the regulator observes q, has a probability distribution over β, there is no moral 
hazard (e), and the firm receives revenues from sales at the regulated price P and a 
transfer payment t from the regulator.  The firm’s utility is now 
U = t + P(q)q – βq 
where P(q) is the inverse demand function.  Since cost is not observable, the regulator 
must rely on fixed price contracts (and accordingly if we added moral hazard the firm 
would have optimal cost-reducing incentives). 
                                                 
23 Loeb and Magat (1979) propose a mechanism where the regulator can observe the firm’s demand 
function and can observe price and quantity ex post.  The regulator does not care about the distribution of 
the surplus.  They propose a mechanism that offers the regulated firm a subsidy equal to the total consumer 
surplus ex post.  The firm then has an incentive to set price equal to marginal cost to maximize its profits.  
If the regulator cares about the distribution of income (rent extraction) it could auction of this regulatory 
contract in a competition for the market auction.  The mechanism then reduces to Demsetz’s franchise 
bidding scheme.  The latter raises numerous issues that are discussed above. 
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If the regulator had full information the optimal linear price would be the Ramsey 
price and the associated Ramsey output: 
   L = (p – β)/p = (λ/1+λ)(1/η)     (37) 
where λ is either the shadow cost of public funds with government transfers or the 
shadow price of the budget constraint when the firm must balance its budget from sales 
revenues and there are fixed costs to cover. 
With asymmetric information of the kind assumed here, the regulator will offer a 
menu of fixed price contracts that are distorted away from the Ramsey prices given β.  
The distortion for a given β reflects the tradeoff between the allocational distortion from 
increasing prices further above marginal cost and the cost of leaving more rent to the firm 
subject to the firm viability and incentive compatibility constraints. 
  L = (p(β) – β)/p(β) =   (λ/1+λ)(1/η) + (λ/1+λ)[(F(β )/(f (β)p(β)] (38) 
where F(β) and f(β) are as defined before and d[F(β )/(f β)]dβ > 0.  Prices clearly exceed 
the Ramsey level at all levels of β (compare (37) and (38)).  Absent the ability to use a 
cost-contingent reimbursement mechanism prices must be distorted away from their 
Ramsey levels to deal with rent extraction/adverse selection costs. 
 This analysis has been extended by Baron and Besanko (1984) to allow for 
random audits of the firm’s costs by the regulator, again in the absence of moral hazard.  
The firm announces its costs and prices ex ante and there is some probability that the firm 
will be audited ex post.  The result of the audit is a noisy measure of the firm’s actual 
costs.   After the audit the regulator can penalize the firm if it gets a signal from the audit 
that the firm’s actual costs are greater than its announced costs.  Absent moral hazard the 
optimal policy is to penalize the firm when the audit yields a measured cost that is low, 
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signaling the regulator that the firm’s costs are likely to be lower than the cost and 
associated price that the firm announced. (With moral hazard things are more 
complicated because one does not want to penalize the firm for cost-reducing effort).  
The threat that the firm’s announced costs will be audited reduces the price the firm 
charges, the rents it retains, and the allocational distortion from prices greater than 
costs.24 
e.  Pricing mechanisms based on historical cost observations 
 Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) have developed a mechanism that relies on 
observations of a regulated firm’s prices, output and profits to adjust the firm’s prices 
over time.  Their mechanism, as characterized by Laffont and Tirole (Laffont-Tirole, p. 
162-63), gives the firm a reward or bonus at each point in time defined by 
   Bt = a + (Пt - Пt-1) + (pt-1 – pt)qt-1    (39) 
where  Пt = (pt qt – C(qt)).  Basically, the mechanism rewards price reductions up to a 
point.  Think of pt as starting at the monopoly price.  If the firm leaves its price at this 
level it gets a bonus payment of a.  If it reduces its price in the second period, q will 
increase, profits will fall from t to t-1, but total revenue will increase since MR > 0 at the 
monopoly price.  The increase in revenue from the second term will exceed the reduction 
in profits from the first term, increasing net profit under the bonus formula when the price 
falls from the pure monopoly level and the bonus will be higher than if the firm left its 
price at the monopoly level.  The regulator is bribing the firm to lower its prices in order 
to reduce the allocative distortions from prices that are too high by rewarding it with 
some of the increases in infra-marginal consumers surplus resulting from lower prices.   
                                                 
24 Lewis and Sappington (1988a) extend this line of attached to assume that the firm has private 
information about demand rather than costs and extend the analysis (1988b)to assume private information 
about both demand and costs. 
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Finsinger and Volgelsang show that the firm has the incentive to continue to reduce its 
price until it reaches the Ramsey price.  However, if cost reducing effort is introduced, 
the cost-contingent nature of this mechanism leads to too little cost reducing effort 
(Sappington 1980; Laffont and Tirole 1993, pp. 142-145) offer a similar mechanism with 
better cost reducing incentives. 
 
IX.  MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PRICE AND ENTRY REGULATION 
Price and entry regulation may affect several interrelated performance indicia.  
These indicia include the level of prices, the structure of price charged to different groups 
of customers or for different products, prices for inputs paid by the regulated firm, the 
firm’s realized costs of production, firm profits, research and development activity, the 
adoption of product and process innovations, and the distribution of economic rents 
between shareholders, consumers and input suppliers.  To measure the effects of 
regulation one must first decide upon the performance norms against which regulatory 
outcomes are to be measured.  Candidate benchmarks include characterizations or 
simulations of fully efficient outcomes, hypothetical unregulated/competitive outcomes, 
and outcomes resulting from the application of alternative regulatory mechanisms.  The 
identification of benchmarks and, especially the use of alternative benchmarks for 
normative evaluation of the effects of regulatory mechanisms and processes, should be 
sensitive to the fact that fully efficient outcomes or perfectly competitive outcomes are 
unlikely to be achievable in reality.  Accordingly, what Williamson (1996, pp. 237-38) 
refers to as a remediableness criterion should be applied in normative evaluations.  That 
is, what is the best that can be done in an imperfect world? 
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  Once the relevant benchmarks have been identified there are several different 
empirical approaches to the measurement of the effects of price and entry regulation on 
various performance indicia. 
 1.  Cross-sectional/Panel-data analysis:  These studies examine the performance 
indicia for firms serving different geographic areas and subject to different intensities or 
types of regulation, typically measured over a period of more than one year.  For example 
studies may compare prices, costs, profits etc. for similar firms serving customers in 
different states under different regulatory regimes for a period of one or more years.  The 
classic study here is that of Stigler and Friedland (1962) where they examined differences 
in electricity prices between states with commission regulation and states without state 
commission regulation of electricity prices.  Or the cross-sectional variation may be 
between states that use different types of regulatory mechanisms (e.g. price caps vs. cost 
of service) or apply similar mechanisms more or less intensively (Mathios and Rogers 
1989).  The assumption in many of these studies is that the choice of whether to regulate 
or not is exogenous, so that cross-sectional data provide observations of “natural 
experiments” in the impacts of the effects of alternative regulatory mechanisms.  
However, several recent panel data studies recognize that the choice of regulatory 
instrument may be endogenous (e.g. Ai and Sappington, 2002, 2004). 
Natural or near-natural experiments that produce cross-section and time series 
variations in the nature or intensity of regulatory mechanisms can and have provided very 
useful opportunities to measure the effects of regulation, the effects of variations in the 
structure of regulatory mechanisms and the impacts of deregulation initiatives.  However 
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ensuring that one really has a meaningful natural experiment is always a challenge 
(Joskow 2005b). 
In principle, cross-country comparisons can be used in an equivalent fashion, though 
differences in accounting conventions, data availability, and basic underlying economic 
and institutional attributes make cross-country studies quite difficult.  Nevertheless, there 
has been increasing use of cross-country data both to evaluate the effects of regulation 
and to provide data to develop performance benchmarks that can be used by regulators 
(Carrington, Coelli and Groom, 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003).  
2.  Time series or “before and after” analysis:  These studies measure the effects of 
regulation by comparing various performance variables “before” and “after” a significant 
change in the regulatory environment.  Much has been learned about the effects of price 
and entry regulation by comparing firm and industry behavior and performance under 
regulation with the changes observed after price and entry regulations are removed.  Or it 
could be a shift from cost of service regulation to price cap regulation.  Here the 
challenge is to control for other factors (e.g. input prices) that may change over time as 
well and the inconvenient fact that regulation and deregulation initiatives are often 
phased in over a period of time and not single well defined events.  
3.  Structural Models and Policy Simulations:  These studies specify and estimate the 
parameters of firm and/or industry demand, firm costs, and competitive interactions (if 
any) to compare actual observations on prices, costs, profits, etc. with simulated prices 
under alternative regulated and unregulated regimes.  This is most straightforward in the 
case of legal monopolies.  With the demand and cost functions in hand, the optimal prices 
can be derived and compared to the actual prices.  Or industries where there are multiple 
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firms competing based on regulated prices, the actual prices can be compared to either 
optimal prices or “competitive” prices, once the nature of competitive interactions have 
been specified.  Related work measures the attributes of production functions and tests 
for cost minimization.  Still other work uses models of consumer demand to measure the 
value of new products and, in turn, the social costs of regulatory delays in the 
introduction.  Related work on process innovations can also be incorporated in a 
production function framework for similar types of analysis. 
 a.  Incentive Regulation in Practice   
 There is an extensive literature that examines empirically the effects of price and 
entry regulation in sectors in which there are (or were) legal monopolies to serve specific 
geographic areas (e.g. electricity, gas distribution, water, telephone) as well as in sectors 
in which prices and entry were regulated but two or more firms were given the legal 
authority to compete in the market (e.g. airlines, trucking, railroads, automobile 
insurance, natural gas pipelines).  Reviews of the pre-1990 literature on the measurement 
of the effects of regulation in both single and multi-firm settings can be found in Joskow 
and Noll (1981), Berg and Tschirhart (1988). Joskow and Rose (1989), Winston (1993, 
Joskow 2005b).25  I will focus here on the more recent nascent literature that examines 
the effects of incentive or performance based regulation of legal monopolies. 
 Although the theoretical literature on incentive regulation is fairly recent, we can 
trace the earliest applications of incentive regulation concepts back to the early regulation 
                                                 
25 See also Joskow (2004) 
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of the gas distribution sector26 in England in the mid-19th century (Hammond, Johnes, 
and Robinson, 2002).  A sliding scale mechanism in which the dividends available to 
shareholders were linked to increases and decreases in gas prices from some base level 
was first introduce in England in 1855 (Hammond, Johnes, and Robinson, 2002 p. 255).  
The mechanism established a base dividend rate of 10%.  If gas prices increased above a 
base level the dividend rate was reduced according to a sharing formula.  However, if gas 
prices fell below the base level the dividend rate did not increase (a “one-way” sliding 
scale).  The mechanism was made symmetric in 1867.  Note that the mechanism was not 
mandatory and it was introduced during a period of falling prices (Hammond, Johnes, 
and Robinson, 2002, pp. 255-256).  A related profit sharing mechanism (what Hammond, 
Johnes and Robinson call the “Basic Price System”) was introduced in 1920 that 
provided a minimum guaranteed 5% dividend to the firm’s shareholders and shared 
changes in revenues from a base level between the consumers, the owners of the firm and 
the firm’s employees.  Specifically, this mechanism established a basic price pb to yield a 
5% dividend rate.  This dividend rate was the minimum guaranteed to the firm. At the 
end of each financial year the firm’s actual revenues (R) were compared to its basic 
revenues Rb = pb times the quantity sold.  The difference between R and Rb was then 
shared between consumers, investors and employees, apparently subject to the constraint 
that the dividend rate would not fall below 5%.  Hammond, Johnes and Robinson (2002) 
use “data envelopment” or “cost frontier” techniques (Giannakas, Jamasb and Pollitt 
2004) to evaluate the efficiency properties of three alternative gas distribution pricing 
mechanisms used in England based on data for 1937.  While they find significant 
                                                 
26 This is before the development of natural gas.  “City gas” was manufactured from coal by local gas 
distribution companies.  At the time there were both private and municipal gas distribution companies in 
operation in England.  
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differences in performance associated with the different mechanisms, the linkage 
between the incentive structure of the different mechanisms and the observed 
performance is unclear.  Moreover, the analysis does not appear to account for the 
potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory mechanism applied to different firms.  
 In the early 20th century, economists took note of the experience with sliding scale 
mechanisms in England, but appear to have concluded that they were not well matched to 
the regulation of electricity and telephone service (and other sectors) where demand and 
technology were changing fast and future costs were very uncertain. (Clark, 1913)  As 
already discussed, cost of service regulation (with regulatory lag and prudence reviews) 
evolved as the favored alternative in the U.S., Canada, Spain and other countries with 
private (rather than state-owned) regulated monopolies and the experience in England 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries was largely forgotten by both regulators and 
students of regulation. 
 State public utility commissions began to experiment with performance based 
regulation of electric utilities in the 1980s.  The early programs were targeted at specific 
components of an electric utility’s costs or operating performance such as generation 
plant availability, heat rates, or construction costs (Joskow and Schmalensee 1986, 
Sappington, et. al. 2001).  However, formal comprehensive incentive regulation 
mechanism have been slow to spread in the electric power industry (Sappington et. al. 
2001), though rate freezes, rate case moratoria, price cap mechanisms and other 
alternative mechanisms have been adopted in many states, sometimes informally since 
the mid- 1990s.  Because of the diversity of these programs, the co-existence of formal 
and informal programs, and the simultaneous introduction of wholesale and retail 
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competition and related vertical and horizontal restructuring initiatives (Joskow 2000), it 
has been difficult to evaluate the impact of the introduction of these incentive regulation 
mechanisms in the electric power sector.  Rose, Markowicz, and Wolfram (2004) 
examine aspects of the operating performance of regulated generating plants during the 
period 1981-1999 and find that the threat of the introduction of retail competition led to 
improvements in various indicia of generating plant performance.   
 Beginning in the mid-1980s a particular form of incentive regulation was 
introduced for the regulated segments of the privatized electric gas, telephone and water 
utilities in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and portions of Latin American as well as in 
the regulated segments of the telecommunications industry in the U.S.27   The mechanism 
chosen was the “price cap” (Beesley and Littlechild 1989; Brennan 1989; Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers 1994; Isaac 1991).  In theory, a price cap mechanism is a high-
powered “fixed price” regulatory contract which provides powerful incentives for the 
firm to reduce costs.  Moreover, if the price cap mechanism is applied to a (properly) 
weighted average of the revenues the firm earns from each product it supplies, the firm 
has an incentive to set the second-best prices for each service (Laffont and Tirole 2000; 
Armstrong and Vickers 1980). 
 In practice, price cap mechanisms apply elements of cost of service regulation, 
yardstick competition, high power “fixed price” incentives plus a ratchet.  Moreover, the 
regulated firm’s ability to determine the structure of prices under an overall revenue cap 
is typically limited. Under price cap regulation the regulator sets an initial price po (or a 
vector of prices for multiple products).  This price (or a weighted average of the prices 
                                                 
27 The U.S. is behind many other countries in the application of incentive regulation principles, though their 
use is spreading in the U.S. beyond telecommunications. 
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allowed for multiple products) is then adjusted from one year to the next for changes in 
inflation (rate of input price increase or RPI) and a target productivity change factor “X.”  
Accordingly, the price in period 1 is given by: 
 
p1 = po (1+ RPI – X)     (40) 
 
Typically, some form of cost-based regulation is used to set po.  The price cap mechanism 
then operates for a pre-established time period (e.g. 5 years).  At the end of this period a 
new starting price  and a new X factor are established after another cost-of-service and 
prudence or efficiency review of the firm’s costs. That is, there is a pre-scheduled 
regulatory-ratchet built into the system.   
Several things are worth noting about price cap mechanisms since they have 
become so popular in the regulatory policy arena.  A pure price cap without cost-sharing 
(a sliding scale mechanism) is not likely to be optimal given asymmetric information and 
uncertainty about future productivity opportunities.  Prices would have to be set too high 
to satisfy the firm participation constraint and too much rent with be left on the table for 
the firm.  The application of a ratchet from time to time that resets prices to reflect 
observed costs is a form of cost-contingent dynamic regulatory contract.  It softens cost-
reducing incentives but extracts more rents for consumers. 
Although it is not discussed too much in the empirical literature, price cap 
mechanisms are typically focused on operating costs only, with capital cost allowances 
established through more traditional utility planning cost-of-service regulatory methods.  
In addition, it is widely recognized that a pure price cap mechanism provides incentives 
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to reduce both costs and the quality of service.  Accordingly, price cap mechanisms are 
increasingly accompanied either by specific performance standards and the threat of 
regulatory penalties if they are not met or formal PBR mechanisms that set performance 
standards and specify penalties and rewards for the firm for falling above or below these 
performance norms (OFGEM 2004b, 2004d; Sappington 2003; Ai and Sappington 2004; 
Ai, Martinez and Sappington 2004). 
 A natural question to ask about price cap mechanisms is where does “X’ (and 
perhaps po) come from (Bernstein and Sappington 1999)?  Conceptually, assuming that 
RPI is a measure of a general input price inflation index, X should reflect the difference 
between the expected or target rate of total factor productivity growth for the regulated 
firm and the corresponding productivity growth rate for the economy as a whole and the 
difference between the rate of change in the regulated firm’s input prices and input prices 
faced by firms generally in the economy.  That is, the regulated firm’s prices should rise 
at a rate that reflects the general rate of inflation in input prices less an offset for higher 
(or lower) than average productivity growth and an offset for lower (or higher) input 
price inflation.  However, the articulation of this conceptual rule still begs the question of 
how to calculate X in practice.    
In practice, the computation of X has often been fairly ad hoc.  The initial 
application of the price cap mechanism by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to AT&T’s intercity and information services used historical productivity growth 
and added an arbitrary “customer dividend” to choose an X that was larger than the 
historical rate of productivity growth.  In England and Wales and some other countries, 
benchmarking methods have come to be used to help to determine a value for X (Jamasb 
 161
and Pollitt, 2001, 2003) in a fashion that is effectively an application of yardstick 
regulation.  A variety of empirical methods have been applied to identify a cost efficiency 
frontier and to measure how far from that frontier individual regulated firms lie.  The 
value for X is then defined in such a way as to move the firms to the frontier over a pre-
specified period of time (e.g. five years).  These methods have recently been expanded to 
include quality of service considerations (Giaanakis, Jamasb and Pollitt 2004). 
 The extensive use of periodic “ratchets” or “resets to cost” along with price cap 
mechanisms reflect the difficulties of defining an ideal long-term value for X and the 
standard tradeoffs between efficiency incentives, rent extraction and firm viability 
constraints.  These ratchets necessarily dull incentives for cost reduction.  Note in 
particular that with a pre-defined five year ratchet, a dollar of cost reduction in year one 
is worth a lot more than a dollar of cost reduction in year four since the cost savings are 
retained by the firm only until the next reset anniversary (OFGEM 2004b). 
  Most of the scholarly research evaluating the effects of incentive regulation have 
focused on the telecommunications industry (Kridel, Sappington and Weisman, 1996; 
Tardiff and Taylor 1993; Crandall and Waverman 1995; Braeutigam, Magura and Panzar 
1997; Ai and Sappington 2002, Banerjee 2003).  Ai and Sappington’s study is the most 
recent and comprehensive.  They examine the impact of state incentive regulation 
mechanism applied to local telephone companies between 1986 and 1999 on variables 
measuring network modernization, aggregate investment, revenue, cost, profit, and local 
service prices.  The methodological approach involves the use of a panel of state-level 
observations on these performance indicia, state regulatory regime variables and other 
explanatory variables.  Instrumental variables are used to deal with the endogeneity of the 
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choice of regulatory regime and certain other explanatory variables so that the fixed-
effects estimates are consistent.  Ai and Sappington (2002) find that there is greater 
network modernization under price cap regulation, earnings sharing regulation, and rate 
case moratoria (effectively price cap regulation with RPI + X = 0), than under rate of 
return regulation.  Variations in regulatory mechanisms have no significant effects on 
revenue, profit, aggregate investment, and residential prices, and except for rate case 
moratoria, on costs.   Crandall and Waverman (1995) find lower residential and business 
prices under price cap regulation than under rate of return regulation but other forms of 
incentive regulation do not yield lower prices. Tariff and Taylor (1993) use similar 
methods and find similar results to Ai and Sappington (2002). Brauetigam, Magura and 
Panzar (1997) find lower prices under some types of price cap regulation but not under 
other form of incentive regulation.   
 Sappington (2003) reviews several studies that examine the effects of incentive 
regulation on the quality of retail telecommunications service in the U.S.   These studies 
do not lead to consistent results and for many dimensions of service quality there is no 
significant effect of variations in the regulatory regime applied.  Ai, Martinez and 
Sappington (2004) also examine the effects of incentive regulation on service quality for 
a state-level panel covering the period 1991 through 2002.   They find that incentive 
regulation is associated with significantly higher levels of service quality compared to 
rate of return regulation for some dimensions of service quality (e.g. installation lags, 
trouble reports, customer satisfaction) and significantly lower levels of service quality in 
other dimensions (e.g. delays in resolving trouble reports, percentage of installation 
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commitments met).  Banerjee (2003) provides a related empirical analysis of the effects 
of incentive regulation on telephone service quality. 
 Systematic research on the effects of incentive regulation in other industries is 
limited.  Newbery and Pollitt (1997) argue that the incentive regulatory mechanisms 
applied to electric distribution companies in England and Wales during the first half of 
the 1990s led to significant efficiency improvements. Significant savings associated with 
the application of price cap and other incentive mechanisms to electricity distribution and 
transmission have also been noted by regulators in the U.K. (OFGEM 2004a, 2004b). 
Rudnick and Zolezzi (2001) examine the changes in several dimensions of productivity in 
the liberalized electricity sectors in Latin America during the 1990s and find significant 
improvements in these productivity indicia.  Bacon and Besant-Jones (2000) provide a 
broader assessment of the effects of privatization, market liberalization and regulatory 
reform of electricity sectors in developing countries, indicating more mixed results. 
However, it is hard to know how much of these observed cost reductions is due to the 
incentive regulation mechanisms and how much to privatization. Estache and Kouasi 
(2002) examine the diverse performance effects of alternative governance arrangements 
on African water utilities and Estache, Guasch and Trujillo (2003) analyze the effects of 
price caps and related incentive provisions on and the renegotiation of infrastructure 
contracts in Latin America.   
 Gagnepin and Ivaldi (2002) examine the effects of incentive regulatory policies 
on public transit systems in France using data on a panel of French municipalities over 
during the period 1985-93.  This is a particularly interesting paper because the empirical 
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analysis is embedded directly in a structural model of optimal regulation a la Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) discussed above.   
Since 1982 local public transport (buses, trams) in France has been decentralized 
to the municipalities.  The municipalities own the rolling stock and infrastructure but 
contract out the operation of the systems to private operators in 80% of the cases (there 
are three private operators in the country which also provide other municipal services).  
Fares (P) do not produce enough revenue to cover the total costs incurred by the 
operators so there are transfer payments from the government to the operator to satisfy 
break-even constraints (the treatment of the costs of municipal-owned infrastructure in 
the analysis is a little unclear, but they are not paid directly by the operator).     
Private operators are given either “cost-plus” (CP) contracts or “fixed price” (FP) 
contracts.  The former cover observed costs and ex post deficits.  The latter cover 
expected costs and expected deficits.  In 1995, 62% of the operators had fixed price 
contracts and 25% cost-plus contracts.  The rest were operated by the municipalities or 
are not in the data base for other reasons.  The contracts have a duration of one year and 
municipalities apparently never switch operators during the sample period.  The analysis 
focuses on the larger municipalities with more than 100,000 population (excluding Paris, 
Lyon, Marseilles, which were not included in the data set) and relies on a panel data set 
for 59 municipalities over 1985-93 period on input costs, output, network infrastructure.  
 The paper includes the following empirical analyses:  (a) estimates the parameters 
of a cost function (structural model) for urban public transport that treats the effects of 
regulation on costs under asymmetric information as endogenous given the type of 
contract each system is place upon;  (b) estimates the parameters of the distribution of the 
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“labor inefficiency” parameter θ and the cost of effort function give assumptions about 
the form of these functions (e.g. a beta distribution for θ) and the cost function (Cobb-
Douglas technology);  (c) estimates the level of inefficiency θi and effort (ei) of each 
urban transport system given the cost function’s parameters, the estimated parameter of 
the cost of effort function and the regulatory contract they have been placed upon; (d) 
estimates the implied cost of public funds given the cost function parameters, the 
parameters of a demand function for public transport (see appendix)  and the form of the 
contract each transport operator has been given assuming that the municipality sets the 
optimal fare (Ramsey) given demand, costs, and each municipality’s cost of public funds 
λ and; (e) calculates the optimal regulatory contract (second-best under asymmetric 
information  a la Laffont-Tirole) for each system given the cost of public funds and its 
inefficiency parameter and the welfare gains from doing so. 
These analyses leads to several conclusions including: (a) there are economies of 
scale in urban transport; (b) there is a large variation in the efficiency parameters for 
different networks; (c) for the lowest θ group the cost distortions (difference in efficiency 
between a fixed price and a cost plus contract) are not significantly different between the 
FP and CP contracts, for the intermediate θ the difference in cost distortions is about 4%, 
and for the highest θ group  there is a lot of inefficiency even with a FP contract, but FP 
contracts reduce costs significantly (mix of CP and FP contracts); (d) cost of public funds 
varies from .17 to .56 across municipalities and (e) optimal second best (Laffont-Tirole) 
contracts improve welfare significantly compared to cost plus contracts, but not 
compared to fixed price contracts.  
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Research measuring the effects of regulation and deregulation on the speed of 
introduction of new services and technologies in telecommunications also make it clear 
that dynamic considerations are extremely important from a social welfare perspective 
(Hausman 1997; Crandall and Hausman 2000).  Hausman (1997) estimates the costs of 
FCC delays in the introduction of voice messaging service and cellular telephone service 
by estimating the structural parameters of consumer demand and the value to consumers 
of new goods.  The basic method is to estimate the effect of the introduction of a new 
good on real consumer income and then to perform a counterfactual analysis to measure 
the costs foregone by regulatory delays in introducing the product.  He finds that 
regulatory and court delays led voice messaging to be introduced 5 to 7 years later than it 
would have been without these delays.  He finds as well (see also Hausman 2002, 2003) 
that FCC regulatory delays led to cellular telephone being introduced 7 to 10 years later 
than would have been the case without these delays.  The social costs of these delays are 
estimated to be about $6 billion and $30 billion in 1994 dollars respectively.  Hausman 
(2002) also finds that other regulatory restrictions on mobile service competition led to 
significantly higher prices for mobile services. 
Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) examine the effects of incentive 
regulation on the deployment of digital technologies by local telephone carriers.  Recent 
work by Thomas Hubbard has shown how new technologies adopted by post-
deregulation trucking firms have both served to improve service quality and to improve 
productivity and lower costs (Hubbard 2001, 2003).  Regulation of prices and entry prior 
to deregulation in 1980 inhibited the diffusion of these kinds of technologies in a number 
of different ways, though the precise impact of regulation per se has not been measured. 
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Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) find significant consumer benefits from the entry of direct 
broadcast satellite to compete with cable TV, but limited effects on the cable firms’ marker 
power.  
 It is clear that the social costs of delaying product and process innovations can be 
very significant.  Both theoretical and empirical research has probably focused too much 
on static welfare effects associated with the impacts of regulation on prices and costs in 
the short run and too little research has focused on the effects of regulation on the 
adoption and diffusion of product and process innovations. 
 
X.   COMPETITIVE ENTRY AND ACCESS PRICING 
 The firms in many industries that have been subject to price and entry regulation 
have organizational structures that involve vertical integration between production of 
complementary services at different levels of the production chain.  For example, in most 
countries, electric power companies historically evolved with governance structures 
where generation, transmission, distribution and retail marketing of electricity where 
vertically integrated (Joskow 1997).  However, there are also thousands of small 
municipal and cooperative distribution utilities that purchase power from third parties 
(typically proximate vertically integrated utilities) which they then resell to retail 
consumers to whom they provide distribution (delivery) service in their franchise areas.  
In many countries natural gas producers also own natural gas pipelines that transport 
natural gas from where it is produced to where it is distributed in local consumption 
areas.  Telephone companies historically provided both local and intercity services and, 
in the U.S., the vertical integration extended into the production of telephone network 
equipment and customer premises equipment.    
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These industries likely evolved with these structures in response to economies of 
vertical integration (Joskow 1997).  However, to the extent that the economies of vertical 
integration led to the integration of a production segment with natural monopoly 
characteristics with a production segment without natural monopoly characteristics, the 
effect of vertical integration is to extend the natural monopoly to the potentially 
competitive segments as well.  For example, the transmission and distribution of 
electricity have natural monopoly characteristics.  However, there are numerous 
generating plants in each region of the U.S. , suggesting that the generation of power may 
be potentially competitive (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983; Joskow 1997).  Vertical 
integration effectively extends the natural monopoly over transmission and distribution to 
generation when firms in the industry are vertically integrated, extending the boundaries 
of regulation and its complexities and potential imperfections.  Alternatively, two or more 
vertically integrated segments may once have had natural monopoly characteristics as 
well as economies of vertical integration, but technological change may have changed the 
characteristics of the underlying technology at one or more levels of the vertical chain to 
make it potentially competitive.  For example, microwave, satellite, and radio technology, 
as well as the diffusion of cable television, have changed the economic attributes of both 
the supply and demand for intercity and local telecommunications services dramatically. 
 The bundling of multiple supply segments (or products), one or more of which 
does not have natural monopoly characteristics and is potentially competitive, into a 
single firm subject to price and entry regulation naturally leads to a number of questions 
and issues. Would better performance be achieved by separating the potentially 
competitive segments from the natural monopoly segments and removing price and entry 
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regulation from the competitive segments?  Are the benefits of potentially imperfect 
competition in these segments greater than the lost cost savings from vertical integration 
(if any)?  Or should we allow the incumbent regulated firm to continue to offer both sets 
of services, but allow competitive entry into the potentially competitive segments so that 
entering firms can compete with the incumbent?  If we take this approach when and how 
do we regulate and deregulate the prices charged by the incumbent for competitive 
services?  How do we know that competitive entry will take place because lower cost 
suppliers have incentives to enter the market rather than by price distortions resulting 
from decades of regulation?  Should limits be placed on the ability of regulated firms to 
respond to competitive entry to guard against predatory behavior?  Is structural separation 
necessary (divestiture) or is functional separation with line of business restrictions to deal 
with potential cross-subsidization of by regulated services by regulated services and 
behavior that disadvantages competitors sufficient to foster efficient competition?   These 
issues are especially challenging in many regulated industries because access to the 
natural monopoly segments (e.g. the electric transmission network) is necessary for 
suppliers in the competitive segment (e.g. generating plants) to compete.   Such networks 
are often referred to as “essential facilities” or “bottleneck facilities,” though these terms 
have been abused in the antitrust policy context.   
 The terms and conditions under which competitive suppliers can gain access to 
the incumbent’s monopoly network when the incumbent is also a competitor in the 
competitive segments has been the focus of considerable research in the last decade as 
previously regulated vertically integrated firms in several regulated industries are 
“restructured” to separate natural monopoly network segments from competitive 
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segments and price and entry regulation relaxed in the competitive segments (Vickers 
1995; Laffont and Tirole 2000; Baumol and Sidak 1994; Vogelsang 2003).  If the access 
prices are set too low, inefficient entry may be encouraged.  If access prices are set too 
high they will serve as a barrier to entry to competitors who are more efficient than the 
entrant or encourage inefficient bypass of the network to which access is sought.  When 
prices for regulated services are partially based on realized costs, cost allocations 
between regulated and unregulated services becomes an issue as well since the incumbent 
may be able to subsidize the costs of providing competitive services by hiding some of 
them in the cost of service used for determining regulated prices.  Access pricing issues 
also arise when the incumbent network operator’s business is restricted to regulated 
network services only, but the nature of the distortions is different as long as all 
competitors are treated equally.   
a.  One-way network access 
Much of the access pricing literature initially evolved in the context of the 
development of competition in the supply of intercity communications services and the 
interconnection of competing intercity networks with regulated monopoly local telephone 
networks which originate and terminate intercity calls. I will focus on 
telecommunications examples here, following the development in Laffont and Tirole 
(2000).  Conceptually similar issues arise in electricity and natural gas as well, though the 
technical details are different (Joskow 2004).  There are two kinds of services.  The first 
is provision of “local network” service which is assumed for now to be a natural 
monopoly and subject to price and entry regulation.  The second service is intercity 
service which allows for transmission of voice and data signals between local networks in 
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different cities, is supplied by the incumbent and is being opened to potential 
competitors.  The incumbent is assumed to be vertically integrated into both the provision 
of local exchange services and the provision of intercity services and the prices for both 
services are assumed to be regulated.  For a competitive intercity supplier to enter the 
market and compete with the incumbent it must be able to gain access to the local 
network in one city to originate calls and to gain access the local network in the other city 
to complete the calls.  The entrant is assumed to provide its own intercity facilities to 
transport the calls between local networks but relies on the regulated monopoly 
incumbent to provide local connection services on the local origination and termination 
networks.  See Figure 12. 
 
Let: 
 qo = quantity of local calls sold at price po 
 q1 = quantity of incumbent’s long distance calls at price p1 
 q2 = quantity of entrant’s long distance calls at price p2 
 
Q = qo + q1 + q2  = total calls 
 
fo = fixed cost of the local network 
co  = cost of originating or terminating a local call 
c1 = incumbent’s cost of a long distance call 
c2 = entrant’s cost of a long distance call 
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Convention:  Every local or long distance call involves one origination and one 
termination on the local network.  Each local network has a marginal cost per call of co so 
the marginal cost to use local networks to originate and complete a call is 2co . 
Incumbent’s costs: fo + 2co(qo + q1 + q2) + c1q1 
Entrant’s costs:   c2q2 + aq2 = c2q2 + (p2 – c2)q2 
where “a” is the access price the entrant must pay to the incumbent for using its local 
network facilities (one origination and one termination per long distance call)  
Assume that the entrant has no market power so it sets its price for intercity calls 
equal to the marginal cost it incurs, including the price it is charged for access to the 
incumbent’s local access.  The entrant’s price for long distance service p2 must be (it 
passes along marginal costs with no additional markup): 
   p2 =  a + c2 
and 
           a = p2 – c2 
(A useful way to think about this is that the incumbent “subcontracts” with the entrant to 
supply the entrant’s long distance service at cost.) 
The incumbent’s profits on the provision of local, long distance and “access 
service” are then given by: 
π(po,p1,p2)  =  (po – 2co)qo 
+ (p1 – c1 – 2co)q1 
+ (p2- c2- 2co)q2 
-   fo 
(where p2 – c2 = a) 
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Assume that So(po) and S1(p1,p2) give the net  consumers’ surpluses for local and 
long distance and recall that the derivative of the net surplus with respect to a prices is 
(minus) the corresponding quantity.  Assume as well that the incumbent is regulated and 
is subject to a breakeven constraint.  Then the optimal prices po, p1, and p2 (and “a”) are 
given by: 
 
Max          { So(po) + S1(p1,p2) + π(po,p1,p2)}      (41) 
(po,p1,p2) 
 
S.T.  π(po,p1,p2) > 0 
 
This is just a familiar Ramsey pricing problem and yields the following familiar 
conditions where λ (> 0) is the shadow cost of the budget constraint and the ηi are price 
superelasticities that account for cross-price effects when there are goods that are 
substitutes or complements: 
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Note that if there were no fixed costs fo, the optimal price would be equal to marginal 
cost and the access price “a” would equal 2co.  However, with fixed costs, the access 
price includes a contribution to these fixed costs.  The optimal Ramsey access price a = 
p2 – c2   (Laffont and Tirole (1996, 2000, pp. 102-103) then follows from the formula 
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  a = 2C0 + λ/(1+ λ)(p2/η2) 
This can be rewritten (Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996) as 
  a = 2C0 + λ/(1+ λ)(p2/ε2) + δ(p1 – 2C0 – C1)    (45) 
where  ][
2
2
2
1
p
q
p
q
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=δ  is the change in the sales of the incumbent divided by the change 
in sales of the competitive entrant and ε2 is the own-price elasticity of demand without 
accounting for cross-price effects .  The Ramsey access price “a” is set above marginal 
cost and therefore contributes to the incumbent’s fixed costs.  It is composed of two 
components.  The first is the standard Ramsey price equation.  The second allows for the 
substitution between the incumbents sales of network services and its loss of retail sales 
to the competitive entrant. 
According to Willig (1979) the appropriate access price is given by a = p1 – c1 or 
the difference between the incumbent’s retail price for long distance calls and the 
marginal or avoided cost of supplying these calls (see also Baumol and Sidak 1994; 
Baumol, Ordover and Willig 1997).  This rule is often referred to as the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule or ECPR.  It has been argued that this rule has a number of 
desirable features including:  (a) potential entrants can enter profitably if and only if they 
are more efficient than the incumbent; since a + c2 = p1 – (c1 – c2), only a cost advantage 
will lead to entry; (b) entry is neutral regarding operating profit for the incumbent since it 
still gets the same profits on sales of “access” as it does on retail sales.  Incumbent does 
not have incentive to destroy entrant; (c) entry does not interfere with existing cross-
subsidies and is not “unfair” to the incumbent; (d) if entrants do not have lower costs 
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there will be no entry and (e) if entrants have lower costs the incumbent will be driven 
from the retail market and will supply only “access.” 
Laffont and Tirole (1994, 2000) and others point out a number of problems with the 
ECPR.  They include:  (a) ECPR is a “partial rule” in the sense that it does not tell us how 
p1 should be set optimally.  It takes p1 as given.  However, given that regulators are 
unlikely to have set second-best efficient prices as competition emerges, this may be a 
very practical real world approach; (b) ECPR is implied by Ramsey pricing only under a 
restrictive set of assumptions.  These assumptions are equivalent to assuming that there is 
full symmetry between the incumbent and the potential entrant in the sense that they have 
equal costs of providing intercity services (c1 = c2), that they face symmetrical demands 
in the intercity (competitive) segment, and that the entrants have no market power.  In 
this case since a = p2 – c2, the combination of p1 = p2 and c1 = c2 implies that a = p1 – c1 
which is the efficient component pricing rule; (c) ECPR gives the wrong access price for 
competitive services that are differentiated products rather than being identical to the 
product produced by the incumbent.   
To illustrate this last point, assume that the competitors have the same costs by 
different demands   
q1 = a1 – bp1 + dp2 
q2 = a2 – bp2 +dp1  
where a1 > a2 (brand loyalty/less elastic demand) and b > d. 
 In this case is can be shown that the access price should be lower than ECPR: 
 
 a < p1 – c1 and p1 > p2 
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The reason is that the optimal price for the incumbent is higher than the optimal price for 
the entrant because the incumbent has a less elastic demand: 
 p1 > p2  
The access price (for an intermediate good) must be lower to keep p2 from rising above 
its optimal level.  In this case, if the incumbent has lower costs than the entrant the access 
price should be higher than ECPR.  The logic is the same in reverse.  The optimal prices 
are p1 < p2. 
 The ECPR is also not efficient if entrants have market power.  If the entrants have 
market power they will mark up the access price when they set the retail price leading to 
a classic double marginalization problem (Tirole (1988), Chapter 4). When there is 
competitive entrant with market power, the optimal access prices is the ECPR level 
minus the competitor’s unit markup m: 
 
  a = p1 – c1 – m 
 
 Finally, the entrant may be able and willing inefficiently to bypass the 
incumbent’s network if the access price is greater than its own cost of duplicating the 
network.  The regulator can respond to this problem by setting access charge lower than 
the incumbent’s entry cost.  But this increases the incumbent’s access deficit and the 
incumbent would than have to increase prices further for captive customers. In principle 
the regulator could charge low access price and then levy an effective  excise tax on the 
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competitor’s sales to cover the access deficit, but such an instrument may not be available 
to the regulator. 
These considerations suggest that setting the optimal access price requires 
consideration of many other aspects of the industrial organization of the potentially 
competitive sector which may not be consistent with the assumptions that lead to the 
ECPR.   The optimal access prices reflect standard Ramsey pricing considerations, the 
relationship between wholesale access prices and the incumbent’s retail sales, 
differentiated product and double marginalization (vertical market power) considerations, 
and imperfect competition in the potentially competitive segment.  Setting the optimal 
access prices clearly places very significant information and computational burdens on 
regulators.   
Laffont and Tirole (1996, 2000) suggest that a superior approach to setting access 
prices is to apply a global price cap to the regulated firm that includes “network access” 
as one of the products included in the price cap.  If the weights in the price cap formula 
are set “properly” (equal to the realized quantities from optimal pricing) then the 
regulated firm will have the incentive to price all of the services covered, including 
pricing “access” to the network at the optimal Ramsey prices that take all of the relevant 
costs and super-elasticities into account.  They recognize, however, that finding the 
optimal quantities also creates a significant information and computational burden on 
regulators.  In addition, applying a price cap mechanism in this way may enhance 
incentives for the incumbent to adopt a predatory pricing strategy that leads to an access 
price that is set too low, with the lost net revenue partially recouped in the short run by 
increasing prices for other regulated services and in the long run by inducing competitors 
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to exit the market.  Accordingly, they suggest that a global price cap be combined with a 
rule that the access price can be no lower than the difference between the incumbent’s 
retail price and its avoided cost or its “opportunity cost” of sales lost to the incumbent (a 
< p1 – c1). 
b.  Introducing local network competition 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress determined that competition should be opened up for 
providing local networ services as well as intercity services. That is, it adopted a set of 
policies that allowed competitors to offer local telephone services in competition with the 
incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs).  The Competitive Local Exchange Carriers 
(CLECs) could compete by building their own facilities (as a cable television network 
might be able to do) or by leasing the facilities owned by the ILEC.  The argument was 
that while there were opportunities for facilities-based competition at the local network 
level, there were likely to be components of the local network that had natural monopoly 
characteristics (e.g. the “last mile” from the local exchange to the end-user’s premises).  
At the very least, it would take time for facilities based competitors to build out a 
complete network.  This is not the place to go into the complex issues associated with 
local service competition, but this policy required regulators to set regulated prices at 
which competitors could gain access to the local loop.  Accordingly, a brief discussion of 
the issues associated with the regulated pricing of “unbundled network elements” is in 
order (Laffont and Tirole 2000; Crandall and Hausman 2000). 
 Following the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC required ILECs to offer 
to lease pieces of their networks (network elements) to CLECs.  In addition to requiring 
interconnection of networks so that all termination locations could be reached on any 
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network, the FCC concluded that it would also require ILECs to lease individual network 
elements to CLECs. The FCC decomposed ILEC networks into a complete set of 
“Network Elements” and required the ILECs to lease each and every element to CLECs 
requesting service “at cost.” (See Hausman 1999; Crandall and Hausman 2000)  For 
example, RCN has built its own local fiber optic network providing cable TV, telephone 
and high-speed internet service in portions of Boston and Brookline.  It is interconnected 
to Verizon’s local telephone network so that RCN subscribers can reach on-net and off-
net locations and vice versa.  If RCN also wanted to offer service to potential subscribers 
in, say, Cambridge , but building its own network there is uneconomical, it could then 
lease all of the network elements on Verizon’s Cambridge’s network at “cost-based” 
wholesale prices, and begin offering service there as if it were its own network.  At that 
time, the FCC thought that this was the best way to promote local service competition.  
This policy leads to a number of questions, only two of which I will discuss briefly 
here.28  
 What is the right regulated price for network elements?  The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) uses an engineering model of a local telephone 
network and estimates of the current cost of equipment and maintenance to build an 
“optimal network” and then to estimate the “forward looking long run incremental costs” 
for each network element (TELRIC).  This approach has a number of shortcomings: (a) 
The underlying engineering model is at best an imperfect representation of real telephone 
                                                 
28 Other questions include:  If RCN is simply buying service on Verizon’s network at wholesale prices 
(including connects and disconnects, network maintenance, etc.) and then reselling these services under it’s 
brand name, what is the social value added from making this competition possible?  “Retail service” costs 
are very small. If an ILEC must lease any and all of its facilities to competitors “at cost,” how does this 
affect its incentives to invest on its network in general, and in particular, to invest in new technologies for 
which it must compete with other firms? 
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networks; (b) the cost calculations fail properly to take into account economic 
depreciation of equipment and lead to current cost estimates that are biased downward. 
(See Hausman 1999, 2003); (c) the cost calculations fail to take into account the 
interaction between the sunk cost nature of telecom network investments and uncertainty 
over future demand, equipment prices, and technical change.  This also leads to a 
significant underestimate of the true economic costs of short-term leasing arrangements.  
The FCC leasing rule effectively includes an imbedded option.   The CLEC can take the 
service for a year and then abandon it if a cheaper alternative emerges or continue buying 
at wholesale until a better alternative does emerge (if the ILECs instead could sell the 
network elements to the CLECs at their installation cost rather than offer the service on 
short-term leases, this would solve this problem).  (Hausman 1999; Hausman and Myers 
2002; Pindyck 2004); (d) wholesale network element prices determined by the TELRIC 
rules are substantially below the ILECs actually regulated costs.  This is not surprising 
since the regulated costs are based on traditional “depreciated original cost ratemaking” 
techniques and reflect historical investments that were depreciated too slowly.  This 
creates stranded cost problems for the ILECs and potential distortions in demand for 
“new network elements” rather than equivalent “old network elements.”  Unlike the 
situation in electricity and natural gas sector reforms, where regulators have recognized 
and made provisions for stranded costs recover, this issues has largely been ignored in the 
U.S. in the case of telecom reform; and (e) these rules reduce ILEC incentives to invest in 
uncertain product service innovations.  The FCC rules ignore the cost of “dry holes.”  
CLECs can buy new successful services “at cost,” compete with the ILEC for customers 
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for these services, and avoid paying anything for ILEC investments that are unsuccessful 
(Crandall and Hausman 2000; Pindyck 2004). 
 All of these considerations suggest that TELRIC underprices network elements.  
Moreover, competitive strategies of CLECS may be driven more by imperfections in 
FCC pricing rules than by their ability to offer cheaper/better products. Nevertheless, 
there has been only limited successful CLEC competition except for business customers 
in central cities. 
c.  Two-way access issues 
Opening up the local loop to competition raises another set of interesting pricing 
issues that arise when there are two (or more) bottleneck networks which (a) need to 
interconnect (cooperate) with one another to provide retail services and (b) may compete 
with one another for customers.  Such situations include (a) overlapping LECs which 
require interconnection; (b) internet networks which exchange data traffic; (c) credit card 
associations, and (d) international telephone calls where networks at each end must 
exchange traffic.  These situations create a set of “two-way access” pricing problems. 
What are the most efficient access pricing arrangements to support interconnection 
between the two (or more) networks and what institutional arrangements should be relied 
upon to determine threes prices?  Regulation, cooperation, non-cooperate competitive 
price setting?  There are a number of policy concerns: (a) cooperation may lead to 
collusion to raise prices at the level where the networks compete (e.g. retail calling); (b) 
non-cooperative access pricing may fail to account properly for impacts on other 
networks; and (c) inefficient access prices may increase entry barriers and competition 
(Laffont and Tirole 2000; Laffont, Rey and Tirole  1998a, 1998b). 
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  The literature on two-way access pricing is closely related to the growing and 
much broader literature on “two-sided markets” (Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2004), though 
he precise definition of what is included within the category “two-sided markets” is 
somewhat ambiguous.  However, many markets where network platforms are 
characterized by network externalities are “two-sided” in the sense that the value of the 
network platforms depends on getting buyers and/or sellers on both sides of the market to 
use them effectively through pricing arrangements and market rules.  The value of a 
credit card to consumers depends on its broad acceptance by retailers.  The value of a 
telephone network depends on the number of consumers who can be reached (to call or 
be called) on it or through interconnection with other telephone networks.  The value of a 
bank’s ATM network to its depositors depends on their ability to use other ATM 
networks to get cash from their bank accounts.  A discussion of the literature on two-
sided markets in beyond the scope of this chapter.  However, to identify the issues at 
stake I will briefly discuss the nature of the access pricing issues that arise absent price 
regulation when multiple networks serve consumers who in turn value reaching or being 
reached by consumers connected to the other networks.  While these kinds of problems 
may be solved by regulation, the more typical solution is for the network participants and 
the networks to negotiate access pricing arrangements and market rules to deal with the 
potential inefficiencies created by network externalities and market power. I will follow 
Laffont-Tirole (2000) to identify some of the issues at stake in this literature.   
Consider a situation where we have a city served by two local telephone networks 
which we can call the A and B networks (Wieman and Levin 1994).  Customers are 
connected to one network or the other and all customers need to be able to call any other 
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customer whether they are on the same network or not.   Laffont and Tirole’s (2000) 
analysis of this situation adopts two “conventions.” (a)  The calling company’s network 
pays a (per minute) termination (access) charge “a” to the termination company’s 
network and can bill the caller for this charge.  The receiving customer does not pay a 
termination charge for the call (this is known as a “caller pays” system; and (b) retail 
prices are unregulated so that networks are free to charge whatever they conclude is profit 
maximizing for sales to final consumers.  The question is whether competition is likely to 
lead to efficient competition absent any regulatory rules.  
Assume that there are 100 consumers each connected to a separate independent 
network who call each other.  Each network sets it own access charge for terminating 
calls to it. The originating network incurs marginal cost c to get the call to the network 
interface and then a termination charge ai to the receiving network. Assume that each 
originating network sets a retail price equal to c plus the average of the termination 
charges of the 99 networks to which it interconnects (no price differences based on the 
location of the termination network).  In this case, the impact of an increase in ai on the 
average termination price originating callers pay to call network i is very small.  In this 
case each network has an incentive to charge high access charges because the perceived 
impact on the volume of calls that it will receive is small.  All networks set access fees 
too high and the average access fee passed along to consumers by the calling networks is 
too high.  This in turn leads to high retail prices and too little calling. 
This result is most striking for a large number of networks and no network 
specific price discrimination.  However, Laffont and Tirole (2000) show that similar 
results emerge when there are only two networks which have market power.  Consider 
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the case of international calls.  There are two monopolies (one in each country) and each 
sets a termination charge that applies to calls received from the other.  Since each is a 
monopoly whatever the access charge is chosen by the other, this will get “marked up” by 
the local monopoly leading to a double marginalization problem. (Laffont and Tirole, 
(2000), Box 5.1).   
It should be obvious as well that if two networks which compete intensely 
(Bertrand) with one another at retail cooperated in setting their respective access prices 
that they could agree on high access prices, increasing the perceived marginal cost at 
retail and the associated retail prices.  The monopoly profits would then reside at the 
wholesale (access business) level rather than the retail level.  Basically, it is profitable for 
each network to increase its rivals costs so that market prices rise more than do the firm’s 
costs (Ordover, Salop and Saloner 1990).  Accordingly, both non-cooperative and 
cooperative access pricing can lead to excessive retail prices.  In the context of a simple 
duopoly model with competing firms selling differentiated products and the of joint costs, 
Laffont and Tirole (2000) derive the access prices that would result if the firms compete 
Bertrand, derive the Ramsey prices for this demand and cost structure and show that the 
access prices that result from Bertrand competition are two high.  Indeed, the socially 
optimal access/termination charge lies below the marginal cost of termination while the 
(imperfectly) competitive access price lies above the marginal cost of termination.  When 
fixed costs are added to the model, the relationship between the competitive prices and 
the second-best optimal prices is ambiguous. The results can be further complicated by 
introducing asymmetries between the competing firms.  Various extensions of these 
models of non-cooperative and cooperative access pricing have recently appeared in the 
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literature.  While one might make a case for regulation of access prices in this context, 
computing the optimal access prices in a two-way access situation would be extremely 
information intensive and subject to considerable potential for error. 
 
XI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 For over 100 years economists and policymakers have refined alternative 
definitions of natural monopoly, developed a variety of different regulatory mechanisms 
and procedures to mitigate the feared adverse economic consequences of natural 
monopoly absent regulation, and studied the effects of price and entry regulation in 
practice.  The pendulum of policy toward real and imagined natural monopoly problems 
has swung from limited regulation, to a dramatic expansion of regulation, to a gradual 
return to a more limited scope for price and entry regulation.  Natural monopoly 
considerations became a rationale for extending price and entry regulation to industries 
that clearly did not have natural monopoly characteristics while technological and other 
economic changes have erased or reduced the significance of natural monopoly 
characteristics that may once have been a legitimate concern. However, the adverse 
effects of economic regulation in practice led scholars and policymakers to question 
whether the costs of imperfect regulation were greater than the costs of imperfect 
markets.  These developments in turn have led to the deregulation of many industries 
previously subject to price and entry regulation, to a reduction in the scope of price and 
entry regulation in several other industries, and to the application of better performance-
based regulatory mechanisms to the remaining core natural monopoly segments of these 
industries. 
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 After the most recent two decades of deregulation, restructuring, and regulatory 
reform, research on the regulation of the remaining natural monopoly sectors has three 
primary foci.  First, to develop, apply and measure the effects of incentive regulation 
mechanisms that recognize that regulators have imperfect and asymmetric information 
about the firms that they regulate and utilize the information regulators can obtain in 
effective ways.  Second, to develop and apply access and pricing rules for regulated 
monopoly networks that are required to support the efficient expansion of competition in 
previously regulated segments for which the regulated networks continue to be an 
essential platform to support this competition.  Third, to gain a better understanding of 
the effects of regulation on dynamic efficiency, in terms of the effects of regulation on 
the development and diffusion of new services and new supply technologies.   These 
targets of opportunity are being addressed in the scholarly literature but have been 
especially slow to permeate U.S. regulatory institutions.  Successfully bringing this new 
learning to the regulatory policy arena is a continuing challenge.  
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